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. The Korematsu Conundrum
The evil that men do lives after them;
The good is oft interredwith their bones.
William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar'

Brown v. Board of Education2 is justifiably hailed as the herald "of
effective enforcement of civil rights in American law" and as "the watershed

constitutional case of the [twentieth] century."3 Indeed, Brown is arguably

"the most important decision in the history of the Court."4 But the origins of
the Warren Court's civil rights jurisprudence predate Brown by more than a
decade. In a very real sense, those origins stem from Earl Warren's career in
California politics. The attack on Pearl Harbor shattered the longstanding
belief, in California as in the rest of America, that "war always comes to
someone else."5 On February 2, 1942, Attorney General Warren announced
his belief that Americans of Japanese descent were organizing a "fifth

column" campaign against the United States.6 Within two weeks, President
Roosevelt, Congress, and the United States military set into motion the legal
machinery that culminated in orders to curfew, evacuate, and detain all
1.
WunjAM SHAKESPEARE, JiuIs CAESAR, act 3, so. 2, il. 76-77, in THE OXFORD
SHAKEsPEARE: THE COMPLETE WoRKs 1089, 1107 (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds., 1994).
2.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. BERNARD SCHWARTZ,AHISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 286 (1993). See generally
RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROwN v BOARD OF EDUCAT7ON AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALTY (1976); JAMES T. PATrERSON, BROWN V BOARD
OFEDUCATION. A CIVIL RIGHTs MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY (2001); Dennis J.
Hutchinson, UnanimityandDesegregation:Decisionmakinginthe Supreme Court,1948-1958,
68 GEo. L.J. 1, 34-44 (1979); S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J.
POL. 689 (1971). At a minimum Brown was the leading case of the twentieth century. See
generally HUGH W. SPEER, THE CASE OF THE CENTURY: A HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL
PERSPECTIVE ON BROWN v BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA, WITH PRESENT AND FrURE
IMPLICATIONS (1993).
4.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 286 (quoting Justice Stanley Reed, who added that
Brown, if not the most important decision in the Court's history, was at least "very close"). But
see EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977) (describing Baker v. Carr,369
U.S. 186 (1961), as "the most important case of my tenure on the Court"). On Baker v. Carr,
see generally Ouy-Uriel Charles, ConstitutionalPluralismandDemocraticPolitics: Reflections
on the InterpretiveApproach ofBaker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
5. JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 480 (Penguin 2002) (1952).
6. See Problems of Evacuationof Enemy Aliens and Othersfrom ProhibitedMilitary
Zones: Hearingson H. Res. 113 Before the Select Comm. Investigating National Defense
Migration, 77th Cong. 11,011-12 (1942) (Warren's testimony regarding the threat posed by
Japanese Americans); MORTON GRODZINS, AMERICANS BETRAYED: POLITICS AND THE
JAPANESE EVACUATION 94 (1949) (describing Warren's fear of an attack by Japanese
Americans); JOHN D. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA 105 (1967) (same).
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persons of Japanese descent inthe Pacific states. Even as U.S. military forces
secured the Pacific theater, Governor Warren advocated the continued
operation of the detention camps, lest freshly released saboteurs unleash "a
second Pearl Harbor in California."7 Under Warren's administration,
California joined Oregon and Washington in an amicus brief urging the
Supreme Court to prolong the detention of the Issei and Nisei.'
And so Earl Warren came to link himself most ignominiously with
one of the most embarrassing chapters in American race relations.9 But the
fuiture Chief Justice's entanglement supplies merely a fragment of this
scandal's jurisprudential significance. In the Hirabayashil°and Korematsu"
cases, the Supreme Court made several curious legal maneuvers in defense of
the wartime curfew, evacuation, and detention orders. Decoding the doctrinal
conundrum presented by these cases holds the key to critical elements of the
Warren Court's jurisprudence regarding the definition and enforcement of
civil rights by the federal government.
Just how did equal protection principles come into play in
Hirabayashiand Korematsu? Those cases declared, at least as a nominal
matter, that racial classifications in federal law should draw intense judicial
suspicion. 2 But a decade would elapse before Boling v. Sharpe3 formally
equated the federal government's obligations under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment with the states' obligations under the Equal
Protection Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Of course, Korematsu was
neither the first nor the last instance of premature adjudication. The United
States Reports abound with outlandish constitutional pronouncements that
came well before their time. How would American constitutional law look if
7.

WEAVER, supra note 6, at 109.

8.
ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 157-58(1997).
9.
See generally, e.g., PETER IRONS, JuSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1983); JusTIcE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE

AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (Peter Irons ed. 1989); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases - A Disaster,54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945). See also RABBrr IN THE MOON (New
Day Films 1999) (motion picture documentary criticizing the Supreme Court's decisions in the

internment cases).
10. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
11. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
12. See id. at 216 (stating that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect"); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 (noting the
"odious" nature of "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry").
13. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).

14.

See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in

public schools is a "denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution").
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Mitchum v. Foster5 had predated Younger v. Harris,6 if the Supreme Court
had reached Geduldig v. Aiello 7 before Roe v. Wade,"8 or if Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo9 had preceded Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC?2" Could the revival of Article IV privileges-and-immunities analysis in
the Camden government contracting case2 have prevented the adulteration of
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine in the so-called "Mayor White" case?'
Might the straightforward application of Batson v. Kentuck? to white
criminal defendants in Powers v. Ohio24 have forestalled the Sixth
Amendment decision of Hollandv. Illinois?25 For the moment at least, let us
consign such speculation to the realm of science fiction. 2' The concrete
doctrinal puzzle at hand is fantastic enough in its own right.
As Justice Stevens is fond of observing in other contexts, "there is
only one.. . Equal Protection Clause."27 From Reconstruction through the

15. 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
16. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
17. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
18. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on
Autonomy and Equality inRelation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985)
(suggesting that the right to abortion should have been framed as a question of equal
protection).
19. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
20. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
21.
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
22. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
23. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
24. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding that a white criminal
defendant has standing to challenge the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors of a
different race and that, under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), peremptory challenges
must give way "to the command of racial neutrality").
25.
See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 476-77 (1990) (explaining that under Batson,
the Equal Protection Clause forbids the use of peremptory challenges to eliminate jurors of the
defendant's own race, whereas the Sixth Amendment guarantees a venire that is a "fair cross
section" of the community).
26. See generallySymposium, The Sound ofLegal Thunder: The ChaoticConsequences
of CrushingConstitutionalButterflies, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 483 (1999) (contemplating what
would be different today if key cases in constitutional history had been decided differently).
27. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 246 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 514 n.,5 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); cf Bd. of Educ. v. Orumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("There is, after all, only one
Establishment Clause, one Free Speech Clause, one Fourth Amendment, one Equal Protection
Clause.").

COME BACK TO THE NICKEL AND FIVE

1207

beginning of World War II, the Supreme Court consistently recognized that
the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains no equal protection
clause.2' Indeed, the Constitution of 1787 and the Bill of Rights both omit all
derivatives of the word "equal."29 During the same Term in which the Court
heard the first of its cases concerning the wartime treatment of Japanese
Americans, the Justices declared that this key textual difference between the
Bill of Rights and the Reconstruction Amendments strips citizens of any
"guaranty against discriminatory legislation by Congress."30 Whenever
Congress made allegedly unequal "choices" in exercising its powers to lay and
collect taxes, to regulate commerce among the several states, or to wage war,
the Court treated "the question [as] one of wisdom and not of power." 31 That
the Fourteenth Amendment alone contained an Equal Protection Clause
minimized judicial discretion to hold the federal government to a norm of
nondiscrimination: "If this latitude of judgment is lawful for the states, it is
lawful, afortioi, in legislation
by the Congress, which is subject to restraints
32
less narrow and confining.
Hirabayashi and Korematsu recognized but did not attempt
meaningfully to bridge the gap between Fifth Amendment due process and
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. Chief Justice Stone's opinion for
the Court in Hirabayashiobserved that "[t]he Fifth Amendment contains no
equal protection clause and... restrains only such discriminatory legislation
by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process. '33 In his concurring
opinion, Justice Murphy acknowledged the textual difference between the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments but insisted that '"here may . . . be
discrimination of such an injurious character in the application of the laws as
to amount to a denial of due process. "' A year later, Justice Murphy's
Korematsu dissent explicitly argued that a military order effecting "an obvious
racial discrimination . . .deprives all those within its scope35of the equal
protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment."
28. E.g., Helvering v. Lemer Stores Corp., 314 U.S. 463,468 (1941); Currin v. Wallace,
306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,584 (1937); La
Belle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377,392 (1921).
29. Cf GARRYWnHLS, LNCOLNAT GETTYSBURG 145 (1992) (observing how Lincoln and
other Americans of the Civil War era noticed the absence ofthe word "equality" from what was
then the Constitution).
30. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943).
31.
Cumn, 306 U.S. at 14.
32. Steward, 301 U.S. at 584.
33.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
34. Id. at 112 (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
35.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,234-35 (1944) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting).
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The Hirabayashimajority repelled the charge of discrimination by
adopting a level of scrutiny that modem eyes would recognize as rational
basis review. Arguing that a potential Japanese "attack on our shores... set
these citizens apart,"3' 6 Chief Justice Stone considered it "enough that
circumstances within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility

for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for [their]
decision."37 He explicitly upheld Congress's discretion to "hit at a particular

danger where it is seen, without providing for others which are not so evident
or so urgent."3 Though Korematsu nominally directed courts to treat "all
legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group [as]
immediately suspect,"39 the Court ultimately refused to frame the controversy

in terms "of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers
which were presented."40
Despite having become one of the most despised cases in the
constitutional canon,4 Korematsu is routinely cited for the proposition that
facial classifications based on race, whether embodied in state law or adopted
by the federal government, merit strict judicial scrutiny.42
Quite
36. Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 101.
37. Id. at 102.
38. Id. at 100.
39. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
40. Id. at 223.
41. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I am
optimistic enough to believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhartwill be assigned its rightful
place in the history of this Court's jurisprudence beside Korematsu and DredScott [v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856)]."); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564 n.12 (1990)
(comparing Korematsu with "South African apartheid" and "the 'separate-but-equal' law at
issue in" Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (listing Korematu among "the most extreme reminders that
when we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency,
we invariably come to regret it"); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
215 n.* (1995) (acknowledging congressional redress of the "grave injustice [that] was done to
both citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry by the evacuation, relocation,
and internment of civilians during World War II" (quoting Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-383, § 2(a), 102 Stat. 903, 903 (1988))); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 345 n.30
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the "reluctance to rely on Korematsu" as a basis
for excusing the government from conducting "a case-by-case determination as to whether...
an infringement" of personal liberty is "in fact necessary to effect the Government's compelling
interest in national security"); cf Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging Hirabayashi and Korematsu's exceptional status as cases
upholding racial classifications); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 339 & n.20 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (same).
42. E.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,216-17 (1995); Rowland v.
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extraordinarily, Korematsu has been cited as an interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment in general43 and of the Equal Protection Clause in
particular.44 At an extreme, the Court has identified Korematsu as the
"apparent[]... genesis" of the doctrine under which "classifications... based

upon 'suspect'
criteria" of any sort must "be supported by a 'compelling'
4
interest."
These assertions cannot bear even casual scrutiny.

Neither

Hirabayashinor Korematsu made a credible effort to overcome the serious
textual barrier to equating Fifth Amendment due process with Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection. The Fourteenth Amendment, after all, also
protects persons from the official deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. That "the Due Process Clause appears in both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, whereas the Equal Protection Clause does
not," makes it "quite clear that the primary office of the latter differs from, and
' Far from
is additive to, the protection guaranteed by the former."46
warranting
aggressive constitutional reinterpretation, the inclusion of due process in the

Fourteenth Amendment kept the meaning of that phrase "practically... the
same as it" had been under the Fifth, "except so far as the amendment may
place the restraining power over the States in this matter in the hands of the

Mad River Local Sch. Dist, 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 113 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting);
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290-91 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.); Moore
v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 551 (1977) (White, J., dissenting); Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495, 504 & n.10 (1976); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351,357 & n.3 (1974) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 & n.9 (1973) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 & n.64 (1973)
(Marshall, J.,dissenting); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326 & n.5 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73 & n.22 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 & n.5 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1969); Harper v. Va.
State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92
(1964). See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal
Protection, 55 N.C. L.REv. 541, 554 (1977) ("In case after case, fifth amendment equal
protection problems are discussed on the assumption that fourteenth amendment precedents are
controlling.").
43. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 639 & n.7 (1969) (Stewart,
J.,
dissenting).
44. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
45. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), overruled
in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
46. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 n.17 (1976); see also Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 213 (1995) (conceding that the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause "is not as explicit a guarantee of equal treatment as the Fourteenth
Amendment") (emphasis omitted).
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Federal government."47 To equate due process with equal protection would
render the latter phrase mere surplusage within section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4 Notwithstanding Chief Justice John Marshall's admonition
' the maxim expressio unius est
that "it is a constitution we are expounding,"49

exclusio alteriussometimes governs concise formulations of fundamental law
as well as prolix legal codes. Nor do the words "due process" of their own

force embrace the concept of equality. The "more or less vague"
constitutional formulation of "due process, originally meaning 'according to
the law of the land,' would be a highly inappropriate provision on which to

rely to invalidate a 'law of the land' enacted by Congress under a clearly
granted power."50

Finally, it defies belief that the framers of the Bill of

Rights, who undoubtedly knew and intended the original Constitution's
separate and unapologetically unequal treatment of different races,"1 could
have intended the concept of due process to embrace a norm of racial
nondiscrimination.
As attorney general and governor of California, Earl Warren fanned
the flames of anti-Japanese prejudice. However "poignantly" he might have
come to regret "his vehement - even rabid - support" for the resettlement
order,52 Warren in the episode's immediate aftermath never mentioned "his
own role in bringing on the evacuation." 3 Before writing his memoirs, he
never apologized publicly. 4 During his first Term as Chief Justice of the
47. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 80 (1873).
48. Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 391 (1821) (refusing to adopt a
constitutional interpretation that would render portions of Article MII"mere surplusage");
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (observing that "[ilt cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect" and disfavoring
interpretations that would render constitutional phrases "mere surplusage, entirely without
meaning").
49. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.).
50. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 277-78 (1964) (Black,
J., concurring).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (distinguishing between "free Persons," "Indians not
taxed," and "all other Persons" for purposes of congressional apportionment and direct
taxation); id. art. I, § 9, cl. I (permitting the unfettered "Migration or Importation of such
Persons" - namely, slaves - "as any of the States [then] existing shall think proper to admit...
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight"); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 407-27 (1856) (examining previous indications that different races are not equal),
supersededby U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
52. JACK HARRISONPOLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JuDaEWHO CHANGED AMERICA 79
(1979).
53. CRAY, supra note 8, at 159.
54. See WARREN, supra note 4, at 149 ("I have since deeply regretted the removal order
and my own testimony advocating it, because it was not in keeping with our American concept
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United States Supreme Court, however, Warren began formulating what
would prove to be his response to the constitutional conundrum (if not the
moral crisis) presented by Korematsu. Part II of this Article describes that
effort and identifies it as an essential component of what became the Warren
Court's three-pronged approach to the definition and enforcement of civil
rights by the federal government. The Warren Court's civil rights consensus
rested on three foundations: (1) the use of Fifth Amendment due process to
bind the federal government to the sort of limitations imposed on the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause; (2) the expansion of
Congress's power to enforce the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) the continuation of the New Deal's
understanding of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce.
Part III describes how the Burger Court, despite extending its
predecessor in numerous and often surprising ways, ultimately undermined the
Warren Court's civil rights consensus. The Burger Court's decisions did not
accomplish this transformation by direct attack, for the Warren Court's
visions of Fifth Amendment due process, section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Commerce Clause all survived the appointment of
Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice. Rather, affirmative action, the product of
a profoundly cynical maneuver by President Richard Nixon, achieved
indirectly what President Nixon's judicial appointments never delivered.
Part IV describes the sudden and final collapse ofthe Warren Court's
civil rights consensus in a three-Term span during the Rehnquist Court. At
the heart of the contemporary Supreme Court's initiative to revitalize judicial
review of federal legislative power lie two landmark cases, the 1995 Lopez
decision 5 and the 1997 City of Boerne decision,56 that in turn dismantled the
Warren Court's Commerce Clause and section 5 jurisprudence. Just in time
to mark Congress's repudiation of the Japanese internment episode, the
Rehnquist Court has reduced the Warren Court's civil rights legacy to a single
prong: the "reverse incorporation" of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
obligations against the federal government through Fifth Amendment due
process. Ironically, the Rehnquist Court's adherence to this principle has
demolished Justice Brennan's final effort to realign the constitutional status
of race-conscious legislation in favor of a group-based vision of equal
protection.

of freedom and the rights of citizens."); see also CRAY, supra note 8, at 159 n.* (stating that
Warren, before writing his 1974 memoirs, "never apologized publicly for advocating the
evacuation").
55. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
56. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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Part V attributes the implosion of the Warren Court's civil rights
vision to the weakness of its doctrinal formulations. In particular, the Warren
Court's insistence upon equivalence in judicial review of racial classifications
under federal and state law could not coexist with its vision of congressional
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. The simple pursuit of a
magisterial, ethically appealing vision of "Equal Justice Under Law" would
eventually unravel the Warren Court's legacy in the administration ofjustice.
H. The Nickel andFive
And thou shalt teach them ordinances and laws, and shalt show
them the way wherein they must walk, and the work that they must
do.
Exodus 18:20"
How Earl Warren moved from "the comer pocket" in the capitol in
Sacramento5 8 to the center seat on the Supreme Court bench is the stuff of
legend.59 Though familiar, that legend is rarely given legal significance except
insofar as Warren's performance as Chief Justice supposedly prompted
President Eisenhower to call Warren's appointment "the biggest damned-fool
mistake I ever made.""'
I shall recount the legend in order to stress the
intensely political origins of Earl Warren's judicial career. Chief Justice
Warren shepherded the Supreme Court from the first year of the Eisenhower
administration to the dawn of the Nixon administration, but only because his
Republican rivals had frustrated his presidential ambitions. Despite those
modest origins, Earl Warren's subsequent judicial career converted his
accession as Chief Justice into a jurisprudentially transformative moment in

its own right.6"
57. Exod. 18:20 (King James).
58. See WEAVER, supra note 6, at 115 (describing "the governor's corner suite in the
[California] Capitol" as "'the comer pocket'").
59. So much for the usual rule that "Californians travel horribly." STEVEN VARNI, THE
INLAND SEA 146 (Perennial 2001) (2000) (fictional novel in which the protagonist leaves the
warmth of California's central valley for winter in the Midwest and is told, in anticipation of
the seasonal and cultural changes that await him, that "Californians travel horribly").
60. Compare ELMO RICHARDSON, THE PRESIDENCY OF DWIGHT D. EIsENHOWER 108
(1979) (describing this statement as Eisenhower's reaction to Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S.
483 (1954)) with CRAY, supra note 8, at 337 (describing Eisenhower's outburst as his reaction
to the "Red Monday" cases decided on June 17, 1957: Watins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957)). See also Irving R. Kaufman, Keeping Politics Out of the Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
9, 1984, § 6, at 72, 87 (describing President Eisenhower's unhappiness with Chief Justice
Warren's performance).
61. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Transformative Appointments, 101 HARV. L. REV.
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Having taken tentative steps toward national office in 1944 and 1948,62
including service as New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey's running mate on
the 1948 Republican ticket,63 Warren emerged as a dark-horse candidate for
President during the 1952 campaign.6 4 Too poorly financed to challenge
former General Dwight D. Eisenhower and Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio in
much of the country, Warren slumped to the Republican National Convention
with faint hopes of emerging as a compromise candidate in the unlikely event
of a stalemate between Eisenhower and Taft.65 Warren clutched seventy-six
crucial delegates, including the seventy votes of the California delegation.'
He hoped to hold his delegates "while Robert Taft and Dwight Eisenhower
scrambled for votes among the remaining uncommitted."6 7 Before the
convention, "Warren issued a last disavowal of any cabinet or Supreme Court
appointment in exchange for [his] seventy-six convention votes."s
Meanwhile, however, Senator Richard M. Nixon of California had
secured his own vice-presidential candidacy in the event Eisenhower won the
nomination.69 By surreptitiously "lead[ing] the delegation into the Eisenhower
camp," Nixon undermined Warren's efforts to remain "a serious candidate"
rather than "a kingmaker."7 With the nomination in the balance, a desperate
Taft offered Warren "anything [he] wanted," including the vice-presidency.71
Warren rebuffed the overture. Instead, he cast California's seventy votes in
favor of a procedural rule that effectively awarded seventy-eight disputed
southern votes to Eisenhower.7 2 Taft never recovered. He tried to recruit yet
1164 (1988) (treating presidential efforts to make historic judicial appointments as a unique
constitutional phenomenon).
62. See POLLACK, supra note 52, at 5-6 (describing Warren's 1948 vice-presidential
candidacy and his refusal in 1944 to join the Republican ticket as Dewey's running mate).
63. CRAY, supra note 8, at 187-93.
64. See id. at 226 (quoting son Earl Warren, Jr.: "My father realized ... he's riding a
dark horse, or at least a pretty gray one").
65. See id. at 227-28 (discussing Warren's service as a vice-presidential candidate).
66. In addition to California's seventy delegates, Warren won six delegates in the
Wisconsin primary and none in the Oregon primary. Warren campaigned only in these three
states. See id. (describing Warren's failure to extend his campaign beyond the California state
line).
67. Id. at 229.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 230-32; see also WEAVER, supra note 6, at 181-82 (describing how Nixon's
flirtation with Eisenhower violated his oath under California law to honor his delegate's
statement of preference favoring Warren).
70. CRAY, supranote 8, at 232.
71. Id. at239.
72. See id. at 240 (describing how the so-called Fair Play Amendment proposed by
Eisenhower's campaign switched thirty-nine Texas, Georgia, and Louisiana delegates from Taft
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another Californian,
senior Senator William Knowland, as his running mate,
but to no avail. 3 The Minnesota delegation, including Warren E. Burger, "cast
the votes that put . .. Eisenhower over the top. ''7 4 Having secured the
nomination, Eisenhower fulfilled his promise to tap Nixon for the vicepresidency." For his part, "Warren loyally fell into line" and "campaign[ed]
in fourteen states, from Washington to Georgia," on a "particular
assignment ... to appeal to independents and Democrats."76 Eisenhower's
victory that fall returned the White House to Republican control after a twentyyear hiatus.

Although both Warren77 and Eisenhower" denied the existence of a
political bargain, President-elect Eisenhower offered Governor Warren "the
first vacancy on the Supreme Court" in apparent fulfillment of a "personal
commitment.""

During the summer of 1953, the new administration

"formally offered Warren the post of solicitor general" with an eye toward
"clear[ing] away any possible objection to his fitness for the Supreme
Court.""0 In what Felix Frankfurter would eventually describe as "the first
indication that [he had] ever had that there is a God,""1 however, Chief Justice
Fred M. Vinson died on September 8, 1953. Though President Eisenhower
wavered, apparently never having contemplated that the first vacancy on the
Court might be that of the Chief Justice,"2 Warren held firm. 3 Vice-President
to Eisenhower); see also id. at 236 (describing how the Fair Play Amendment would have
prevented the challenged delegates from voting on their own credentials).
73. Id. at 242.
74. Id. at 513, see also id. at 243 (describing how Burger and state delegation chairman
Edward Thye pressured favorite son Harold Stassen into releasing his Minnesota delegates).
75. Id. at244.
76. Id. at 245.
77. See POLLACK, supra note 52, at 133-34 (quoting Warren: "I have made no alliance
with any other candidate and shall make none").
78.
1 DWiGHT D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE 228 (1963) ("The truth is that I
owed Governor Warren nothing."); see also CRAY, supranote 8, at 250 (same); WEAVER, supra
note 6, at 183 (same).
79. CRAY, supranote 8, at 247.
80. Id. at 249.
81. Id. at 278 (quoting two former law clerks' recollections of Justice Frankfurter's
revelation). This sort of religious experience seems to arise quite often in connection with civil
rights law. Cf Michael A. Olivas, ConstitutionalCriteria: The Social Science and Common
Law ofAdmissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1065, 1121 (1997)
(describing the survival of Justice Powell's "surprisingly resilient and supple" opinion in
Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), as "proof that there is
a god").
82. POLLACK, supra note 52, at 150.
83. See CRAY, supra note 8, at 250-53 ("Warren wanted that seat.").
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Nixon, eager to remove Warren from California politics and to neutralize the
three-term governor's presidential ambitions, encouraged the President to
appoint Warren."4 Eisenhower was likewise persuaded that installing Warren
on the Court would defuse the "admittedly... remote" threat that Warren
might mount another presidential campaign in 1956." As a controversial set
of school desegregation cases loomed, Earl Warren took office as the
fourteenth Chief Justice of the United States on October 5, 1953.
Scarcely seven months later, Chief Justice Warren secured his place
in American legal history as the architect of Brown v. Board of Education.
Well before he retired on June 23, 1969, it had become obvious that Earl
Warren had guided the Supreme Court through a monumental epoch. In 1964
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act,8 6 the most significant piece of civil
rights legislation in American history; a year later, it passed the comparably
expansive Voting Rights Act of 1965.87 Under Chief Justice Warren's
leadership, the Supreme Court sustained both statutes.8" Key pillars of Chief
Justice Warren's jurisprudential legacy, however, rested on his Court's
resolution of two seemingly peripheral doctrines: "reverse incorporation" of
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection via the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and the scope of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. The decisions that built this constitutional edifice, which I shall
call "The Nickel and Five," seemed even more insubstantial. Although Chief
Justice Warren's judicial career may have arisen from colossal political
struggles, the durability of his Court's decisions would eventually hinge on
precise doctrinal puzzles.
A. The "Nickel": Fifth Amendment Due Process
and "Reverse Incorporation"
Of the myriad uses that the Supreme Court found for the notion of due
process during the twentieth century, three continue to spark controversy.
Procedural due process, at least after Goldberg v. Kelly, 9 heralded the rise of

84.

POLLACK, supra note 52, at 6, 153.

85. Id. at 154.
86. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
87. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
88. See infra notes 303-17 (discussing the Court's upholding of the Civil Rights Act of
1964); infra notes 235-37 (detailing the Court's upholding of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
89. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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"newi property and the administrative state." The mature Warren Court
buried the Lochnerian variant of substantive due process,9' only to resurrect
it two Terms later for controversies involving privacy, personhood,
reproduction, and family formation.' Like civilization itself, however,
constitutional law has "advance[d] by extending the number of important
operations which we can perform without thinking about them."9 The
incorporation of much of the Bill of Rights has a far deeper, more enduring
impact than any other application of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
Incorporation doctrine's true triumph lies in its invisibility. Deploying
the entire Bill of Rights against the police powers of the states was arguably
the leading jurisprudential project of Hugo Black's thirty-four-year career on
the Court,94 which spanned all sixteen years of Earl Warren's tenure as Chief
Justice. No other line of Supreme Court decisions more perfectly frames Earl
Warren's career as attorney general of California, governor of California, and
Chief Justice of the United States than the sequence that began with the
recognition of rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" in Palko v.
Connecticut95 and ended with the overruling of Palko's refusal to incorporate
90. See generally, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (stating that the
termination of some benefits entails constitutional considerations because these benefits are
"important rights"); Charles Reich, The New Property,73 YALE L.J. 733, 783-86 (1964) (stating
that the increasing importance of agency decisions and government benefits requires due
process review of agency action and demands that society classify some benefits as "rights");
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican AdministrativeLaw, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669,
1718-19 (1975) (relying on Goldberg to support the proposition that statutory benefits cannot
terminate without prior adjudication and stating that the real issue is "the expansion of due
process rights to procedural protections at the agency level").
91.
See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (stating thatLochner'sdue process
doctrine "has long since been discarded").
92. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) (declining to use
Lochner as a guide for due process issues raised by a law affecting the "intimate relation of
husband and wife").
93. ALFREDNORTHWHE
AD, ANINTRODUCTIONTO MAThMATICS 61 (1911) ("It is
a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they
are making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking what we are doing. The
precise opposite is the case."); accord,e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35
AM. EcON. REv. 519, 528 (1945) (describing Whitehead's principle as one "of profound
importance in the social field").
94. E.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71-72 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting),
overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See generally GERAD T. DUNNE, HUGO
BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977) (discussing Justice Black's incorporation of the

Bill of Rights); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994) (same).
95.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,324-25 (1937), overruledby Benton v. Maryland,
395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on double jeopardy.96 Between those
bookends, the Warren Court incorporated hefty chunks of the Fourth, Fifth,

and Sixth Amendments into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.9
By comparison, the "reverse" incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection against the federal government seems not only an anomaly
but also an afterthought. Although Boiling v. Sharpe" is frequently and
correctly considered the bridesmaid of Brown, it was Boiling that finally and
decisively resolved the Korematsu conundrum." Having decided in Brown

"that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools," the Court in
Boiling candidly admitted that "[tIhe legal problem in the District of Columbia
is somewhat different."" ° Chief Justice Warren's solution lay in importing
equal protection analysis through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The two legal concepts, allegedly "stemming from our
American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive." ' Acknowledging
that "'equal protection of the laws' is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited
unfairness than 'due process of law,"' the Court disavowed the implication
"that the two are always interchangeable phrases. '"" Rather, the Court
emphasized the prospect that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be
10
violative of due process.""
To buttress this proposition, Chief Justice Warren cited three cases: 4
96. Benton, 395 U.S. at 794. Benton was announced on June 23,1969, Earl Warren's last
day as Chief Justice. CRAY, supra note 8, at 512.
97. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968) (Sixth Amendment right to
jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16-19 (1967) (Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403 (1965) (Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)
(Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule).
98. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
99. See Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 46-47 (describing the "constitutional basis" of the
plaintiffs' case in Boilingas an "amalgamation" of the internment cases with fundamental liberty
cases and reasoning accordingly that the plaintiffs relied on Fifth Amendment due process rather
than Fourteenth Amendment equal protection).
100. Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,498-99 (1954).
101. Id. at499.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 499 n.2 (citing three cases supporting proposition that discrimination
violates Fifth Amendment due process).
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DetroitBankv. UnitedStates,10 5 Currinv. Wallace,"° and CharlesC. Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis."°7 But none of these cases actually supported the
bedrock principle on which Chief Justice Warren would build the
jurisprudential framework of reverse incorporation. Both Detroit Bank and
Currin stood for the opposite proposition. Detroit Bank unequivocally
announced that "[u]nlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth contains no
Equal Protection clause and [therefore] provides no guaranty against
discriminatory legislation by Congress."'' ° Justice Murphy's concurrence in
Hirabayashicited Currin in support of that very distinction between Fifth
Amendment due process and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection."'°
Justice Murphy did state the proposition that Chief Justice Warren was trying
to establish - "that there may . . .be discrimination of such an injurious
character in the application of laws as to amount to a denial of due process."" 0
But Boiling never invoked this statement. Worst of all, Steward relied on the
presence of an Equal Protection Clause binding the states, plus the correlative
absence of a similar phrase binding the federal government, to declare
Congress "subject to restraints less narrow and confining" than those of the
states."' Currin reasoned that inequality occasioned by congressional
legislation raised solely "question[s] ...of wisdom and not of power."112
Having thus aligned Fifth Amendment due process with Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection (however implausibly), Boiling then sought to
establish a rule of presumptive invalidity under both provisions for racial
segregation in public schooling. Once again Chief Justice Warren reached
deep for precedential support. He cited Korematsu and Hirabayashlfor the
proposition that "[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized
with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect.""'
He quoted Gibson v. Mississippi"4 for "the
principle 'that the constitution... forbids, so far as civil and political rights are
concerned, discrimination by the general government, or by the states, against
105. 317 U.S. 329 (1943).
106. 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
107. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
108. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943) (citing Currin v. Wallace,
306 U.S. 1 (1939)).
109. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 112 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring)
("The Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains no guarantee of equal protection.").
110. Id. (Murphy, J.,
concurring).
111.
Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 584 (1937).
112. Currin,306 U.S. at 14.
113. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 & n.3 (1954).
114. 162 U.S. 565 (1896).
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any citizen because of his race.'""" To reinforce that quotation, Chief Justice
Warren then invoked Steele v. Louisville & Nashville RailroadCo.," 6 a 1944
decision that avoided a constitutional controversy by refusing to construe
federal labor law to permit parties to a labor contract to discriminate on the
basis of race."' Finally, he characterized Buchanan v. Warley"5 as a case in
which the Court had invalidated "a statute which limited the right of a property
owner to convey his property to a person of another race" as "a denial of due
process of law.""' 9
None of these authorities provided genuine support. Chief Justice
Warren omitted the inconvenient fact that Gibson failed to find "any error of
law ...committed by the courts of' Mississippi and ultimately refused to find
"as [a] matter of law, that the conviction of the accused ofthe crime of murder
was due to prejudice of race."' 20 Steele represented an unexceptional
application of the canon that courts ought to avoid interpreting the Constitution
when some other basis for decision fairly presents itself. 2 ' Any case invoking
this precept provides no credible support for any reading of the Constitution.
As for Buchanan, that Court ultimately phrased the question presented as
whether "a white man [may] be denied, consistently with due process of law,
the right to dispose of his property to a purchaser by prohibiting the occupation
of it for the sole reason that the purchaser is a person of color intending to
occupy the premises as a place of residence."'2 Other cases before Boiling
had cited Buchanan merely as a case reaffirming the Reconstruction-era
agenda of extending the dignity of property ownership to former slaves 2 ' or,
115. Boiling,347 U.S. at 499 (quoting Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 566, 591 (1896)).
116. 323 U.S. 192(1944).
117. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1945); see also
Boiling,347 U.S. at 499 & n.4 (construing Steele as a case supporting the proposition that racial
classifications are "constitutionally suspect").
118. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
119. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (describing the transaction
underlying Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1912), "as an unreasonable discrimination").
120. Gibson, 162 U.S. at 592.
121. E.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1998); Spector
Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
122. Buchanan,245 U.S. at 78.
123. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 258 (1953) (denying California's ability to
enforce a racially restrictive covenant and noting that Buchanan prevented a state from
"incorporat[ing such a restriction] in a statute"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1948)
(stating that Buchanan "gives specific recognition to" the principle that "rights to acquire, enjoy,
own and dispose of property" are "protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment"); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 215 (1923) (citing Buchanan for the
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even more modestly, as a standing case. 24 None treated Buchanan as having
sustained a generalized attack on the compatibility of racial classifications
with the notion of due process. 2 '
These doctrinal hurdles did not keep the Court from its final task:
demonstrating how racial segregation would deprive public schoolchildren of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Conceding that "the
Court has not assumed to define 'liberty' with any great precision," Chief
Justice Warren nevertheless stressed that "[1]iberty under law" is "not
confined to mere freedom from bodily restraint," but rather "extends to the
full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue."'26 Liberty so
defined, the Chief Justice reasoned, "cannot be restricted except for a proper
governmental objective."'' Racially segregated public schools flunked that
test: "Segregation in public education is not reasonably related to any proper
governmental objective, and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District
of Columbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their liberty
in violation of the Due Process Clause."' 28
This emphasis on the "liberty" interests of black students drew Boiling
away from Brown's equal protection underpinnings. If anything, the Court's
invocation of the Due Process Clause tilted Boiling toward an altogether
distinct center of constitutional gravity. Though another decade would elapse
before Ferguson v. Skrupa 2 9 would conclusively halt the use of substantive
due process to invalidate ordinary social and economic legislation, 3 ' the
Court in 1949 had already signaled its retreat from the Lochnerianpractice of
"so broadly constru[ing]" the Constitution's Due Process Clauses as to put
"Congress and state legislatures ...in a strait jacket when they attempt to
suppress business and industrial conditions which they regard as offensive to
proposition that property rights "include the right to use, lease, and dispose of it for lawful
purposes").
124. See Barrows, 346 U.S. at 266 n.7 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (citing Buchanan for the
proposition that an interest in exercising a right is required for standing); Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 141 (1951) (same); Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138,
141 (1922) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (citing Buchanan for the proposition that a damaged party
has standing despite its inaction).
125. See Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 45 & n.359 (explaining the Court's treatment of
Buchanan before Boiling).
126. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954).
127. Id. at 499-500.
128. Id. at500.
129. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
130. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-33 (1963) (holding that "courts do not
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of the legislative bodies").
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the public welfare."'' Substantive due process, however feeble its grip after
the New Deal's realignment of constitutional law, presented Chief Justice
Warren with a plausible (albeit wobbly) basis for deciding the District of
Columbia's school segregation case.
The original draft of Boiling seized this opportunity. From 1923

through 1927, in a period better known for legal upheaval over the content of
speech than for disputes over the languages in which controversial ideas were
expressed,'3 2 the Supreme Court decided four cases upholding the freedom of
parents to shape the education of their children. In 1923, the Court
invalidated two state laws, both enacted during World War I's anti-German
hysteria, prohibiting foreign language instruction.'33 Two years later, Pierce

v. Society of Sisters'34 used substantive due process to nullify a state statute
requiring students to attend public rather than private schools. 3

Most

intriguingly, the Supreme Court in 1927 used a Fifth Amendment theory of
substantive due process to invalidate a ban, in what was then the Territory of
Hawaii, on education in any language besides English or Hawaiian. 3 6 This
final case, Farringtonv. Tokushige,'37 had figured prominently in the original
1952 argument of Boiling, for Farrington'sreliance on the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment made it the strongest case against Congress's
ability to segregate public schools by race in a federal enclave.' 38
131.
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525, 536-37 (1949); see also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952)
("[1]f our recent cases mean anything, they leave debatable issues as respects business,
economic, and social affairs to legislative decision.").
132.
But cf Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 617 (1919) (observing that the war
protestors at issue had published their pamphlets in English and in Yiddish, ostensibly to reach
a larger proportion of fellow immigrants from Russia).
133. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404,409-11 (1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,396403 (1923).
134. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
135. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invoking "the doctrine
of Meyer v. Nebraska," which established "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control"). Pierce could not have rested on a
free exercise theory, for the litigation involved not only the Society of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary but also the Hill Military Academy, a wholly secular, private military
school. Id. at 532-33.
136. Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927).
137. 273 U.S. 284 (1927).
138. Farrington, 273 U.S. at 296-99; 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTrrTUIONAL LAW 401-02, 407 (Philip B.
Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) (oral argument before Boiling Court) (relying on
Farringtonto oppose segregation by the federal government and admitting that Farringtonis
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The centrality of these language and education cases seems doubly
odd in today's dominant constitutional discourse, which not only stresses
equality over liberty but also tends to regard substantive due process as a
doctrine primarily (if not solely) concerned with reproductive freedom, family
formation, and personal identity through sexual expression. In a country that
is, paradoxically, both polyglot and linguistically uniform, contemporary
constitutional law does not treat linguistic discrimination as a serious civil
rights issue.139 Since 1927, the Supreme Court has only rarely addressed
questions of language policy. The Court has implicitly upheld the federal ban
on English-only elections as a proper exercise of Congress's powers under the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 4" In Alexander v. Sandoval 4' the
Court held that alleged discrimination against non-English speakers cannot be
redressed through a private lawsuit seeking enforcement of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bars discrimination "on the ground of race,
color, or national origin [in] .. .any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.' 142 Alexander disavowed any suggestion to the contrary
in Lau v. Nichols,143 which had held that a school system's failure to provide
14
meaningful education to non-English speaking students violated Title VI.1
In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 145 the Supreme Court dismissed
as moot - and therefore never considered on the merits - the only case ever
to raise a direct constitutional attack on legislation declaring English the
official language of a state.146 At its most generous, the contemporary Court
has suggested that conscious discrimination against native speakers of
languages besides English may have a racially disparate impact. 47 By this
the "closest case in point so far").
139. Cf Mar J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent AntidiscriminationLaw, and a
Jurisprudencefor the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991) (contrasting linguistic
diversity with its lack of constitutional protection).
140. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(eXl) (1994) (prohibiting states' use of proficiency in English
as condition of voting); Briscoce v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404, 405-06 & n.2 (1977) (reporting
"overwhelming evidence" that showed "the ingenuity and prevalence of discriminatory practices
that have been used to dilute the voting strength and otherwise affect the voting rights of
language minorities"); New York v. United States, 419 U.S. 888, 888 (1974) (summarily
affirming a three-judge district court's decision to invalidate an English-only election).
141.
532 U.S. 275 (2001).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,283 (2001).
143. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
144. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 285.
145.
520 U.S. 43 (1997).
146. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,44 (1997).
147. See Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (conceding that "proficiency
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reasoning, language discrimination triggers the constitutional standard of
Washington v. Davis.'4 8
But the Warren Court was two generations closer to the Lochner era's
controversies on education and foreign language instruction and to the waves
of immigration that sparked those conflicts. Chief Justice Warren's original
Boiling draft equated "arbitrary [racial] restraints on access to [public]
education" with previously discredited "arbitrary restrictions on the parent's
right to educate his child."'1 49 His concluding sentences squarely grounded
Boiling in a substantive vision of due process: "We have declared that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools. It would be unthinkable that the Federal Government should have a
lesser duty to protect what, in our present circumstances, is a fundamental
150
liberty.
The Boiling Justices and litigants apparently overlooked a fifth case
decided during the 1923-1927 sequence of language controversies. The 1926
case of Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad' involved the legality of the Chinese
Bookkeeping Act, 5 2 which the legislature of the Philippine Islands, then a
United States territory, enacted in 1921.15 The Supreme Court considered
whether a Philippine statute "making it a crime for any one in the Philippine
Islands engaged in business to keep his account books in Chinese" conflicted
with the Philippine Bill of Rights.' 5 4 The Philippine Bill of Rights, which
Congress incorporated into the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,155 provided
that "[n]o law... enacted in th[o]se Islands... shall deprive any person of
in a particular language, like skin color," might be most properly "treated as a surrogate for
race"); cf.United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563 (1976) (upholding the use of
federal officers' perception of motorists' "apparent Mexican ancestry" to make selective
referrals to secondary inspection areas at immigration checkpoints).
148. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
149.

Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 94 (reprinting Chief Justice Warren's Memorandum to

Conference, May 7, 1954).
150.

Id. at 94 (reprinting Chief Justice Warren's Memorandum to the Conference, May 7,

1954); cf Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958) (citing Boiling for the proposition that "[tihe
right of a student not to be segregated on racial grounds in schools so maintained" is "so
fundamental and pervasive that it is embraced in the concept of due process of law").
151.
271 U.S. 500 (1926).
152. Act No. 2972, Feb. 21, 1921, of Philippine Legislature, quoted in Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1926).
153.

Yu CongEng,271 U.S. at 507-08.

154. Id. at 524.
155. Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, ch. 416, § 3, 39 Stat. 545, 546; Act of July 1,
1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 691, 692-93.
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life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws."' 56 The Supreme Court had
previously held that the Philippine Bill of Rights extended "guaranties
equivalent to the due process and equal protection of the law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment," as those provisions were understood "at the time
when Congress made them applicable to the Philippine Islands.""' Yu Cong
Eng held that the Bookkeeping Act violated the territorial bill of rights.""
Despite its heavy reliance on Meyer v. Nebraska"9 and other substantive due
process cases, 60 the Yu Cong Eng Court described the violation as one not
only of due process, but also of equal protection.16 Half a century later,
Justice Stevens would cite Yu Cong Eng for the proposition that "the Due
Process Clause," at least in the absence of a "special national interest," may
be "construed as having the same significance as the Equal Protection
62
Clause."
Whatever support Yu Cong Eng could have provided for Boiling is
admittedly shaky. Unlike Farrington,which used the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to invalidate a territorial statute, Yu Cong Eng upheld
the power of Congress to curb a territory's legislative authority. The Warren
Court landmark that Yu Cong Eng most closely resembles, therefore, is not
Boiling v. Sharpe, but Katzenbach v. Morgan.63 Even this connection is
tenuous. Because Congress enacted the Philippine Bill of Rights under its
power to govern the territories of the United States,"M Yu Cong Eng shed no
156. Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, § 3, quoted in Yu CongEng,271 U.S. at 524.
157. Serra v. Mortiga, 204 U.S. 470,474 (1907); accord Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 524;
see also Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1904) (describing the Philippine Bill
of Rights as differing slightly in form, but not in substance, from its American predecessor).
158. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500,524-28 (1926).
159. Id. at 526-27 (quoting and discussing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),
as a case recognizing a due process right "to acquire useful knowledge").
160. See id. at 527-28 (analyzing Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), and Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), and citing Piercev. Society ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
161. See id. at 528 (finding that the Chinese Bookkeeping Act was "obviously intended
chiefly to affect [Chinese merchants] as distinguished from the rest of the community" and
describing the act as "a denial... of equal protection of the laws").
162. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 n.18 (1976) (citing Boiling as well
as Yu Cong Eng for this proposition).
163. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (stating that Congress has
authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment "to exercise its discretion in
determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of' that
Amendment).
164. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations Respecting the Territory or other Property belonging
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direct light on the issue in Morgan: the extent of Congress's authority to
"enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment through "appropriate legislation., 165 Yu
Cong Eng did suggest, perhaps more than any other precedent available to the
Boiling Court, that a statute offensive to substantive notions of due process
can simultaneously violate equal protection. To be sure, Yu Cong Eng offered
no reasoning in support of its naked assertion that the ban on Chineselanguage bookkeeping violated equal protection as well as due process.
Moreover, the Yu Cong Eng Court effectively equated the class of speakers
of Chinese with the class defined by Chinese ethnicity. If Hernandezv. New
York" provides any indication, the modem Court does not so readily equate
language with race. 67 Nevertheless, Yu Cong Eng offered Chief Justice
Warren a precedential bridge between the substantive due process doctrine of
Pierce and Meyer and the equal protection concept illuminated in Brown. Yu
Cong Eng gave the Bolling Court a chance to overcome the Korematsu
conundrum. Its absence from the draft and final opinions in Bolling suggests,
at the very least, that Chief Justice Warren missed an opportunity to reinforce
his doctrinal position.
History does not report the precise course of the Justices'
deliberations between the circulation of the May 7, 1954 draft of Boiling and
the public release of Chief Justice Warren's opinion on May 17. Scholars
have speculated that Hugo Black and Felix Frankfurter, the Justices most
closely ideologically committed to burying Lochnerian substantive due
process,' persuaded the Chief Justice to abandon his reliance on the
education cases. 69 Biographer G. Edward White minced no words in
to the United States .... ").
165.

U.S. CONST, amend. XIV, § 5; cf Morgan,384 U.S. at 647 n.5 (declining to delineate

the power of Congress to regulate "Territory or other Property belonging to the United States").
166.
167.

500 U.S. 352 (1991).
See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371 (1991) (suggesting that the native

ability to speak a language besides English might serve as a proxy for race in certain
circumstances); cf Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514-15 (2000) (treating descent from the
eighteenth century inhabitants of Hawaii as an unlawful proxy for Polynesian ancestry). See
generallysupra notes 139-48 and accompanying text (reviewing the history of Supreme Court
disputes over language).
168. See, e.g., Am. Fed'n of Labor v. Am. Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 556 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (opposing substantive due process primarily because "[j]udges
appointed for life whose decisions run counter to prevailing opinion cannot be voted out of
office and supplanted by men of views more consonant with it"); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (Black, J.) (declaring that the "due
process philosophy" of the Lochner era "has been deliberately discarded").
169. See 0. EDWARD WHrTE, EARL WARREN: A PUBUC LIFE 226-28 (1982) (examining
Warren's "relative indifference to the doctrinal basis of his opinions"); Hutchinson, supra note
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describing the Chief Justice's motivation: "Warren omitted the fundamental
liberty analysis in Boiling because he wanted to maintain unanimity in his
Court."'7 Chief Justice Warren ultimately adopted the language that now
appears in United States Reports: "In view of our decision that the
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government. "'7 '
Chief Justice Warren had one last opportunity to give Boiling some
legal basis besides the "unthinkable" nature of the contrary proposition, that
somehow the Constitution could permit Congress to segregate public schools
under its control while preventing the states from adopting that very policy.'
To buttress his final assertion, the Chief Justice cited Hurd v.Hodge.'73 But
the Court had no basis for relying on Hurd. Decided the same day as Shelley
' Hurd involved a covenant
v. Kraemer,74
prohibiting the transfer of real
property to nonwhites. 7 In a series of decisions stretching back to 1917, the
Supreme Court had held that the enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant
by a state court would violate equal protection.' 76 Hurd acknowledged that
the high court had "never... adjudicated" whether the enforcement of such
covenants within the District of Columbia would be "forbidden by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment."'7 Relying upon Hirabayashiand
Korematsu's nominal condemnation of race-based classifications, the Hurd
3, at 48-50 (speculating that Justices Frankfurter and Black persuaded Chief Justice Warren to
drop due process analysis from Boiling). Justice Black evidently patrolled other draft opinions
in order to block the "roving commission" of substantive due process. See CRAY, supra note
8, at 452-53 (describing how Justice Black persuaded Chief Justice Warren to "trim[] ...
offending passages" on substantive due process and references to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923), from the draft ofLovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
170. WHrTE, supra note 169, at 227.
171. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
172.
Cf LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AN AmmcAN PoLITIcs 32 (2000)
("Apparently it was also unthinkable to hold that segregation in the South violated the

Constitution and then to leave to Congress the option of retaining the only legally segregated
schools in America.").
173.
Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500 n.5 (citing Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)).
174.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
175. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 26. Shelley also concerned the judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
176.

See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (invalidating a statute forbidding

blacks from living in primarily white neighborhoods); see also City of Richmond v. Deans, 281
U.S. 704, 704 (1930) (following Buchanan); Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 668 (1927)
(same).
177.

Hurd,334 U.S. at 28.
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petitioners pressed this very claim. 7 " Chief Justice Vinson, however, "found
it unnecessary to resolve the constitutional issue" and ultimately barred the
enforcement of racially restrictive covenants as a violation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866.'
Boiling's feat of "[e]quating the Due Process Clause and the Equal
s "Never before had
Protection Clause... was nothing short of stunning. 180
a Supreme Court opinion found the two clauses banned similar governmental
behavior."''
Stripping Boiling of its supporting citations exposes the
incredible flimsiness of its reasoning. 'With a flick of the wrist," Chief
Justice Warren "changed Boiling v. Sharpe from an education case into a race
case, and the equal protection component of the fifth amendment was born."'8 2
Equal protection, which Justice Holmes had mocked a mere twenty-seven
years earlier as "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments,"'8 3 would
become in the latter half of the twentieth century "the first resort of
constitutional argument."18 4 So complete was the transformation that the
Court could assert two decades after Boiling, with equally minute amounts of
shame and support, that "[tihis Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 5
Although it may be tempting to conclude that Bolling's "result [of]
outlawing segregation in the District of Columbia" was much more
"significant" than "[h]ow that result was accomplished,""8 6 greater wisdom lies
elsewhere. Boiling sacrificed doctrinal coherence to achieve constitutional
symmetry between the states and the federal government - and to conceal
latent divisions among the Justices on a civil rights controversy of the highest
magnitude. 7 "Warren preserved the Court's unanimous voice" in Bolling "at

178. Id. at 30.
179. Id.
180. POWE, supranote 172, at 32.
181.
Id.
182. Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 46; see also WHrIE, supra note 169, at 363 ("When
others suggested that ... there was no. .. 'fundamental' right [to an education], Warren turned
Boiling v. Sharpeinto an unconventional equal protection case.").
183. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,208 (1927).
184. Edward J. Larson, The Scopes Trial and the Evolving Concept of Freedom, 85 VA.
L. REV. 503, 507 (1999).
185. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636,638 n.2 (1975).
186. WHITE, supranote 169, at 363.
187. See Louis H. Pollak, The Supreme Court UnderFire, 6 J. PUB. L. 428, 443 (1957)
(applying this criticism to both Bolling and Brown).
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a substantial price."' Though substantive due process "stood on shaky, even
discredited, ground," the new Chief Justice's novel Fifth Amendment theory
"lacked both precedent and ... analytical inevitability.' ' 89 Unanimity barely
concealed the Justices' "willingness to sacrifice established, if dubious,
precedent for naked moral parity between Brown and Bolling."'90
Boiling, in the end, hinged on a single word: "unthinkable." Chief
Justice Warren did what his colleague, John Marshall Harlan, would decry on
several other occasions: the "substitut[ion] [of] resounding phrases for
19
analysis.""
As Justice Harlan might have described the problem, Boiling
rested on a "captivating phrase[]"'" that gave the Court an "all-too-easy
opportunity to ignore the real" tension between equal protection and due
process and to "solve the problem simply by labeling the ... practice" of
school segregation "as invidious 'discrimination." ' 93
Such analytical
weakness diluted the Warren Court's doctrinal legacy. The jurists who were
called upon to translate the Warren Court's landmarks in later cases could not
accord serious respect to the reasoning beneath decisions such as Boiling.1 94
B. The "Five": Civil Rights Enforcement Under Section 5 of the
FourteenthAmendment
The Warren Court's decisions upholding the Civil Rights Act of
19641"s and the Voting Rights Act of 1965196 resolved much of the unfinished
business of Reconstruction.
Despite recognizing that the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments shared the common goal of protecting
the newly freed slaves,"9 the post-Civil War Court considerably narrowed the
188.

Hutchinson, supra note 3, at 50.

189.

Id.

190. Id.
191.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
192. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 683 (1966) (Harlan, I.,
dissenting).
193.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 36 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
194. See Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics,and the RealistTradition,82 YALE L.J. 227,23234 (1972) (stating that Boiling omits "all examination of constitutional premises").
195. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
196. Act of Aug. 6, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
197. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 68-71 (1873); see Exparte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339,344-45 (1879) ("One great purpose of these amendments was to raise the colored
race from that condition of inferiority and servitude in which most of them had previously
stood, into perfect equality of civil rights with all other persons within the jurisdiction of the

1229

COME BACK TO THE NICKEL AND FIVE

scope of congressional power to defend civil rights. The Court under Chief
Justice Morrison Waite repeatedly excluded purely private conduct from the
reach of federal civil rights statutes. "The fourteenth amendment," said the
Court in one of its earliest opportunities to construe the Amendment, "adds

nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another."' 98 This exclusion of
purely private conduct from the Fourteenth Amendment's reach thus crippled

the federal response not only to the impairment of blacks' voting rights,' but
also to some of the most gruesome acts of racial violence in the post-war

South.

In the 1883 Civil Rights Cases2° l the Court invalidated the public
accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 18752') and thereby
constricted Congress's reach under the enabling clauses of the Reconstruction
amendments - section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, section 5 of the
Fourteenth, and section 2 of the Fifteenth. 2°3 Insisting that the Fourteenth

Amendment affected solely "[s]tate action of a particular character" without
reaching "[i]ndividual invasion of individual rights,

2

04

the Court curbed

States."); see also Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 785 (1985) (describing Congress's intent in
ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment as "the amelioration of the condition of the freedmen").
198. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875).
199. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875) (noting that Congress did not
provide for the punishment of a voting inspector who refused to receive and count blacks'
votes). But cf Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1884) (upholding the application
of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 to private actors who committed violence against black voters
in a congressional election).
200. See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 630, 640 (1882) (lynch mob murder of
prisoners under the custody of a deputy sheriff); Cruikshank,92 U.S. at 548-49 (massacre of
freedmen and Republican partisans after a disputed election). Arising in the aftermath of
"perhaps the bloodiest racial conflict in Louisiana history" - or, for that matter, in American
history - Cruikshankinvalidated the convictions ofthree members of a "veritable army" of "old
time Ku Klux Klan" who killed no fewer than "60 freedmen... after they had surrendered" and
left the victims' mutilated bodies "to rot in the parching sun." ROBERT J.KACZOROWsIU, THE
PoLTIcs OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876, at 175 (1985). On the history of Reconstruction, see generally ERIc
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (Henry Steele Comager et al. eds., 1989); ALAN NEVINS, THE
EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICA, 1865-1878 (1927); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF
RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965).
201.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
202. Civil Rights Act of 1875, Ch. 114,18 Stat. 335.
203. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18-19 (1883) (holding that the "law in
question cannot be sustained by any grant of legislative power" and that Congress has no
authority to enact "primary and direct" legislation that "supersedes and displaces state
legislation on the same subject").
204. Id. at 11; cf United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1882) (invalidating a federal

1230

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1203 (2002)

Congress's power to punish "every act of discrimination which a person may
see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will
take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal
with in other matters of intercourse or business. ' 2° The Civil Rights Cases
held that section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment conferred no power to pass
"general legislation upon the rights of the citizen," but rather confined
Congress to the task of enacting "corrective legislation... for counteracting"
unconstitutional state legislation. '° A contrary reading empowering Congress
to legislate beyond "provid[ing] modes of redress," Justice Bradley reasoned,
would be "repugnant to the tenth amendment."1207 The Civil Rights cases thus
"firmly embedded" the principle that the Fourteenth Amendment "erects no
shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongfil." '
Four years before the Civil Rights Cases, however, the Court had
given wide berth to federal legislative power in a trilogy of cases involving the
exclusion of blacks from jury service. In Strauderv. West Virginia,2° a case
best known for recognizing that "discriminat[ion] in the selection of jurors...
against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put upon trial for an
alleged offence against the State,"21 ° the Court upheld Congress's power to
"provid[e] for the removal of [the affected] case from a State court, in which
the right is denied by the State law, into a Federal court.0 1 1 Strauder even
lauded removal as a "very efficient and appropriate mode" of "protecting
rights and immunities conferred by the Federal Constitution." 21 2 In Ex parte
Virginia,2 3 the Court endorsed "[w]hatever legislation is appropriate, that is,
adapted to carry out the objects" of the Reconstruction amendments and
"tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure
to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal

anticonspiracy statute that was "directed exclusively against the action of private persons,
without reference to the laws of the State or their administration by her officers").
205. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25.
206. Id. at 13-14.
207. Id. at 15.
208. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948); accord, e.g., United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598,621 (2000); District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,423-24 (1973); United
States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,755 (1966).
209. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
210. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,310 (1879).
211. .Id. at 311.
212. Id.
213. 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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'
protection of the laws."214
Finally, although Virginia v. Rives 21 5 interpreted
the federal removal statute to "authorize[ a removal of the case only before
trial, not after a trial has commenced,"' 6 that case reaffirmed the general
principle that "[r]emoval of cases from State courts into courts of the United
States has been an acknowledged mode of protecting [federal
civil] rights"
21 7
whose "constitutionality has never been seriously doubted."
Step by step, the Warren Court eased the tension between the Civil
Rights Cases and the 1879 jury service trilogy.21 Although the Supreme
Court has never retreated from the Civil Rights Cases' requirement that
legislation under section 5 "be adapted to the mischief and wrong" targeted by
the Fourteenth Amendment at large, 21 9 the reconceptualization of equal
protection in Brown extended Congress's power to grant and preserve civil
rights. The Warren Court even temporarily crafted a definition of state action
that swept many commercial activities within the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment.22 As for the Civil Rights Cases' invalidation of federal equal
accommodations legislation, that "question [was] rendered largely academic
by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ' 221 The Warren Court cases
upholding that statute as an exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce opened a productive new avenue for civil rights legislation.222 The
Court's expansive definition of the power to enforce the Thirteenth

214. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879); accord South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966) (relying in part on Exparte Virginia to support the
proposition that "Congress has full remedial powers to effectuate the constitutional prohibition
against racial discrimination in voting"). EX parte Virginia's resemblance to the classic
statement ofjudicial deference in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819),
is unmistakable. Steven A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the FourteenthAmendment:.
City ofBoeme v. Flores and the OriginalUnderstandingof Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 120
(1999).
215. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
216. Virginia v.Rives,100 U.S. 313,319 (1879).
217. Id. at 318.
218. Cf James M. McGoldrick, The Civil Rights Cases: The Relevancy of Reversing a
HundredPlus Year Old Error,42 ST.Louis U.L.J. 451,464-66 (1998) (arguing that creative
alternatives to the direct application of Congress's section 5 power helped preserve the
"undeserved longevity" of the Civil Rights Cases).
219. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
220. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308, 319-20 (1968) (holding that a self-contained business district cannot exclude
members of the public seeking to exercise their constitutional rights), overruled by Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).

221.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,441 n.78 (1968).
222. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.294,304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241,250 (1964).
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Amendment" and of state-law complicity in superficially private conduct224

gave Congress other legislative options.
But these developments carried at best secondary significance for civil
rights enforcement. The crucial question of the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enabling Clause loomed on the Court's docket. Before and
during the Warren era, the Supreme Court routinely analyzed Congress's
power under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, 5 section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment," 6 and even section 2 of the Eighteenth Amendment..
according to the elaboration of the Necessary and Proper Clause2' in
McCulloch v. Maryland: 9 "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the

223. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 438-39 (stating that Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment includes the power to legislate in a manner "calculated to achieve. . . objective"
of eradicating badges and incidents of slavery, even if the resulting legislation "regulate[s] the
conduct of private individuals"); see also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105-06 (1971)
(holding that the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment permits Congress to punish
private, racially motivated violence against persons traveling between states); cf Butler v. Perry,
240 U.S. 328, 332 (1916) (defining the scope of Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment according to a legislative target's similarity "to African slavery").
224. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 756-57 (1966) (observing that "a charge
of active connivance by agents of the State in the making of... 'false reports,' or other conduct
amounting to official discrimination [is] clearly sufficient to constitute denial of rights protected
by the Equal Protection Clause"); cf Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 242 (1964) (Douglas, J.)
(arguing that a private individual's invocation of state law enforcement and state court process
to give effect to a private policy of racial discrimination would warrant the extension of equal
protection rights to individuals targeted by the racial discrimination); id. at 286 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (same).
225. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 439 (stating that section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
"clothed 'Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges
and incidents of slavery'" (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))); Clyatt v.
United States, 197 U.S. 207, 217 (1905) (stating that Congress has power to legislate over
individuals "so far as necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery"); see
also United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866) (No. 16,151) (Swayne,
Cir. J.) (stating that Congress has power to "select ...the means that might be deemed
appropriate to" abolish slavery).
226. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966); Exparte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651,665 (1884).
227. James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545,558 (1924).
I & 18 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make
228. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.").
229.
17 (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 230 The antebellum
Court had applied the same standard in construing other provisions of the
Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause 31 and the Fugitive Slave
Clause. 2 Much of the Warren Court's civil rights agenda therefore hinged
on the interpretation of Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of' that
2 33 That
amendment.
burden fell squarely on the shoulders of Katzenbach v.
234
Morgan.
Morgan seemed an unlikely candidate for landmark status. It was not
even the most prominent voting rights case of the 1965 Term. In South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,23' a case of such "urgent concern to the entire
country" that the Justices "invited all of the States to participate... as friends
of the Court, ' ,1 6 the Court repelled a multifaceted attack on the epochal
Voting Rights Act of 1965. Most significantly, South Carolinav. Katzenbach
upheld Congress's power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to
require federal administrative or judicial approval of state-law changes in "any
voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or
procedure with respect to voting." 7 Decided later during the same Term,
Morgan involved a comparatively trivial portion of the Voting Rights Act.
Morgan involved section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which
provided that no person who "has successfully completed the sixth primary
grade" in an "American-flag" school "in which the predominant language was
other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or
230. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819); cf United States v. Fisher,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805) ("Congress must possess the choice of means, and must be
empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the exercise of a power granted by
the constitution.").
231.
United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 634,638,12. Pet. 72,78 (1838); Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1,3-4,9 Wheat. 1, 187-88 (1824).
232. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 521-22 (1858); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. 417, 423-24, 16 Pet. 539, 614-15 (1842); cf.Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393, 542-43 (1856) (McLean, J., dissenting) (urging the adoption of the McCulloch standard
for interpreting Congress's power to regulate the territories). See generally Engel, supra note
214, at 138-40 (discussing the use ofMcCulloch's standard of review throughout the antebellum
era).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
234. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
235. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
236. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1994); see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337
(1966) (holding that portions ofAct under review were "valid means" of enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment).
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local election because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret
any matter in the English language. ''23 An English literacy requirement in.
New York had disenfranchised "many of the several hundred thousand New

York City residents who ha[d] migrated there from the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico ....

,239 In the 1959 case of Lassiter v. Northampton County

Board of Elections,24° however, the Supreme Court had already repelled a
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment attack on North Carolina's English
literacy requirement.24 Because section 4(e) effectively displaced state laws
that Lassiterwould have upheld, Morgan had to explain whether "an exercise
of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits
the enforcement of a state law can... be sustained if the judicial branch
determines that the state
law is [not] prohibited by the [substantive] provisions
242
of' that amendment.
This obstacle did not detain Justice Brennan very long. Invoking the
historical understanding that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed
principally to expand congressional power rather than the power of the federal
judiciary, 243 Justice Brennan declined to "confine the legislative power"
granted by section 5 "to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state
laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of
merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the
'majestic generalities' of § 1 of the Amendment."'24 Justice Brennan thus
sidestepped the troubling task of reconciling his reasoning with Lassiter24s
238.

42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1994); see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,643, & n.l

(1966).
239.

Morgan, 384 U.S. at 644.

240.

360 U.S. 45 (1959).

241.
See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1959)
(holding that a literacy requirement does not violate constitutional requirements).
242. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648. Justice Brennan did not address alternative bases for
resolving the controversy, including Congress's power to legislate in federal territories, regulate
congressional elections, or guarantee each state a republican form of government. Id. at 647
n.5.

243. See id. at 648 & n.7 (citing, inter alia, Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,345 (1879),
and Laurent B. Frantz, CongressionalPower to Enforce the FourteenthAmendment Against
PrivateActs, 73 YALE L.J. 1353, 1356-57 (1964)); see also Fullilove v. Klulznick, 448 U.S.
448, 509 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed that Congress would bear primary responsibility for enforcing the
Amendment); 6 CHARLES FAMMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-68, PART ONE at 1295-96 (1971) (same).
244. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,648-49 (1966) (quoting Fay v. New York, 332
U.S. 261,282 (1947)).
245. See id. at 649 (contending that the issue in Lassiterdiffered from the issue presented
by Morgan).
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even as he acknowledged the constitutionally commanded task of
"determining whether" section
4(e) was "appropriate legislation to enforce the
2 46
Clause.
Protection
Equal
On the crucial question of the standard of review for legislation
passed under section 5, Justice Brennan adopted the "classic" - and extremely
deferential - rational basis formulation of McCulloch v. Maryland.2 47 He
argued that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment equated section 5's
"appropriate legislation" formula with that of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.2 4 This reasoning united the standard of review for section 5
legislation with the judicial standard for assessing legislation under the
enabling clauses of the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendments.249 Forswearing
serious judicial "review [of] the congressional resolution" of the myriad
factors affecting section 4(e)'s "nullification of the English literacy
requirement," Justice Brennan declared that an exercise of the section 5 power
would stand as long as the Court could "perceive a basis upon which the
Congress might [have] resolve[d] the conflict as it did."2"'
But Congress did no such thing. The mood of Justice Brennan's verbs
betrayed Congress's failure to make any findings that could have rationalized
its decision to abrogate state-law literacy requirements. At most, Justice
Brennan could argue only that "Congress might well have questioned" the
underlying intent of these literacy requirements, that "Congress might have
also questioned whether denial of' the franchise "was a necessary or
appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn English," and that
"Congress might well have concluded that... an ability to read or understand
Spanish is . . . effective" in informing a Spanish-speaking electorate "of
election issues and governmental affairs."'" By constantly repeating findings
that "'Congress might well have"' made, Morgan implied that Congress had
an "independent ability," in all respects "identical" with that of the judiciary,
'
"to interpret the Constitution for itself."252
By revealing the embarrassing
truth that Congress had conducted no hearings and produced no reports in
support of section 4(e),2"' Justice Harlan's dissent mercifully removed this
246. Id. at 649-50.
247. Id. at 650.
248. See id. at 650 n.9, 651 (noting that an earlier draft of the Fourteenth Amendment used
the phrase "necessary and proper" instead of the phrase "appropriate legislation").
249. See id. at 651 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966), and
James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1924)).
250. Id. at 653.
251.
Id. at 654-55 (emphases added and footnotes omitted).
.252. PowE, supranote 172, at 264.
253. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,669 n.9 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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dispute
from the set of legal questions that depend on the meaning of the word
''254
"is.

Moreover, by reminding the majority that the Court had relied on
Congress's consideration of concrete evidence in upholding the Civil Rights

Act of 196425 and the principal provisions of the Voting Rights Act of
1965,256 Justice Harlan showed the extent to which Morgan had relaxed an
already deferential standard of review. No longer would Congress be required
to demonstrate that the alleged injury at issue "is in truth an infringement of
the Constitution, something that [supposedly
was] the necessary prerequisite
27
to bringing the § 5 power into play at all.1
But Justice Harlan's harshest criticism triggered the most remarkable
aspect of Morgan. Justice Harlan charged that the majority's interpretation
of section 5 gave "Congress the power to define the substantive scope of the
Amendment," a dangerous sort of "'discretion"' that Congress could abuse
"by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process
decisions of this Court."258 This was not an idle prospect, for the politics of
the Warren era were, by contemporary standards, virulently hostile to civil
rights. At its most grotesque, the Senate's Southern gerontocracy elevated
massive resistance to a global stage, attempting through the Bricker
Amendment to insulate Jim Crow from international human rights treaties.25 9
254. Cf., e.g., Owaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 55-60
(1987) (holding that section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, which authorizes
civil actions "against any person.. . who is alleged to be in violation of... an effluent standard
or limitation," requires proof of an ongoing violation) (emphasis added).
255. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668-69 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
261 (1964)).
256. See id. at 667 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301,308-15 (1966)).
257. Id. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Three years later, in Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), the Court sustained the federal ban on literacy tests in a county in
which no evidence existed that the test was discriminatory or had been administered in a
discriminatory manner. The Court concluded that the county's "systematiefl" history of
"depriv[ing] its black citizens of the educational opportunities it granted to its white citizens"
all but guaranteed the deprivation of blacks' voting rights even ifthe county undertook impartial
administration of an impartial test. Id. at 296-97; accord Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
233-35 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
258. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
259.

See generally,e.g., NATAUJE HEVENERKAUFMAN,HUMANRIGHTS TREATIES AND THE

SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 94-116 (1990); DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER
AMENDMENT CONTROvERsY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER'S POUI.CAL LEADERSHiP (1988); Louis
Henkin, U.S. Ratificationof the Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost ofSenatorBricker, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995). Cf. POWE, supra note 172, at 112 (listing segregation among the
"local customs and institutions" that, according to the fears of the Bricker Amendment's
proponents, were threatened by obligations under international treaties).
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Justice Harlan warned, in effect, that Morgan's reasoning exposed Brown to
legislative override. Justice Brennan responded with footnote ten, the source
of Morgan's celebrated "one-way ratchet":
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent... § 5 does not grant
Congress power to exercise discretion in the other direction and to
enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due
process decisions of this Court." We emphasize that Congress'
power under § 5 is limited to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees. Thus, for example, an
enactment authorizing the States to establish racially segregated
systems of education would not be - as required by § 5 - a measure
"to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause since that clause of its
own force prohibits such state laws. 2 °
One final obstacle remained. Morgan all but invited the allegation of
unequal treatment that accompanies any extension of civil rights to an
identifiable group. Though section 4(e) enfranchised Spanish-speaking voters
educated in Puerto Rico, the Voting Rights Act wholly neglected other voters.
Lassiter's underlying holding having survived Morgan, all non-Englishspeaking voters, including native speakers of Spanish, educated in nonAmerican-flag schools remained subject to state literacy requirements. This
disparity raised a final objection to section 4(e): New York argued that the
provision "itself works an invidious discrimination in violation of the Fifth
Amendment by" distinguishing between non-English speakers "educated in
American-flag schools" and those "educated in schools beyond the territorial
limits of the United States in which the language of instruction was also other
261
than English.
Justice Brennan disagreed. He reasoned that constitutional doctrine
otherwise demanding "the closest scrutiny of distinctions in laws denying
fundamental rights" did not apply to "a limitation on a reform measure aimed
2 62
at eliminating an existing barrier to the exercise of the franchise.
Invocation of the one-way ratchet effectively excused Congress from the "need
[to] 'strike at all evils at the same time.' 2, 63 Observing that Congress "may take
one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to [its] legislative mind," Justice Brennan swept away the
2
objection. 6
260.
261.
262.

263.
264.

Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651-52 n.10 (1966).
Id.at 656.
Id. at 657.
Id. (quoting Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935)).
Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,489 (1955)).
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This aspect ofMorgan was deeply ironic. Though no member of the
Court bothered to take note, New York could not have deployed this equal
protection argument but for the reverse incorporation doctrine of Boiling v.
Sharpe. Moreover, Morgan's resort to this bedrock principle of rational basis
review contradicted the Warren Court's contemporaneously developed
doctrine of strict scrutiny for state laws impairing the fundamental right to
vote. The Court decided the leading case in this vein, Harperv. VirginiaBoard
of Elections,26 in the same Term as Morgan.2
Justice Brennan
acknowledged, but did not resolve, the tension.267 Had the Warren Court
followed a different course in 1954, Justice Brennan might have been able to
distinguish Harper and kindred cases by arguing that those decisions had
rested on the Equal Protection Clause and therefore did not control an
allegation of inequality within the federal Voting Rights Act. But Boiling v.
Sharpe's notion of reverse incorporation foreclosed such a strategy. If Fifth
Amendment due process demands that the federal government respect the
equivalent of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, then federal laws
affecting voting rights deserve the same level of scrutiny that would befall
similar legislation at the state level. Alone among the Justices who voted to
uphold section 4(e), Justice Douglas disassociated himself from Morgan's
resolution of the conflict.2"
Footnote ten secured Morgan's place in the civil rights jurisprudence
of the Warren era. By liberating Congress from the ministerial task of merely
ratifying judicial decisions and awarding it discretion to grant rights not yet
recognized by the Supreme Court, Morgan represented the Warren Court's
most aggressive effort to enlist Congress as a creative agent in the struggle over
civil rights. In contrast with the Warren Court's assumption in other
settings,269 this strategy treated elective politics as the preferred avenue for
achieving substantive justice.27 The gambit foreshadowed Justice Brennan's
265. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
266. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966) (holding that a state law
conditioning the franchise upon payment of a poll tax violates equal protection).
267. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647, & n.6 (1966) (recognizing how the
"Equal Protection Clause itself has been held," in cases such as Harper, "to forbid some state
laws that restrict the right to vote"); id. at 654 n. 15 (citing Harper and other cases for the
proposition that "States can be required to tailor carefully the means of satisfying a legitimate
state interest when fundamental liberties and rights are threatened").
268. Id. at 658-59 (separate statement of Douglas, J.).
269. Cf., e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) ("Groups which find
themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently turn to the courts.");
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (extolling "the basic principle that the federal judiciary
is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" and describing "that principle...
as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system").
270. Cf Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 131 & n.29 (1940) ("[L]egislatures are
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later attempt to enlist state courts in a similar campaign to extend civil rights
and liberties. 1' In this sense Morgan represents the mirror image of the
Fourteenth Amendment as its ratifying Congress saw it. Morgan interpreted

section 5as granting Congress a new source of legislative authority even as the
self-executing provisions of section 1 "[e]nlist[ed] the judiciary" as an
auxiliary force in future struggles over civil rights.272
Morgan thus transforms section 5 into "a tool that permits the
Congress to use its power to enact ordinary legislation to engage the Court in

a dialogue about our fundamental rights, thereby 'forcing' the Justices to take

a fresh look at their own judgments." 2" Extended to its logical limits, Morgan

confers "the power to enact any law which may be viewed as a measure for
correction of any condition which Congress might believe involves a denial of

equality or other fourteenth amendment rights.,, 4 Indeed, in the immediate
wake ofMorgan, six Justices went so far as to suggest that the absence of state
action no longer represented an obstacle to Congress's invocation ofits section
5 power. 5 The one-way ratchet is so symbolically alluring that Morganhas
become an essential element of the cult of William J. Brennan, Jr., as the
Warren Court's great doctrinal visionary. For "Brennan, more than any other
single justice, most fully assimilated the full jurisprudential consequences 276
of
the Warren Court's revolutionary new vision of the American polity.1

ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the
courts." (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267,270 (1904))).
271.
See generally William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977). Certain attributes of state law, such as
retention elections, may curb judicial independence. Judith S. Kaye, State Courtsat the Dawn
of a New Century, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1995).
272. Engel, supra note 214, at 128.
273. Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of
ConstitutionalDecisions, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 824 (1986).
274. Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term - Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion ofHuman Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966).
275. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,762 (1966) (Clark, J.,
joined by Black, J.,
& Fortas, J.,concurring) ("[T]here can now be no doubt that the specific language of § 5
empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies - with or without state action that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights."); id. at 782 (Brennan, J.,
joined by Warren,
C.J., & Douglas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A majority of the members of
the Court expresses the view today that § 5 empowers Congress to enact laws punishing all
conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights, whether or not state
officers or others acting under the color of state law are implicated in the conspiracy."). This
suggestion had no binding effect because a majority of Justices agreed that the complaint at
issue had successfully alleged the degree of state-law complicity needed to satisfy the
Fourteenth Amendment's traditional state action requirement. Id. at 756-57.
276. Robert C. Post, William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT
IN HISTORICAL AND POLmCAL PERSP"cTMvE 123,129 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).
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Indeed, "[t]o the extent that the [Warren] Court.. .has any intellectual legacy
that is accessible to those trained in doctrine and not in ethics, it is Brennan
who is responsible."277
At bottom, Morgan draws most of its notoriety from the one-way
ratchet's latent subversion of Marbury v. Madison's dogma that "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is."27 In so doing, Morgan epitomized and extended that proud tradition
in American constitutional law, argument by ipse dixit. After all, Marbury
grounded the 279
entire institution of judicial review in a single adverb,
"emphatically." She who lives by the ipse dixit shall die by the ipse dixit." °
But one must mourn for the Constitution. When juxtaposed, Boiling
and Morgan are fatally incoherent. The first step in exposing the
incompatibility of reverse incorporation with the one-way ratchet consists of
treating both doctrines as variants of "the oldest question of constitutional
law."" 1 Although both Boiling andMorgan are "case[s] about federalism," 2
they point in squarely opposite directions. Whereas Boiling reinvigorated the
277. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief: Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81
MICH. L. REV. 922,924 (1983).
278. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); accord,e.g., United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2000); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974);
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); see, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-14, at 342 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that Morgan displaced Marbury
by prescribing judicial deference to congressional interpretation of the Constitution); William
Cohen, CongressionalPower tolnterpretDueProcessandEqualProtection,27 STAN. L. REv.
603, 606 (1975) (same); Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right:
Reflections on City of Boeme v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 793, 811-12 (1998) (noting
the tension between Marbury'svision ofjudicial supremacy and decisions that expand the scope
of Congress's interpretive power); cf.Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,204-05 (1970) (Harlan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the Court's "duty... to make an
independent determination whether Congress has exceeded its powers" extends beyond
Marbury's dictum and "inheres in the structure of the constitutional system itself" insofar as
"Congress is subject to none of the institutional restraints imposed on judicial decisionmaking").
279. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); seeAEXANDERM. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 6 (1962) (noting the lack of textual evidence to support
Marbury's view ofjudicial review); William W. Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 22 (stating that the text of the Constitution does not indicate how
laws are to be reviewed for constitutionality). But see James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original
Jurisdiction,and the Supreme Court's SupervisoryPowers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (2001)
(marshaling historical support for Marbury's conclusions on the nature of mandamus, the
meaning of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the meaning of Article I of the Constitution).
280. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
281. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). See generally H. Jefferson
Powell, The Oldest Question of ConstitutionalLaw,79 VA. L. REv. 633, 635 (1993).
282. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991). For a forceful description of
Morgan from the perspective of federalism, see Cohen, supra note 278, at 604-09.
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Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause as a restraint on federal legislative
power, Morgan aggressively expanded the power of Congress to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. Boiling used Brown's expansion of equal protection
to constrain federal power, while Morgan ratified a congressional bid to
protect the franchise more aggressively than the Supreme Court had in
Lassiter. Reverse incorporation shackles the federal government in a fashion
akin to the way incorporation of the Bill of Rights handicaps the states. In
contrast, coextensive congressional enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment
represents a dramatic expansion in federal authority over civil rights.
Moving from federalism's structural perspective to a more overtly
substantive assessment heightens the tension between Boiling and Morgan.
Reverse incorporation under Boiling invokes a rigidly formal conception of
equality. Subjecting the federal government and the states to identical equal
protection analysis grows out of a very simple sense of fair play. In America,
"'playing fair' means making everyone play by the same rules" - precisely
what it meant when most Americans learned in kindergarten to "clean up your
own mess" and not to "take things that aren't yours."2 3 A similar attraction to
formal equality animated the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions.s 4
In contrast, Morgan's one-way ratchet implicitly endorses the
antisubordination interpretation of equal protection.2"' According to this
theory, the equality that matters is substantive rather than formal; structural
equality achieves nothing unless the law can bring historically downtrodden
groups into parity with socially dominant groups. As if to express faith in the
inevitability of progress through constitutional law,?" footnote ten represents
a constitutional variant of the Voting Rights Act's nonretrogression
principle." Morgan reads as though the only sin greater than America's fall
283.
Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme CourtReally Needs to Know It Learnedfrom the
Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REv. 459, 481 (1997) ("These fundamentals reflect our liberal
attachment to individualism and formal neutrality."). See generally ROBERT FULGHUM, ALL I
REALLY NEED TO KNOW ILEARNED iNKNDERGARTEN: UNCOMMON THOUGHTS ON COMMON
THINGS (1988).
284. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLCTED WOUND 27-66 (1970)
(discussing the impact of racial equality on the Warren Court's "Due Process Revolution" in the
constitutional law of criminal procedure).
285. On the antisubordination principle, see generally, for example, CATHARINE A.
MACKINNON, TOWARD AFEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34 (1989); Ruth Colker, Anti-

SubordinationAbove All: Sex, Race, andEqualProtection,61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1006-10
(1986); Robin L. West, Equality Theory, MaritalRape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45,60-63 (1990).
286.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS

CRmcs (1991) (examining the widespread faith in the inevitability of progress and the
limitations on that belief).
The nonretrogression principle prevents a federal court from approving a proposed
287.
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from grace was the failure to learn from the nation's historic shortcomings.""8
"A man, though wise, should never be ashamed / of learning more, and must

unbend his mind. / Have you not seen the trees beside the torrent, / the ones that

bend them saving every leaf, / while the resistant perish root and branch?" 28 9
Bolling's brand of formal equality and Morgan'snarrative of learning
through learning cannot coexist in formal, doctrinal terms. These doctrines,
however intuitively appealing when considered individually, consume each
other. Bolling's variant of formal equality is "irreconcilable" with any use of
the one-way ratchet to implement "the antisubordination principle" and a

"group-based approach to equal protection."'2"c Morgan established the

principle that "legislation enacted pursuant to section five must not violate
another constitutional right, because it would then fail the 'appropriate

legislation' requirement" of that provision. 29 ' This is hardly an impressive
demand; even the weakest standards of constitutional validity require

compliance with independent constitutional commands. 292 But almost every
use of the one-way ratchet struggles to clear even this modest hurdle.
Virtually every effort to lift one historically downtrodden group vis-d-vis the
dominant majority creates an incipient violation of equal protection, an

obligation incorporated against the federal government through Bolling's
interpretation of Fifth Amendment due process. Morgan itself showed how
"ratcheting up" the rights of one group can be construed as "ratcheting down"
voting change that will lead to "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect
to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141
(1976); accord Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 983 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 654
(1993).
288. 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DLEMMA 997 (Pantheon Books 1972) (1944)
("Nothing is irredeemable until it is past."), quoted in Daniel A. Farber, The Outmoded Debate
over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 893,934 (1994).
289. SOPHoCLEsAntigone(Elizabeth Wyckofftrans., 1954) in SOPHoCLEs I, at 157, 183
(David Grene & Richard Lattimore eds., 1954). Formerly segregated public school systems, of
course, are charged to eliminate the vestiges of such "racial discrimination... root and branch."
Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968); accord, e.g.,
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 486 (1992); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S.
189, 213 (1973); Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450,458 (1968).
290. Serena J. Hoy, InterpretingEqual Protection: Congress, the Court,and the Civil
RightsActs, 16 J.L. & POL. 381,419 n.141 (2000).
291.
Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire,47 UCLA L. REV. 653,676 (2000).
292. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208 (1987) (acknowledging that
"constitutional provisions" besides the Tenth Amendment "may provide an independent bar to
the conditional grant of federal funds"); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)
(requiring that the regulation of symbolic conduct fall "within the constitutional power of the
Government"); cf Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (declining to give full
credit to "a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity[,] . . . parental
right," or other interest protected by another provision of the Constitution).
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on the rights of another. "[F]rom the perspective of voters who could read
English," section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act "diluted their rights to control
the outcomes of elections by adding in a number of unqualified voters who
'
might tip the election scales."293
The point applies readily outside the voting
context and is just as easily summarized: Every effort to "expand" civil rights
for some may abridge the civil rights of others.
The 1993 case ofHeller v. Doe29 4 illustrates this central contradiction.
In Addington v. Texas,2" decided in 1979, the Supreme Court held that
involuntary commitment for reasons other than criminal conviction could
proceed, as a matter of due process, only upon presentation of clear and
convincing evidence. 2" Heller involved Kentucky's separate procedures for
the involuntary commitment of the mentally retarded and of the mentally ill.
Although Kentucky satisfied the Addington threshold for both classes, it
provided an additional layer of protection for the mentally ill. The mentally
ill, unlike the mentally retarded, could be involuntarily confined only upon a
showing of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 2" In addition, family members
could participate "as if a party" in involuntary commitment proceedings
involving the mentally retarded, but not in proceedings involving the mentally
9
2
ill. 8

Like Morgan, Heller involved a selectively applied one-way ratchet.
Kentucky boosted the procedural protection afforded to one socially
disfavored class (the mentally ill) without elevating the protection afforded to
another disfavored class (the mentally retarded). Kentucky at no point violated
the mentally retarded class's entitlement, as a matter of due process, to a
standard of review based on clear and convincing evidence. 29 9 Although a
majority of the Court eventually concluded that key differences between
mental illness and mental retardation justified this procedural difference, no
fewer than three Justices reasoned that Kentucky's "decision to provide [a]
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

POWE, supra note 172, at 264.
Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,433 (1979).
Heller, 509 U.S. at 317.

298.

Id. at 315.

299. Id. at 323.
300. Id. at 321-25. The Heller majority acknowledged that mental retardation is typically
manifested in childhood and is therefore easier to diagnose, id. at 321-22, that mentally retarded
persons requiring involuntary commitment often compile a more extensive record of danger to
themselves and to others, id. at 324, and that mental retardation involves "much less invasive"
therapy than does mental illness, id. at 324. For extensive discussions of mental retardation in
the context of capital sentencing, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, __, 122 S. Ct. 2242,
2250-52 (2002); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 323-25 (1989).
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high burden of proof in involuntary commitment proceedings where illness is
alleged" undermined the state's claim that distinctions between mental illness
and retardation "can rationally justify provision of less protection" in cases
involving alleged retardation.3"' Indeed, the Heller dissenters ultimately
accused the majority of allowing Kentucky "to draw a distinction that is
difficult to see as resting on anything other than the stereotypical assumption
that the retarded are 'perpetual children." 302
C. Main Street US.A.
The third plank of the Warren Court consensus on civil rights was its
least innovative - and, consequently, its most doctrinally secure.30 3 Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Warren Court decisions upholding it Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States" 4 and Katzenbach v.
McClung3 5 - buried the old ghosts ofthe Civil Rights Cases and implemented
equal access to public accommodations after eighty-one years of frustration.3"
Heart of Atlanta and McClung exploited the lone channel of legislative
authority not foreclosed in the Civil Rights Cases: the power of Congress "[t]o
regulate Commerce . .. among the several States."3' ' But the Commerce
Clause jurisprudence that performed the heavy lifting had already been fully
developed during the New Deal, particularly in the decisional triad of NLRB
v. Jones &LaughlinSteel Corp.,308 UnitedStates v. Darby,3" and Wickard v.

Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 338-39 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting).
301.
302. Id. at 348 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Cf Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Haf The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional
303.
Law, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 921, 926 (2001) (describing the "perverse incentive[s]" that give rise
to "original, creative, even brilliant" constitutional theories that are also "quite obviously
wrong"). See generally Daniel A. Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987)
(arguing that legal scholarship places too much emphasis on "brilliance" at the expense of
common sense); Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance,70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986)
(same).
304. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
305. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
306. See supra notes 201-08 and accompanying text (detailing the Court's rejection of
congressional power to remedy private discrimination in the CivilRights Cases).
307. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 3; see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 278 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that Civil Rights Cases did not prevent
Congress from enacting antidiscrimination statutes under its Commerce Clause power); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18-19 (1883) (leaving open the possibility of antidiscrimination
legislation under Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce).
308. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
309. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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Filburn."° These three cases, especially Jones & Laughlin, are widely
acknowledged as establishing the crucial turning point in the Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. 3"
By contrast, the Warren Court's
Commerce Clause cases cut little if any new doctrinal ground. Even a quick
glance at Heart of Atlanta and McClung suffices to demonstrate how
unexceptional both cases really were.
Subjecting both the Heart of Atlanta Motel and Ollie's Barbecue to the
Civil Rights Act breathed life into the established proposition that "[i]f it is
interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the
operation which applies the squeeze."3 2 McClung in particular confirmed
Wickard v. Filburn's principle that a single actor's impact on interstate
commerce, though "trivial by itself," may nevertheless fall within "the scope
of federal regulation where. . . his contribution, taken together with that of
many others similarly situated, is far from trivial. 31 3 Heart of Atlanta
reaffirmed an even older truism of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. After all,
the Court had said nearly half a century earlier that "the authority of Congress
to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious
'
uses... is no longer open to question."3 14
(Indeed, the notion that Congress
may direct its commerce power against immoral activity is at least as old as
Champion v. Ames.'5) Both HeartofAtlanta andMcClungadopted a rational
basis standard of review for challenges to congressional uses of the commerce
power. 6" McClung added one final observation: that "Congress ... included
310. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). All three of these decisions figured in Heart of Atlanta's
catalogue of cases upholding uses of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Heart of Atlanta,
379 U.S. at 256-57.
311.
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 (2000) ("[I]n the years since NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., Congress has had considerably greater latitude ... than our
previous case law permitted."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995) ("Jones &
Laughlin Steel, Darby,and Wickard ushered in an era of Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
greatly expanded the previously defined authority of Congress."); id. at 573 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (describing Jones & Laughlin as the "case that seems to mark the Court's definitive
commitment to the practical conception of the commerce power").
312. United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460,464 (1949); accord
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,258 (1964).
313. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942); accordKatzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 301 (1964).
314. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917); accordHeart of Atlanta, 379
U.S. at 256.
315. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 357 (1903) ("Congress for the purpose of
guarding the people . . . against the 'widespread pestilence' of lotteries, may prohibit the
carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another.").
316. See McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04 ("[Wlhere we find that the legislators... have a
rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce,
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findings" was "not fatal to the validity of the statute" under
no formal
317
review.
Unlike Boilingand Morgan, therefore, HeartofAtlanta andMcClung
registered primarily political rather than doctrinal points. These decisions
expanded racial integration beyond its origins in public school desegregation
and voting rights and made its impact felt squarely at the motel, the barbecue
shack, and every other business on Main Street U.S.A. The suggestion that the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 had been passed "to relieve a burden on interstate
commerce [was] so much hogwash," for Congress plainly intended to "control
discrimination by individuals."31 If the Warren Court covered any new
ground in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it did so in Marylandv. Wirtz,3" 9
which developed the "enterprise concept" in upholding the extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act32 to hospitals, institutions, and schools operated by
state and local governments.321 Wirtz's second significant holding, that the
Tenth Amendment afforded these governments no immunity against federal
regulation, 3' would become the casus belli in the Burger Court's leading foray
into the law of federalism. Wirtz also withheld judgment on the ability of
Congress to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. 23 The Rehnquist Court, of course, would eventually develop a
deep body of case law on that topic.324 Wirtz's travails notwithstanding, the
our investigation is at an end."); Heart ofAtlanta, 379 U.S. at 258 ("The only questions are: ...
(1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels

affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate that
evil are reasonable and appropriate."); id. at 252 ("[T]he means chosen by [Congress] must be
reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution ....The Constitution requires no
more.").
317. McClung, 379 U.S. at 304 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 (1938)).
318. RICHARD CORTNER, CIVIL RIGHTS AND PUBUC ACCOMMODATIONS: THE HA RT OF
A T4NTA AND MCCLUNo CAsES 115 (2001) (quoting Moreton Rolleston, counsel for the Heart
of Atlanta Motel).
319. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
320. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1964 & Supp. II 1968) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 192-93 (1962), overruledby Nat'l League of Cities
321.
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469

U.S. 528 (1985).
322. See id. at 197 ("[]fa state is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated
by the federal government when engaged in by private parties, the state too may be forced to
conform its activities to federal regulation.").
323.

Id. at 199-200.

324. See infra notes 668-79 and accompanying text (describing the elaboration of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence by the Rehnquist Court).
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Warren Court's extension of the civil rights agenda into the private sphere
would remain afait accompli.
The Civil Rights Act cases do illuminate the contrast between Boiling
and Morgan. HeartofAtlanta andMcClung continued a trend that had begun
during the New Deal. Under Chief Justices Hughes and Stone, the Court had
effectively forsworn two potent sources of judicial leverage over Congress.
Soon after the celebrated "switch in time" of West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish,325 the Court jettisoned the substantive component of Fifth
Amendment due process.3 26 At the same time, Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and
Filburn also abandoned any serious effort to enforce internal limits on
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. The Warren Court not
only relied upon these Commerce Clause cases in upholding the Civil Rights
Act; it also adopted the same rational basis standard of judicial review for
federal legislation arising under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.3 27 Within this pattern of deference to the federal
government's legislative prerogative, the lone exception was Bolling. Heart
of Atlanta and McClung merely reinforced the doctrinal incongruity of
subjecting Congress to closer judicial scrutiny in the name of due process and
equal protection while simultaneously expanding congressional authority to
enforce those very principles, at least as against the states.
However, whatever the legal infirmities of the Nickel and Five,
Boiling, Morgan, and the Civil Rights Act duology pointed uniformly toward
heightened vigilance against racial discrimination - and toward the political
triumph of the Warren Court's civil rights agenda. Though Bolling and
Morgan might have been legally incongruent, the confluence of those
"Shackling" the federal
decisions promised great political success.
government gave Brown greater legitimacy, especially in the face of a Cold
War in which the opposition tried to use the example of Southern segregation
to discredit American culture. The persistent "gap between promise and
achievement in the United States" would demoralize, even repulse, potential
allies abroad, "particularly in what would become known as the Third

325. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (holding that a state
legislature has the power to set minimum wages), overrulingAdkins v. Children's Hosp., 261

U.S. 525 (1923).
326. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (holding that a federal
minimum wage law did not deny due process under the Fifth Amendment); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 148 (1938) (holding that a federal ban on the interstate
shipment of filled milk did not infringe Fifth Amendment due process rights).
327. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651,653 n.11 (1966).
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World."3
"Racism thus became unpatriotic";32 9 opposition to it by any
judicial means necessary became a Cold War imperative.33 ° But as the Bricker
Amendment showed, there lurked the dangerous prospect that hostile
congressional forces could transmogrify Morgan into an instrument of racial
oppression. This menace explains why Justice Brennan took pains in footnote

ten of that opinion to ensure that Congress could not roll back judicial
advances in civil rights.331 Earl Warren, who had crossed the Pacific to amass

international credentials in preparation for his failed presidential campaign, 3 2
proved uniquely suited to play the combined role of Cold Warrior and civil

rights champion.
And so these three abode, Boiling,Morgan, and the Warren Court's

Commerce Clause jurisprudence. That these cases were in significant respects
impossible to reconcile is neither surprising nor inescapably debilitating, for
"[t~he necessity of choosing between absolute claims is .. . an inescapable
'
characteristic of the human condition."333
Indeed, a "clash of doctrines is not

a disaster - it is an opportunity."334 The task of harmonizing the constituent
parts of the Nickel and Five, however, would fall upon the Warren Court's
successors.
I1.The NixonburgerInterregnum
Never ascribe to malice that which is adequately explained by
stupidity.

328.
329.
330.
L. REv.
331.
332.

Folk aphorism known as "Hanlon's Razor"

33 5

CRAY, supranote 8, at 276.
Id.
See generally Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregationas a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN.
61 (1988).
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651-52 n.10.
See CRAY, supra note 8, at 219 (describing Warren's gradual acquisition of

"competence in the international arena" on par with "that of Ohio Senator Robert A. Taft," from
his involvement in "the founding session of the United Nations in San Francisco" to a 1951
encounter in Japan with the wounded of California's division inthe Korean War).
333. Isaiah Berlin, Two ConceptsofLiberty, in FoURESsAYs oNLIBERTY 118,169 (1969).
334.

ALFRED NORTH WHITEBEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WoRLD 266 (1929).

335. "Hanlon's Razor" is quoted in many sources, most of them online. One printed source
is ARTHUR BLOCH, MURPHY'S LAW BOOK Two: MORE REAsONS WHY THINGS Go WRONG! 52
(1980). A very similar quotation, "You have attributed conditions to villainy that simply result
from stupidity," appears in a science fiction story by Robert A. Heinlein. ROBERT A. HEINLIN,
Logic of Empire, in THE GREEN HLLS OF EARTH 195, 247 (1951). The maxim's popularity
among hackers suggests that "Hanlon" is simply a corruption of "Heinlein." Numerous other
online sources attribute the following version of the proverb to Napoleon: "Never ascribe to
malice that which is adequately explained by incompetence." Research in English- and Frenchlanguage sources, however, failed to unearth any firm documentation that the Emperor of
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A. Nixon as Nemesis
Earl Warren's judicial career ended much as it had begun: as a
byproduct of Republican presidential politics and, in particular, of Richard
Nixon's machinations. It is gross understatement to mention, as one of the
Chief Justice's biographers has, that "Warren's distrust of [Richard] Nixon
was long-standing."336 Earl Warren never lost his hatred for "Tricky Dick,"
'
whom he called "a crook and a thief."337
Over its long course, the bitter
rivalry between these California Republicans warped the Supreme Court.
The June 5, 1968 assassination of Democratic candidate Robert F.
Kennedy gave Richard Nixon, the Republican frontrunner, "an unanticipated
political advantage" in the 1968 presidential campaign. 3 The suddenly
palpable prospect of a Nixon presidency accelerated Chief Justice Warren's
retirement schedule. 3 9 Hoping to enable President Johnson to appoint his
successor, Earl Warren tendered his resignation "as Chief Justice of the
United States effective at [the President's] pleasure. 3 40 That summer,
however, Richard Nixon's presidential campaign pounded the Warren Court
in order to win support from "southerners still smarting from Brown, . ..
whites in northern cities worried about rising crime rates, [and] country folk
who had lost their veto power in state legislatures. '341
Conservative
Republicans assailed what they perceived as Chief Justice Warren's attempt
to manipulate the choice of his own successor. 42
President Johnson made a final, fatal return to his inner political
circle. He tapped two cronies for the Court, designating Associate Justice
Abe Fortas as Earl Warren's successor and nominating Fifth Circuit Judge
Homer Thomberry to fill what would be Fortas's vacant seat.34' The Fortas
nomination became a fiasco. Justice Fortas endured a catastrophic barrage of

France ever uttered this phrase.

336.
337.

POLLACK, supranote 52, at 9.
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT -A

JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 21 (1983) (quoting Earl Warren, Jr.), Hutchinson, supranote 277, at 927;
see also POLLACK, supra note 52, at 286-88 (detailing the longstanding antagonism between
Nixon and Warren).

338.

POLLACK,supra note 52, at 275.

339.

CRAY, supra note 8, at 494; POLLACK, supra note 52, at 275.

340.

CRAY, supranote 8, at 496.

341.

Id. at 497-98; see also POLLACK, supra note 52, at 269 ("Opposition to Miranda[v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] became a campaign rallying cry .... [and] a major issue in
Richard Nixon's presidential campaign in 1968.").
342. CRAY, supra note 8, at 498-99; POLLACK, supra note 52, at 276.
343. CRAY, supra note 8, at 499; POLLACK, supra note 52, at 278.
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questions before a hostile Senate Judiciary Committee 344 and eventually came

under fire for having received $15,000 in exchange for conducting nine

seminars at American University on social aspects of the law. 4 Vanquished
by a Senate filibuster, Justice Fortas asked President Johnson to withdraw his
nomination on October 2.346 Aware that he would "leave the impression he
had elected to retire because he feared Richard Nixon would appoint his
successor," Chief Justice Warren did not withdraw his resignation.347 On
Monday, October 7, less than a week after the implosion of the Fortas
nomination, Earl Warren presided over the Supreme Court in his sixteenth and
final Term as Chief Justice.34
Chief Justice Warren could do little besides watch Richard Nixon
toward
the presidency. When Nixon's "mean-spirited presidential
sweep
campaign" targeted "Attorney General Ramsey Clark - as if he were
responsible for crime in local communities" - an angry Earl Warren took the
unprecedented step of rebuking a presidential candidate.349 But Nixon would
not be denied the White House - or an opportunity to reshape the Supreme
Court to his liking. "The chief justice saw his worst fear realized: Richard
Nixon was president-elect, and the question of Earl Warren's retirement 'at
the pleasure of the president"' lay entirely in Nixon's hands."
In one of the twentieth century's most ironic political moments, Chief
Justice Earl Warren swore in Richard M. Nixon as President on January 20,
1969. But for Nixon, the Chief Justice told a friend, Earl Warren might have
taken that oath in 1953.35. President-elect Nixon had agreed that Chief Justice
Warren would continue to preside over the Supreme Court until the end of the
1968 Term. 52 Nixon held one final trump card, however. Weeks before the
end of the Term, a Life magazine article revealed that Justice Fortas accepted
a $20,000 annual fee as director of financier Louis Wolfson's charitable
foundation.353 Justice Fortas was "on a lifetime retainer of a man later
convicted of securities fraud."354 Nixon's Justice Department threatened
344. CRAY, supra note 8, at 500-01; POLLACK, supranote 52, at 280-81.
345. CRAY, supra note 8, at 501; POLLACK, supra note 52, at 281.
346. CRAY, supra note 8, at 501; POLLACK, supra note 52, at 282.
347. CRAY, supra note 8, at 502.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 503-04.
350. Id. at 504.
351. Id. at 505; see SCHWARTZ, supra note 337, at 723 (identifying Warren's confidant as
Herbert 0. Klein).
352. CRAY, supra note 8, at 505; POLLACK, supra note 52, at 285.
353. CRAY, supra note 8, at 508-10; PoLLAcK, supra note 52, at 288-90.
354. CRAY, supra note 8, at 509.
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impeachment. Justice Fortas's resignation on May 14, 1969, coupled with
Warren's retirement, opened the "path... for Nixon to fill not one but two
Court vacancies. "1 On June 23, 1969, before a Supreme Court audience, Earl
Warren35presented
Warren E. Burger as the fifteenth Chief Justice ofthe United
6
States.

And so the "Nixonburger" Court displaced the Warren Court. Richard
Nixon became the first presidential candidate to treat the composition of the
Supreme Court and the content of its decisions as campaign fodder. "Some of
our judges have gone too far," he asserted, "in assuming unto themselves a
mandate which is not there, and that is, to put their social and economic ideas
into their decisions. '357 President Nixon would eventually appoint four
Justices - Warren E. Burger, Harry A. Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and
William H. Rehnquist. These four were merely the first among eleven
consecutive Supreme Court appointments by Republican Presidents; a full
quarter-century, from October 2, 1967 (Thurgood Marshall) to August 10,
1993 (Ruth Bader Ginsburg), passed between Supreme Court appointments by
Democratic Presidents. Having prevailed on the presidential stage that proved
to be Earl Warren's lone political defeat, Richard Nixon stood on the verge of
remaking American constitutional law through raw political will.
B. The Nickel andFive Survives
Despite Nixon's lifelong rivalry with Warren, the "Nixonburger"
Court never did carry out its threatened revolution. The subtitle of a prominent
collection of essays on the Burger Court says it all: "The Counter-Revolution
That Wasn't. "3 11 "The Burger Court, far from reversing or otherwise undoing
its predecessor Warren Court, was marked by a generally surprising penchant
for judicial activism, even in such unexpected areas as civil rights and civil
liberties."359 Rather than "engage in wholesale reversals of liberal precedents,"
a Court dominated by Nixon appointees succeeded at most in "limit[ing] rights
for criminal defendants" but "ultimately disappointed conservatives" by
moving "in liberal directions on so many other important issues, most notably

355.
356.

POLLACK, supra note 52, at 290.
CRAY, supranote 8, at 514.
357. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE CONTINUITY OF CHANGE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
INDIVIDuALLmERTEs, 1953-1986, at 18 (1991) (quoting Nixon).
358.

See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T

(Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
359.
HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICEs AND PRESIDENTS:
APPOINTMENT TO THE SUPREME COURT 349 (3d ed. 1992).

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
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in abortion and affirmative action."" t As for the threatened demolition of the
can be accused at most of
Warren Court's civil rights legacy, the Burger Court
3 61
approaching that task with "all deliberate speed.
In the civil rights arena, the Burger Court did not eclipse, but rather
extended, the Warren Court. Differences in these Courts' Eighth Amendment
and equal protection decisions are illustrative. Despite acknowledging "the
arguments... against capital punishment, both on moral grounds and in terms
of accomplishing the purposes of punishment," Chief Justice Warren himself
wrote that "the death penalty... cannot be said to violate the constitutional
concept of cruelty. '362 It was the Burger Court that suspended every capital

sentence in the nation.363 In imposing the capital punishment moratorium, the
Burger Court disregarded year-old precedent squarely on point 64 and, in so
doing, outperformed the Warren Court in "cast[ing] overboard numerous
settled decisions, and indeed even whole areas of law, with an unceremonious
'heave-ho.' 3 65 The Warren Court's successors have given real meaning to the
old Chief Justice's observation that the Eighth Amendment "must draw its
meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a
66
society.0
maturing
Changes in equal protection doctrine were even more dramatic.
Whereas the Warren Court had succeeded in adding exactly one class bastards367 - to the list of "discrete and insular" groups warranting special

360. Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court
PackingEfforts ofPresidentsReagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1111, 1116 (1994).
361.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
362. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.) (dictum).
363. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,239-40 (1972) (per curiam).
364. MeGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183,208 (1971).
365.
Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 109 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
366. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.); accord, e.g., Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, ___, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (2002) (subjecting cruelty claims to
standards "that currently prevail"); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (stating that
"[n]o static 'test"' governs the determination of whether a certain punishment is cruel and
unusual); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 269-70 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 327, 329
(Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 383 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 409 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); see id. at 425 (Powell, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that "[t]he plurality opinion
in Trop v. Dulles... in large measure.., provides the foundation for the present attack on the
death penalty"); id. at 429 (Powell, J., dissenting).
367. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (invalidating a state statute that denied
illegitimate children the opportunity to recover damages for the wrongful death of their mother);
Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968) (finding no rational basis for
the denial under state law of recovery for the wrongful death of an illegitimate son).
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judicial solicitude,3 the Burger Court adopted some form of heightened
scrutiny for sex-based classifications369 and for alienage. Under these
conditions, the Nickel and Five survived. Despite the doctrinal weaknesses
underlying Boiling and Morgan, the Burger Court did not affirmatively
dismantle any of the components of the Warren Court's civil rights consensus.
The Burger Court never questioned the authority of Boiling or Morgan.
Overruling either case would have been, in Bolling's words, "unthinkable."
By the same token, the Burger Court did not stretch Boiling and
Morgan to their logical limits. In particular, alienage cases of that era
exposed subtle differences between Fifth Amendment due process and
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection - nuances that Boiling had missed.
The 1971 case of Graham v. Richardson37 recognized for the first time that
aliens as a class "are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority" and
3 71
that classifications on that basis therefore merit "close judicial scrutiny."
Two years later, the Court relied upon Graham to invalidate not only a state
law restricting competitive civil service positions to United States citizens,372
but also a state law excluding aliens from the practice of law. 3
The real test came in a pair of 1976 controversies that contested
whether "overriding national interests may provide a justification for a
citizenship requirement in...
federal [law] even though an identical
requirement may not be enforced by a State. 0' 4 An affirmative answer would
contradict Bolling's assertion that "it would be unthinkable that" Fifth
Amendment due process "would impose a lesser duty on the Federal

368. United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
369. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[Classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives."); cf.Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1973) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.) (declaring "classifications based upon sex... inherently invidious" and subjecting
such classifications "to strict judicial scrutiny"); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)
(invalidating a legal "difference in the sex of competing applicants" for lacking "a rational
relationship to a (legitimate] state objective").
370. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
371.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,372 (1971) (quoting CaroleneProds.,304 U.S.
at 152 n.4).
372. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 643 (1973). Sugarman did permit the states to
deny aliens the "right to vote or to hold high public office," giving the state particularly wide
latitude to regulate "functions that go to the heart of representative government." Id. at 647;
accordGregory v. Ashcrofi, 501 U.S. 452,461 (1991).
373. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 (1973) (finding committee failed to show
relevance of citizenship to lawyers' ability to represent clients). Sugarman and Griffiths were
both decided on June 25, 1973.
374. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 (1976).
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Government" than Fourteenth Amendment equal protection imposes on the
states.3" But the Constitution vests the power to regulate immigration and
naturalization in the federal government to the exclusion of the states,376 and
this intrinsically political federal power is uniquely ill-suited to extensive
judicial review.3" Mathews v. Diaz,3" which involved the federal equivalent
of Graham's state-law restriction on welfare payments to aliens, declined to
infer "'invidious[ly]"' "disparate treatment" from the "fact that an Act of
Congress treats aliens differently from citizens."' 9 After observing that
classifications affecting aliens "are frequently of a character more appropriate
3 ' Diaz
to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the Judiciary,""
concluded that "the relationship between aliens and the States" and the
relationship "between aliens and the Federal Government" were
"significantly" and sufficiently different to warrant different "equal protection
analysis" in the two settings.38
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,3" 2 the second alienage case decided on
June 1, 1976, provided an even more extensive justification for "selective
federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual State."3 3
Mow Sun Wong was the federal analogue of Sugarman; it involved a Civil
Service Commission regulation barring noncitizens, including lawfully
admitted resident aliens, from competitive positions in the federal civil
service.3"4 Justice Stevens reasoned, however, "that the paramount federal
power over immigration and naturalization forecloses a simple extension of
the holding in Sugarman."35 Mow Sun Wong recognized what Boiling
categorically denied: that the equal protection component within "the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee of due process" and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment "are not always coextensive."38 6 Despite the
differences in "the language of the two Amendments," Fifth Amendment due
process and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection do "hav[e] the same
375. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
376. E.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,42 (1915).
377. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) (noting that the
power to exclude or expel aliens greatly affects international relations).
378. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
379. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
380. Id. at 81.
381. Id. at 84-85.
382. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
383. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
384. Id. at 90.
385. Id.
386. Id.
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significance" when federal law governs "only a limited territory, such as the
District of Columbia, or an insular possession," or "when there is no special
national interest" at stake.38 7 Neither condition applied to a nationwide rule
restricting aliens' eligibility for positions in the federal civil service.
Yet Mow Sun Wong did not drain all critical power from the equal
protection component of Fifth Amendment due process. "When the Federal
Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a
discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if
adopted by a State," the Court held, "due process requires that there be a
legitimate basis for presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that
interest. 3 8 Because exclusion from the federal civil service effected the
"deprivation of an important liberty" from a broad class of lawfully admitted
resident aliens, the Court concluded, due process requires that such a decision,
if made by a lower-level agency such as the Civil Service Commission rather
than by the President or by Congress, "be justified by reasons which are
properly the concern of that agency."3 9 This highly intricate elaboration of
Bolling's "reverse incorporation" principle, however, had virtually no impact
on the rest of the Burger Court's jurisprudence. In cases not involving
alienage classifications, the Court continued to insist that "[e]qual protection
analysis in the 9Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth
3
Amendment. 0
As for Morgan, the second leg ofthe Warren Court's civil rights triad,
the Burger Court entertained two landmark cases concerning the scope of
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. In Oregon v.
" ' a horribly splintered Court reviewed three provisions of the
Mitchell,39
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970."
One provision lowered the
387. Id. (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271
U.S. 500 (1926)); see also id. at 100 n.17 ("Since the Due Process Clause appears in both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, whereas the Equal Protection Clause does not, it is quite
clear that the primary office of the latter differs from, and is additive to, the protection
guaranteed by the former.").
388. Id. at 103.
389. Id.at 116.
390.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); accord Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (relying on Buckley for the proposition that "both Amendments require the
same type of analysis"); see also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)
("This Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely
the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
391.
400U.S. 112(1970).
392. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970) (Black, J.) (framing issues rising
under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified
as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (1994))).
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minimum voting age in both state and federal elections from twenty-one to
eighteen. Another imposed a five-year moratorium on literacy tests in state and
federal elections in any area in which the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had not
already banned such tests. Finally, a third provision prescribed uniform
national rules for absentee voting in presidential and vice-presidential
elections, effectively forbidding states from using state residency requirements
to disqualify voters in such elections."'
No Justice voted to strike the literacy test provisions, and all members
of the Court except Justice Harlan voted to uphold the absentee ballot
provisions.394 Mitchell's bitterest controversy therefore centered on the voting
age provisions. Justice Black's position controlled the fate ofthese provisions.
Together with Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, and Marshall, he concluded
that Congress could enfranchise eighteen-year-olds in national elections.39
Justice Black formed a separate alliance, again solely as to result, with Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun to invalidate the
imposition of an eighteen-year-old voting age in state and local elections."
On the whole, Mitchell upheld the eighteen-year-old vote provisions as applied
to federal elections and invalidated them as applied to state and local elections.
Within the coalition to uphold the eighteen-year-old federal voting age,
Justice Black alone rested on Congress's Article I, section 4 power to "make
or alter... Regulations" affecting "[t]he Times, Places and Manner ofholding
Elections for Senators and Representatives." 3" Relying on Morgan's
description of section 5 as "a positive grant of legislative power authorizing
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation
is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,"'3"e Justice
Douglas was willing to assume that Congress could have "conclude[d] that a
reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 was needed in the interest of equal
protection."3 99 Speaking for himself as well as Justices White and Marshall,
Justice Brennan characterized the question before the Court not as "one of
judicial power under the Equal Protection Clause," but rather as a "question
[of] . . . the scope of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth
393. Id. (Black, J.).
394. Id. at 118-19 (Black, J.).
395. Id. at 118 (Black, J.).
396. Id. (Black, J.).
397. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 123-24 (Black, J.) (reasoning
that Congress has "ultimate supervisory power over congressional elections").
398. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966); accord Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 141 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting language from Morgan).
399. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 141 (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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Amendment."4'
Invoking Morgan for the proposition that "Section 5
empowers Congress to make its own [factual] determination[s], '1 40 1 Justice
Brennan concluded that Congress has "ample power" under section 5 to lower
the voting age in order to remedy perceived discrimination."'
To the extent that Morgan might have been interpreted as giving
Congress an independent, substantive power to define civil rights, that
suggestion garnered no more than four votes in Mitchell. Justice Black's
principal opinion inMitchell summarized what appeared to be the post-Warren
Court consensus regarding the "limitations upon Congress' power to enforce
the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments":4 3
First, Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the
Constitution. Second, the power granted to Congress was not
intended to strip the States of their power to govern themselves or
to convert our national government of enumerated powers into a
central government ofunrestrained authority over every inch of the
whole Nation. Third, Congress may only "enforce" the provisions
of the amendments and may do so only by "appropriate legislation."
Congress has no power under the enforcement sections to undercut
the amendments' guarantees ofpersonal equality and freedom from
discrimination, or to undermine those protections of the Bill of
Rights which we have held the Fourteenth Amendment made
applicable to the States. 4
For Justice Black, the second of these three limitations proved crucial to the
constitutionality of the 1970 amendments' voting age provisions. Implying
that "state and local elections" represented "a domain. . . exclusively reserved
by the Constitution to the [States]," he regarded as fatal Congress's failure to
make "legislative findings that the twenty-one-year-old vote requirement [had
been] used by the [States] to disenfranchise voters on account of race."405
Four other members of the Mitchell Court shared Justice Black's
reluctance to expand section 5 into a general grant of legislative authority,
especially with respect to matters committed to the jurisdiction of the states.

400. Id. at 246 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
401. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654-56).
402. Id. at 280-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
403. Id. at 128 (Black, J.).
404. Id. at 128-29 (Black, J.) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.1 0(1966)
and other cases).
405. Id. at 130 (Black, J.). Justice Black added that he had "serious[] doubt that such a
finding, if made, could be supported by substantial evidence." Id. (Black, J.).
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As he had in Morgan,4"6 Justice Harlan rejected Justice Brennan's aggressive
interpretation of section 5." He took particular issue with the suggestion that
Morgan authorized Congress to grant by statute any civil right as long as it
does not dilute judicially recognized rights."" "To allow a simple majority of
Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation," he
concluded, is "fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional
structure."4' 9 According to Justice Harlan, Justice Brennan's emphasis on the
factfinding competence of Congress vis-a-vis the federal judiciary was wholly
inapposite in light of the Constitution's commitment "to the States" of
discretionary choices over "voter qualifications."4 1
Writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Blackmun, Justice
Stewart also rejected the proposition that Morgan "established the power of
Congress, under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to nullify state laws
requiring voters to be 21 years of age or older if Congress could rationally
have concluded that such laws are not supported by a 'compelling state
interest." 4 Justice Stewart distinguished the 1970 amendments' voting age
provision from the literacy test provision at issue in Morgan. The voting age
provision, he reasoned, required the Court to construe section 5 as granting
Congress "the power not only to provide the means of eradicating situations
that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but also to
determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall
within the ambit of the clause, and what state interests are 'compelling.""'4 2
He accordingly rejected what he considered "an enormous extension of
[Morgan's] rationale" into a substantive interpretation of section 5.43
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which not only protected the "right
of citizens . . .who are eighteen years of age or olderO to vote" against
infringement "by the United States or by any State on account of age," but
also granted "Congress... power to enforce this [guarantee] by appropriate
legislation,"4" 4 conclusively removed Mitchell as an obstacle to a nationally
406. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 667-68 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that section 5 does
not give Congress "power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment," but rather leaves
to the judiciary the task of determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred).
407. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 154-55 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
408. Id. at 205-06 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
409. Id. at 205 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
410. Id. at 208 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
411. Id. at 293 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
412. Id. at 296 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
413. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
414. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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prescribed minimum voting age. The exact scope of the section 5 power and
its interpretation in Morgan,however, remained open. The Burger Court took
pains not to contradict the Warren Court's inchoate suggestion "that Congress
may . . . proscribe purely private conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."4 ' At most, the Burger Court counseled a more cautious
approach to statutory interpretation in the shadow of potentially cataclysmic
constitutional issues. Whereas the Warren Court had construed a federal
anticonspiracy statute "to reach assaults upon rights under the entire
Constitution, including the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments,
and not merely under part of it,"416 a comparable Burger Court decision argued
that the "constitutional shoals that would lie in the path of interpreting" a
federal anticonspiracy statute "as a general federal tort law can be avoided...
by requiring, as an element of the cause of action, [proof] of invidiously
discriminatory motivation" on the part of private actors.4"' The use of clear
statement rules does represent a less than transparent effort to develop
constitutional law,41 and that strategy would eventually bear fruit in the
Rehnquist Court's campaign to reconfigure the jurisprudence of federalism.
Neither Mitchell nor any other section 5 decision rendered by the Burger
Court, however, directly undermined Morgan and its one-way ratchet.
Indeed, the Burger Court discovered a new use for Congress's section
5 powers. The 1974 case of Edelman v. Jordan41 9 intimated that a state's
immunity from money damages granted by a federal court (a doctrine that the
Supreme Court construed in 1890 from the penumbras and emanations of the
Eleventh Amendment) 42 ° could be waived by an appropriate demonstration of
congressional intent to abrogate this species of sovereign immunity. 421 Two
years later, the Court - speaking, surprisingly, through then-Justice
415. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,424 n.8 (1973) (citations omitted).
416. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 805 (1966).
417. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971); cf Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (applying clear statement rule in interpreting an alleged
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity); Employees v. Dept. of Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 285-87 (1973) (same); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 337, 347
(1971) (construing a statute that punished "[a]ny person who . . .receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce [any] firearm" so that "the phrase 'in commerce
or affecting commerce"' [would] be an element "of all three offenses," in order to avoid raising
doubts over the statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause).
418. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking,45 VAND. L. REV. 593,597 (1992).
419. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
420. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1890) (holding that a state may not be sued
by one of its own citizens without its consent).
421.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,674 (1974).
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Rehnquist - found that Congress had indeed satisfied the condition suggested
by but not discovered in Edelmen: abrogation of the states' Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity. Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer422 observed "that the
Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it
embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 423 Thanks to the substantive limits on state
sovereignty embodied in the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Fitzpatrick gave Congress broad discretion, "in determining what is
'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment, [to] provide for private suits against States or state
424
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.
Against the backdrop of what was then undisturbed Warren Court precedent
establishing the authority of Congress to effect this abrogation through its
Commerce Clause power, 42 Fitzpatrick must have seemed utterly
unexceptional.
William H. Rehnquist, the future architect of a
counterrevolution in the law of federalism, must have been occupied
elsewhere. 426 The explosiveness of Fitzpatrick's underlying principle would
lie dormant for another two decades.
The Court resumed the more direct strategy of confronting Morgan's
contested legacy in a pair of 1980 cases involving preclearance under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. A decade removed from the tumult of Mitchell,
the Burger Court took a far more sanguine view of Congress's power to
enforce the Reconstruction amendments. In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 42' a
plurality of the Court announced that both section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorize federal

422. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
423. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976) (citations omitted).
424. Id.
425. See Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964) (holding that Congress
may use its power to regulate interstate commerce to overcome the sovereign immunity of the
states), overruled by Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666 (1999); cf Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 452-53 (noting the difference between the
Commerce Clause legislation at issue in Parden and Congress's invocation of its section 5
power in Fitzpatrick).
426. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.)
(holding that the Tenth Amendment requires Congress to refrain from abridging the ability of
the states to control "how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral government
functions are to be made"), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985). The Court decided NationalLeague of Cities on June 24, 1976, four days before
Fitzpatrick.
427. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).

COME BACK TO THE NICKEL AND FIVE

1261

voting rights legislation only in response to purposeful discrimination.42 On
the same day, the Court also decided City of Rome v. United States. 429 At
issue in City of Rome were proposed city annexations and other electoral
changes that had "a discriminatory effect" but concededly "had not been made
for any discriminatory purpose."43 Appealing from a denial of preclearance,
the city argued "that § 1 of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits only
purposeful racial discrimination in voting, and that in enforcing that provision
pursuant to § 2, Congress may not prohibit voting practices lacking
discriminatory intent even if they are discriminatory in effect."1431 The Court
characterized this claim as "nothing less than" a demand that the Court
"overrule [its] decision in South Carolinav. Katzenbach."4 32 Writing for the
majority, Justice Marshall assumed, without endorsing the position of the City
ofMobile plurality, that section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only
purposeful discrimination. 4 3' After equating the standard of review for
Congress's power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment with the
standard of review adopted in Morgan and Mitchell,4" Justice Marshall held
that a federal "ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an
appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment,
even if it is assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only intentional
discrimination in voting, "as long as" Congress could rationally have
concluded that. . . electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
discrimination in voting create the risk of
history of intentional racial
' 411
discrimination.
purposeful
In practical terms, City of Rome enables Congress to fashion a civil
rights remedy before courts identify a violation. What this constitutional
holding merely implied, Congress soon codified in its 1982 amendments to the
Voting Rights Act. In response to the City ofMobile plurality's declaration
that "a violation.. . of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments" requires
proof "that a contested electoral mechanism was intentionally adopted or
maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose, '436 Congress
428.
J.).
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
Congress
435.
436.

City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62, 67 (1980) (plurality opinion of Stewart,
446 U.S. 156 (1980).
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980).
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966)).
Id. at 173 & n.11.
See id. at 176-77 (relying on, inter alia, Morgan and Mitchell to conclude that
can remedy racial discrimination by "appropriate" means).
Id. at 177 (citations omitted).
Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,35 (1986) (interpreting City ofMobile).
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amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendment banned
any state or local "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure... which results in a denial or abridgement of the right
' The
of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color."437
amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act created liability for voting rights
violations in advance of any direct showing of discriminatory purpose.
Because the "'results' test" codified earlier Supreme Court interpretations of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 438 the validity of the 1982 amendment to section
2 as an exercise of Congress's powers under the Enabling Clauses of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has never been questioned.
Finally, the Burger Court did not disturb the Warren Court legacy in
treating the Commerce Clause as an apt basis for civil rights legislation. In
upholding the application of a federal criminal statute to a loan shark who
alleged that he confined his activities to a single state, the Burger Court
reaffirmed Congress's power to regulate "a class ofactivities... without proof
that [any] particular intrastate activity.. . had an effect on commerce. " 439 In
a case involving the application of federal wage and price controls to state
employees, 441 the Burger Court even reaffirmed Maryland v. Wirtz.441 That
decision went so far as to recite the "aggregation" principle associated with
Darby and Wickard v. Filburn: "Even activity that is purely intrastate in
character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with
like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the states
or with foreign nations."" 2
Admittedly, the Burger Court did overrule Wirtz's Tenth Amendment
holding one Term later in National League of Cities v. Usery,443 thereby
437. Act of June 29, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994)) (emphasis added).
438. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 83-84 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)

(acknowledging that the relevant history of the 1982 amendments, S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 27-28
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07, expressed congressional sentiment in
favor of reinstating the "'results' test" applied in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971)).
439. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 152 (1971) (emphasis added) (citing United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1941)).
440. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975), overruled by Nat'l League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
441. See id. at 548 (relying on Marylandv.Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), to conclude that
wage and price controls could apply to state and local governments in spite of their sovereign
immunity).
442. Id. at 547; accord Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
277 (1981).
443. See Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855 (overruling Wirtz and holding that
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unraveling the extension of federal wage and hour regulation to state and local
governments. But NationalLeague of Cities became the subject of a judicial
frolic and detour that the Burger Court renounced on its own." Indeed, this
Tenth Amendment adventure not only left the underlying Commerce Clause
doctrine intact, but also coincided with aggressive interpretations of the
statute underlying HeartofAtlanta and McClung. After all, the Burger Court
endorsed the disparate impact theory of Title VII liability in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.445 and authorized private, voluntary affirmative action in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber. 46 Both of these cases, but Weber in
particular, upset "the bargain struck by the 88th Congress" and abrogated the
"color-blind aspiration" underlying the Civil Rights Act of 1964.447
The Burger Court proved to be the last battleground on which Earl
Warren and Richard Nixon played out their heated rivalry. By every measure,
ranging from the Nickel and Five's admittedly arcane fate to Nixon's coldly
political calculus, that battle ended in a bitter draw. Like twin stars, the two
California titans faded together during the summer of 1974. As President
Nixon reeled from the Watergate scandal, the former Chief Justice crept
closer to death. The politically moribund Richard Nixon refused to grant
executive approval for the mortally stricken Warren to be treated at Bethesda
Naval Hospital.' Warren was admitted instead to the Georgetown University
Hospital and declined Nixon's belated and guilt-ridden offer to transfer him
to Bethesda." 9 On July 9, 1974, Justices Brennan and Douglas visited Warren
at Georgetown, informing him that the Conference of the Justices had voted
unanimously that day to reject President Nixon's claim of executive privilege
and to compel the President's compliance with the subpoena demanding
Congress cannot "force... essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral government
functions" on states).
444. See Garcia,469 U.S. at 531 (overruling National League of Cities). See generally,
e.g., Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND.
L. REv. 1623, 1625-34 (1994).
445. See Origgs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (holding that a lack of
discriminatory intent does not redeem practices unrelated to a job that "operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups").
446. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (holding a
private employer's affirmative action plan permissible because it was designed to remedy past
discrimination and was not unreasonable towards non-minority groups). For a revealing study
of Weber's aftermath, including the subsequent career of plaintiff Brian Weber, see Philip P.
Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1169 (2000).
447. Bernard Meltzer, The Weber Case:
The Judicial Abrogation of the
AntidiscriminationStandardin Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 423,456 (1980).
448. POLLACK, supra note 52, at 321.
449. Id.
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production of Watergate-related tapes and documents.45 ° Not three hours
later, the former Chief Justice was dead.
On July 27, 1974, Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion for a
unanimous Court, minus a recused Justice Rehnquist, in United States v.
Nixon.451 Fifteen days later, on August 9, 1974, President Nixon resigned.
The old Chief Justice had died exactly one month earlier. During these tense
weeks, local parents and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
were breathing new life into an old, unresolved school segregation case in
Topeka, Kansas. 452 Within five years, Linda Brown Smith, the erstwhile
schoolgirl on whose behalf Brown v. Board of Education had been litigated,
would sue the same school district for the benefit of her own children.453
From 1979 through 1993, the case would wend through the federal courts,
twice reaching the Supreme Court.454 Though the principals of the 1952
Republican National Convention had died, either physically or politically, the
Warren Court's core battles raged on. But the object of the struggle - as well
as the leading antagonists on each side - had changed.
C. Affirmative Action as Armageddon
Although President Nixon's appointment of Warren Burger as Chief
Justice failed to loosen the jurisprudential grip of Earl Warren's Court, his
subsequent appointment of William H. Rehnquist as an Associate Justice
effectively "sow[ed] the wind" of judicial change.4 5 The future Rehnquist
Court would eventually inherit the "task of reaping the whirlwind." 456 Of the
many issues that could spark constitutional revolution, affirmative action - a
concept almost wholly alien to the cases that built the Nickel and Five -

450. CRAY, supra note 8, at 526.
451. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generally Gerald Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and
Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process,22 UCLA L. REV. 30
(1974).
452. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 84 F.R.D. 383, 390 (D. Kan. 1979) (describing how the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) threatened to cut off federal funds and
how the school board, on Aug. 7, 1974, sought an injunction against the threatened HEW
action).
453. See id. at 391 n.4 (stating that "[i]t is interesting to note" that Linda Brown Smith is
one plaintiff, acting on behalf of her children).
454. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 978 F.2d 585 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 903
(1993); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated mem., 503 U.S. 978
(1992).
455. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 255 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
456. Id.
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would catch fire."' At the time, a revolution in the Court's treatment of
affirmative action must have seemed an unlikely prospect.4"' Although the

legality of race-conscious admissions and faculty hiring by public universities
would emerge as "the richest prize at stake" in the Burger Court's prelude to
' Chief Justice Burger fulfilled his role
"[a]ffirmative action Armageddon,"459
through ineptitude rather than malice. Morgan's one-way ratchet and the
Warren Court's expansive definition of the commerce power may have
endured no direct attacks during the Burger Court, but that period's
developments in the law of affirmative action would eventually enable the
Rehnquist Court to dismantle the Nickel and Five.

What Richard Nixon failed to achieve through his judicial
appointments, he inadvertently triggered through his characteristically cynical
manipulation of affirmative action."4 ° In the heady days of the Civil Rights
Act and the Voting Rights Act, President Johnson had laid the groundwork for
race-conscious hiring and contracting by the federal government in Executive
Order 11,246.461 The so-called "Philadelphia Plan" targeted the notoriously
corrupt and racist business of government contracting." 2 The Johnson

administration "quietly" rescinded the highly controversial Plan during its
final days. 63 It was the Nixon administration that rescued the Philadelphia
Plan and thereby entrenched the institution of affirmative action into
American law and society. 4" Why? "Nixon saw affirmative action as a

457. Cf Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 669-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that a "single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smouldering for a time,
may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration," but withholding judgment on the
propensity of "[e]loquence [to] set fire to reason").
458. See TRACY CHAPMAN, Talkin 'Bouta Revolution, on TRACYCHAPMAN (WEA/Elektra
Entertainment 1988) ("Don't you know/They're talkin' about a revolution/It sounds like a
whisper").
459. Jim Chen, Diversity andDamnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1852 (1996) (arguing,
in the immediate aftermath of Adarand Constructors,Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), that
this Armageddeon was "yet to come"). But cf Margaret A. Sewell, Note, Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena: The Armageddon of Affirmative Action, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 611 (1997)
(prematurely awarding the coveted title of Armageddon to Adarand).
460. See Farber, supra note 288, at 896-97 (detailing Nixon's interest in using affirmative
action to break white voters from the Democratic Party); Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action:
Past,Present,and Future,20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1,47-49 (2002) (discussing the political
motives behind Nixon's affirmative action policies).
Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965).
461.
462. Id.
463.
HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF
NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972, at 296 (1990).
464. Id. at 322.
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wedge with which to split organized labor away from the civil rights
movement. 1465
Nixon saved affirmative action. The Comptroller General declared the
Philadelphia Plan illegal"' and never abandoned this view.4 67 The Senate
passed an appropriations rider mandating compliance with the Comptroller
General's order. 4 " President Nixon personally lobbied the House against the
rider,4 69 threatening to veto the appropriations bill at large if it contained the
rider.470 On the day of reckoning in the House, Secretary of Labor George

Shultz declared the vote on the rider "the most important civil rights vote in a
long, long time."4 1 Republican votes - that day in the House and upon
reconsideration in the Senate - proved vital in derailing the rider and saving
the Philadelphia Plan.472 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ultimately
upheld the Plan.4" Thereafter, the Philadelphia Plan became the model for
affirmative action throughout federal contracting.474 President Nixon achieved
his political objective: For decades to come, divisions over affirmative action
would split the coalition that was "principally responsible for the Civil Rights
Revolution" like an overripe melon.475

465. Farber, supra note 288, at 897.
466. See GRAHAM, supra note 463, at 331 (stating that the Comptroller General's
declaration of illegality "was an ambitious reach... under the [General Accounting Office]'s
audit authority").
467. Id. at 338-39.
468. Id. at 339-40.
469. Id. at 340.
470. Robert P. Schuwerk, Comment, The PhiladelphiaPlan: A Study in the Dynamics of
Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723,749 (1972).
471. Id. at 749 n.141.
472.
115 CoNo. REc. 40,921,40,749 (1969), see also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.s. 448,
512 n.12 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussing the House of Representatives' refusal to
accept an amendment to the bill that would have had the effect of overruling the Plan);
GRAHAM, supra note 463, at 340 (stating that Republican votes were the "crucial difference"
that defeated the House rider and influenced the Senate's decision to "drop its now hopeless
proposal"); Schuwerk, supra note 470, at 749 & nn.145-46 (detailing the influence of the White
House on the defeat of supplemental appropriations bill).
473. Contractors Ass'n v. Sec'y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 854 (1971).
474. GRAHAM, supra note 463, at 34245.
475. Randall Kennedy, PersuasionandDistrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action
Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1327-28 (1986) (noting how this progressive political coalition
"has been riven by bitter disagreement over the means by which American society should
attempt to overcome its racist past" - namely, over whether to adopt or to oppose race-based
affirmative action).
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The issue of official race-consciousness reached the Supreme Court
4 76
during the 1973 Term. The Justices agreed to review DeFunisv.Odegaard,
in which a white applicant alleged that his race had played a role in his denial
of admission to the University of Washington School of Law.47 7 Rather
prophetically, the Supreme Court of Washington refused to invalidate raceconscious admissions to a public university per se4"8 but it did require a
demonstration "that [the] consideration of race in admitting47 9students is
necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling state interest.
In retrospect, DeFunis posed the deepest threat to affirmative action;
the Court has never come closer to ending the practice outright. 4 0 According
to one journalistic account, "all nine Justices leaned [initially] toward holding
that . . . fixed racial quotas" in university admissions "were
unconstitutional. '44' Even Justice Marshall feared that "uphold[ing a] fixed
quota for minorities might create an unfortunate precedent which could be
used eventually to exclude minorities."" Another account reports that Justice
Brennan had collected four votes to permit some consideration of race in
university admissions. 3
The Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot. 48 4 As the four Nixon
appointees - Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist - accepted Justice Stewart's "offer[] to write a per curiam
declaring the case moot," "[e]ven the liberals breathed a sigh of relief that the
case was gone. '4 5 (Relieved though they might have been, the liberals took
pains to protest the mootness decision.) 4 6 DeFunisended not with a bang but
476. 414 U.S. 1038 (1973), grantingcert. to 507 P.2d 1169 (Wash. 1973).
477. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1973) (recounting the allegation that
the state "invidiously discriminated against [plaintiff] on account of his race").
478. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 507 P.2d 1169, 1181 (Wash. 1973), vacated, 416 U.S. 312
(1974).
479. Id. at 1182.
480. See Jim Chen, DeFunis, Defunct, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 91, 94 (1999) (stating that
scholars have forgotten about "the Court's close call in DeFunis").
481.

BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE TiE SUPREME

COURT 282 (1979).
482. Id.
483. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, BEHIND BAKKE: AFFIRMATIVEACTION AND THE SUPREME
COURT 33-34 (1988) (discussing the Court's eagerness to rid itself of the case on mootness
grounds).
484. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974) (concluding that the Court
could not decide DeFunis because the petitioner had nearly finished his studies and because not
even an adverse decision would prevent his graduation).
485. WoODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 481, at 282.
486. DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 349 (Brennan, J.,
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7

a whimper. 8
A mere four years later, Regents of the University of Californiav.
Bakke411 fulfidled the DeFunis dissenters' prediction that educational
affirmative action would "inevitabl[y] return" to the Court.45 9 Whereas
DeFunis had allowed an aggrieved white student to graduate without
addressing the merits of affirmative action, Bakke approved race-conscious
admissions in the name of "diversity" even as it ordered Allan Bakke admitted
to the medical school at the University of California at Davis.
Today Bakke is known primarily for two things. First, it upbraided the
California courts for their failure "to recognize that the State has a substantial
interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions
program involving the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin" and
reversed "so much of the ... judgment [below] as enjoin[ed]" the University
of California "from any consideration of the race of any applicant. "' o Second,
it declared that "the attainment of a diverse student body" "clearly is a
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education."49 ' Of
the former pronouncement, John Hart Ely declared: "That is the Opinion of
4 The latter pronouncement has led an entire
the Court inBakke. I'll take it."""
generation of commentators to devote more attention to Bakke than perhaps
any other Supreme Court decision493 - more because of than in spite of14 the
Court's subsequent failure to revisit the question of affirmative action in a
university setting. 95
dissenting).
487. Louis H. Pollack, DeFunis Non Est Disputandum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 495
(1975).
488. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
489. DeFunis,416 U.S. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
490. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978); see also id. at 326
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting Justice Powell's
contribution to "five votes reversing the judgment below insofar as it prohibits the University
from establishing race-conscious programs in the future").
491. Id. at311-12.
492. John Hart Ely, The Supreme Cour4 1977 Term - Foreword: On Discovering
FundamentalValues, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 10 n.33 (1978).
493. E.g., Jim Chen, Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolutionary Theory and
Affirmative Action 'sDestiny,59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 813 (1998); Daniel A. Farber, Missing the
"PlayofIntelligence,"36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 159-60 (1994).
494.
Cf Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979) ("'Discriminatory purpose'
implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effect upon an identifiable group.").
Other cases drawing this distinction include Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802-03 (1997), and
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987).
495. E.g., Texas v. Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033
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In all the hullabaloo, however, one easily forgets that Bakke refused
to "hold that discrimination against members ofthe white 'majority' cannot be
suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 'benign.' 496 Instead, Bakke
adopted a strict scrutiny standard of review: "Racial and ethnic distinctions of
any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial
examination.1 49' A four-member concurring coalition led by Justice Brennan
proposed a more relaxed standard of review that would have sustained a
"benign" race-conscious program as long as "an important and articulated
purpose for its use [has] been shown." 4" But the Brennan standard flunks the
test for divining the holding from a "fragmented" decision in which "no single
rationale explain[s] . . . the assent of five Justices."' 499 Justice Powell's
embrace of strict scrutiny, being the "position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgment[] on the narrowest grounds," is thus "the holding of
the Court" in Bakke. 5°0
For the purpose of illustrating the impact of affirmative action
jurisprudence on larger questions of civil rights enforcement, a second aspect
of Bakke also bears remembering. Bakke at heart was a case about legislative
due process."0 ' Justice Powell's solo opinion acknowledged the use of raceconscious remedies for employment discrimination "where a legislative or
administrative body charged with [appropriate] responsibility made
determinations of past discrimination by the industries affected, and fashioned
remedies deemed appropriate to rectify the discrimination."5' 2 Justice Powell

(1996); Kirwan v. Podberesky, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1128 (1995);
cf Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate,43 UCLA L. REv. 1745,1746(1996)
("The Supreme Court has said a lot about contracting and rather little about education."). What
effect the pending University of Michigan cases will have on this landscape is unknown.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), cert granted,123 S. Ct. 617 (U.S. Dec. 2,
2002) (No. 02-241); Gratz v. Bollinger, 277 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted,123 S. Ct.

602 (U.S.
496.
497.
498.

Dec. 2,2002) (No. 02-516).
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978).
Id. at 291.
Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).

The resemblance to what was then the very fresh formulation of intermediate scrutiny is
unmistakable. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (Brennan, J.) ("[C]lassifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.").
499. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
500. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.1 5 (1976)).
501.
See generallyHans A. Linde, Due Processof Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197,22235 (1976) (grounding a theory of legislative due process in legislators' knowledge of current

affairs and inlegislative goals).
502. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 301 (1978) (opinion of the Court).
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also described Lau v. Nichols... and United Jewish Organizationsv. Carey54
as "case[s] in which the remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination
encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group's
ability to participate, without excluding individuals belonging to any other
group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity" - whether public schooling
(as in Lau) or voting (as in Carey)."'5 The admissions plan in Bakke, he
stressed once more, lacked a "determination by the legislature or a responsible
administrative agency that the University engaged in a discriminatory practice
requiring remedial efforts." ' 6 Justice Powell reserved special disdain for the
Board of Regents' argument that societal discrimination justified raceconscious admissions: "Petitioner does not purport to have made, and is in no
position to make, such findings. Its broad mission is education, not the
formulation of
any legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims
5 07
of illegality.
Justice Powell did take care, though, to reserve safe harbors for
"congressionally authorized administrative actions, such as consent decrees
under Title VII or approval of reapportionment plans under § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965" and for "legislation by Congress pursuant to its powers
under § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to remedy the effects of prior discrimination. ""
Distinguishing those
"isolated segments of our vast governmental structures '5°9 which lack "the
authority and capability to establish . . . that [a racial] classification is
responsive to identified discrimination," ' 0 Justice Powell "recognized the
special competence of Congress to make findings with respect to the effects of
identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority to take
appropriate remedial measures." '
Thanks to the enormous "burden the term 'diversity' has been asked
to bear in the [contemporary] United States," ranging from "a permanent
justification for policies seeking racial proportionality in all walks of life" to
503. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
504. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
505. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305.
506. Id. at 305.
507. Id. at 309.
508. Id. at 302 n.41 (citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966)).
509. Id. at 309 (citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)).
510. Id. (citing Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S.
199 (1977)).
511. Id.at302n.41.
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"a synonym for proportional representation itself,"512 Bakke has occasioned the
513

greatest amount of dishonesty in the squalid debate over affirmative action.
The much more broadly applicable holding in Weber was arguably even "more
destructive [of] the notion of equality." 14 (Hard as it may be for legal
academics to believe, the significance of private labor markets, measured
solely by bodies rather than dollars, exceeds that of higher education by a

factor of five.) 1 5 But nothing else in affirmative action jurisprudence
surpasses Fullilove v. Klutznick l6 as a doctrinal atrocity.
Fullilove involved a 1977 congressional decree requiring recipients of
federal funds for local public works projects to spend ten percent of their
grants on services or supplies from Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs)." 7
Unlike every other affirmative action case that had preceded it, Fullilove
involved a racial classification under federal law."'8 The dispute split the
Court into even thirds. Chief Justice Burger's opinion for himself and Justices
White and Powell relied dispositively on this distinction. The Chief Justice
softened the judiciary's "close examination" to a "program that employs racial
or ethnic criteria" by invoking the Court's obligation to give "appropriate
deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with
512.

Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v.FCC, 141 F.3d 344,356 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

513. See, e.g., Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Futureof the Diversity
Justification,29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 72 (1998) (admitting that the "diversity justification has
been seriously abused by educational institutions"); Kingsley R. Browne, Affirmative Action:
Policy-Making by Deception, 22 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1291, 1299-1300 (1996) (arguing that
policy which allows use of race or sex as "factors" but claims that they are "not necessarily
dispositive" is deceptive because the only way that these preferences can have an effect is by
compelling the hiring of the otherwise less-qualified candidates); Gabriel J. Chin, Bakke to the
Wall: The CrisisofBakkean Diversity,4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 881,902-03 (1996)
(arguing that the "fig leaf" of diversity has enabled race-conscious educators to pursue "primary
purpose[s]... other than diversity," such as role modeling, community service, or proportional
representation for its own sake or merely as basis for patronage); Kent Oreenawalt, The
UnresolvedProblems ofReverse Discrimination,67 CAL. L. REv. 87, 122 (1979) (suggesting
that the "primary motivation" for racial preferences is not promoting diversity, but rather
"countering the effects of societal discrimination"); Wayne McCormack, Race and Politics in
the Supreme Court: Bakke to Basics, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 491,530 (admitting that diversity "is
simply not the most honest statement of... objective[s]").
514. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
515. Compare STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 544 (120th ed. 2000)
(reporting 74.55 million employees as of 1995 in establishments with twenty or more
employees, excluding those employed in government or railroads and the self-employed) with
id. at 152 (reporting 14.26 million students enrolled in higher education as of 1995).
516. 448 U.S. 448(1980).
517. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,453 (1980) (Burger, C.J.).
518. Id. (Burger, C.J.).
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the power to 'provide for the... general Welfare of the United States' and 'to
enforce, by appropriate legislation,' the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment."519 The federal MBE set-aside, the Chief Justice
reasoned, arose not from "a choice made by a single judge or a school board,
but on a considered decision of the Congress and the President."520 Indeed, he
regarded it "fundamental" that "no organ of government, state or federal,"
possesses "a more comprehensive remedial power than . . . the Congress,

expressly charged by the Constitution with competence and authority to
enforce equal protection guarantees."52
"'
Justice Powell's concurrence reinforced Chief Justice Burger's
emphasis on the institutional difference between Congress and other official
decisionmakers. Seeking to distinguish Congress from the University of
California's Board of Regents and Fullilove from Bakke, Justice Powell
stressed that "the National Legislature['s]

. .

. competen[ce] to find

constitutional and statutory violations" gave Congress the power (and the
obligation) to "address directly the problems of discrimination in our
society." 2
Moreover, Justice Powell emphasized Congress's "unique
constitutional power of legislating to enforce the provisions of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments." 5" He attributed no significance to
Congress's failure to make specific findings regarding the "statutory or
constitutional violations" that the MBE set-aside would purportedly remedy.524
Rather than subject Congress to the institutional limits on "an adjudicatory
body called upon to resolve specific disputes between competing adversaries,"
Justice Powell advocated a more relaxed standard of review that would enable
Congress to fulfill "its broader mission to investigate and consider all facts and
opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of an issue."525 Without
disavowing Bakke's distrustful characterization of "racial classifications" as
"fundamentally at odds with the ideals of a democratic society implicit in the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses," Justice Powell concluded that
Fullilove "turn[ed] on the scope of congressional power," specifically
519. Id. at 472 (Burger, C.J.) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend.
xrv, § 5).
520. Id. at 473 (Burger, C.J.), see also id. at 483 (Burger, C.J.) ("Here we deal not with the
limited remedial powers of a federal court, . . . but with the broad remedial powers of
Congress.").
521. Id. at 483 (Burger, C.J.).
522. Id. at 499 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Kaizenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304
(1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,257 (1964)).
523. Id. at 500 (Powell, J., concurring).
524. Id. at 502 (Powell, J., concurring).
525. Id. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Congress's "unique constitutional role in the enforcement of the post-Civil
war Amendments. ,526
Careful examination of Chief Justice Burger's principal opinion and
Justice Powell's concurrence reveals a standard of review closer to the
intermediate scrutiny standard that Justice Brennan advocated inBakke. Three
more Justices in Fullilove, represented in Justice Marshall's concurrence in
the judgment, explicitly endorsed the more lenient standard articulated in the
Brennan concurrence in Bakke.527 Indeed, according to Justice Marshall's
application of that standard of review, "the 10% minority set-aside provision
at issue" was so "plainly constitutional" as to remove the dispute from the
class of "close" legal questions. 5" Yet Chief Justice Burger's opinion refused
to "adopt, either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analysis articulated
in" Bakke.5 29 His complacent conclusion that "the MBE provision would
survive judicial review under either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke
opinions" condemned the affirmative action debate to continuing confusion.5"'
One final Burger Court decision on affirmative action compounded
the chaos. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,"3 ' decided in Warren
Burger's final year as Chief Justice, returned to the realm of state-law
classifications based on race. Wygant involved a collective bargaining
agreement that exposed tenured nonminority public school teachers to layoffs
while retaining minority teachers on probationary status. 3 2 Unlike Bakke and
Fullilove, Wygant secured a majority of Justices on the crucial question of the
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny.533 Adopting Bakke's declaration that
"[riacial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call

526. Id. at 516 (Powell, J., concurring); see also id. at 510 (Powell, J., concurring)
(concluding "that the Enforcement Clauses of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
confer upon Congress the authority to select reasonable remedies to advance the compelling
state interest in repairing the effects of discrimination").
527. See id. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment) (declaring that a remedial
racial classification can be justified by a showing of "an important issue and articulated purpose
for its use" (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361 (1978) (Brennan,
528. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
529. Id. at 492 (Burger, C.J.).
530. Id. (Burger, C.J.)
531. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
532. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,270-71 (1986) (Powell, J.).
533. Justice O'Connor concurred in all portions of Justice Powell's plurality opinion that
outlined the relevant standard of review. See id. at 294 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("I... join in Parts I, II, Ill, and V of the plurality's opinion, and
concur in the judgment.").
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for the most exacting judicial examination, '' 53 Wygant held explicitly that the
Court "must decide whether the layoff provision is supported by a compelling
state purpose and whether the means chosen to accomplish that purpose are
narrowly tailored. 5 35 The Court ultimately rejected the "role model" rationale
offered by the school board as a remedy "ageless in [its] reach into the past,
and timeless in [its] ability to affect the future. 5 36 The absence of a "logical
stopping point," Justice Powell reasoned, would allow a school board using
the "role model theory . ..to engage in discriminatory hiring and layoff
3
practices long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose. "1 1
Wygant confirmed what the difference between Bakke and Fullilove
had already intimated: the Burger Court had divided its affirmative action
cases into two distinct categories. In cases involving racial classifications
under state law, such as Bakke and Wygant, the Court adhered to strict scrutiny
without regard to the putatively "benign" nature of affirmative action or the
political check implicit in a white majority's decision to burden itself on
behalf of a traditionally downtrodden racial minority. To the extent that
Fullilove could be understood coherently, Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell's opinions in that case appeared to adopt some standard of review short
of strict scrutiny. Fullilove's rationale for this departure was less obscure:
Congress's power under the enabling clauses of the Reconstruction
Amendments, especially section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, warranted
greater judicial respect for the federal legislature's capacity to investigate
discrimination on a societal scale and legal authority to fashion an appropriate,

nationwide remedy.
This bifurcated approach to affirmative action was wholly consistent
with Katzenbach v. Morgan. The MBE set-aside inFullilove was not remedial

in a judicial sense; no court had made any findings regarding official
complicity in racial discrimination among contractors doing business with the
federal government. Nor, for that matter, had Congress. As in Morgan,
however, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell were willing to impute
findings from the legislative record and from the solution Congress ultimately
adopted. 38 What section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress - the
534. Id. at 273 (Powell, J.)
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291
(1978)).
535. Id. at 274 (Powell, J.).
536. Id. at 276 (Powell, J.).
537. Id. at 275 (Powell, J.).
538. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477-78 (1980) (Burger, C.J., White, J., &
Powell, J.)(determining that Congress "had abundant evidence from which it could conclude"
that a favored group had been "denied effective participation in public contracting" and
concluding that Congress did not need to "compil[e] the kind of 'record' appropriate with
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authority to enforce the Amendment through appropriate legislation paralleled the power that the federal judiciary had asserted since Marbury v.
Madison: a mandate to ensure compliance with the substantive demands of
due process, equal protection, and the privileges and immunities of national
citizenship. Morgan stands for that very proposition.539
On the other hand, Bolling v. Sharpe recoils at the mere suggestion
that the federal government's resort to racial classifications might warrant less
penetrating scrutiny than an identical use of race under state law. Astute
observers recognized immediately that the Court had set a higher hurdle for
state and local laws using racial criteria.54 ° So stark a difference between the
Fourteenth Amendment's notion of equal protection and the equal protection
component of Fifth Amendment due process would be, in Chief Justice
Warren's words, "unthinkable. '5 41 The affirmative action jurisprudence of the
Burger Court had set Bolling and Morgan on a collision course.
The line between state-law and federal racial classifications became
searingly bright during the Rehnquist Court. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.,542 decided in 1989, involved a public contracting scheme that the City of
Richmond, Virginia, had adapted from the statute at issue in Fullilove. 43 The
minority contractor set-aside provision in Croson was identical to Fullilove in
every relevant respect but one: the identity of the governmental agency that
had adopted the race-based classification. The Court, however, declined the
city's invitation to apply Fullilove's standard of review. 4 According to
respect to judicial or administrative proceedings").
539. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (describing section 5 as a
"positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress... to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
540. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. City & County of San Francisco, 813
F.2d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The city is not just like the federal government with regard to
the findings it must make to justify race-conscious remedial action."); Robert A Bohrer, Bakke,
Weber, and Fullilove: Benign Discrimination and CongressionalPower to Enforce the
FourteenthAmendment, 56 IND. L.J. 473, 512-13 (1981) ("Congress may authorize, pursuant
to section 5, state action that would be foreclosed to the states acting alone."); Drew S. Days,
Ill, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453,474 (1987) ("Fullilove clearly focused on the constitutionality
of a congressionally mandated set-aside program.").
541.
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
542. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
543. Compare City of Richmond v. JLA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 550 n. I1(1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that Richmond's ordinance used the same definition for
"minority group members" that Congress had adopted in its legislation) with Fullilove, 448 U.S.
at 454 (Burger, C.J.) (reprinting section 103(f(2) of Public Works Employment Act of 1977).
544. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 489 (O'Connor, J.)
("Appellant and its supporting amid rely
heavily on Fullilove for the proposition that a city council, like Congress, need not make
specific findings of discrimination to engage in race-conscious relief."); id. at 491 (O'Connor,
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Justice O'Connor, the city "ignore[d] ... that Congress, unlike any State or
political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the
dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.""54 That Congress enjoys "the power
to define situations which... threaten principles of equality and to adopt
prophylactic rules to deal with those situations," she wrote, "does not mean
that, a fortiori, the States and their political subdivisions are [equally] free to
decide that such remedies are appropriate."54' 6 She feared that a contrary rule
could permit the "mere recitation of a benign or compensatory purpose for the
use of a racial classification" to cloak "the States [with] ... the full power of
Congress under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and [to] insulate any racial
classification from judicial scrutiny under § 1."47
Croson thus followed Bakke and Wygant in applying strict scrutiny to
a racial classification under state law. 4 In particular, the Court "reaffirm[ed]
the view expressed by the plurality in Wygant that the standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those
burdened or benefited by a particular classification."5 49 Doubting the ability
of judges to distinguish between classifications that "are 'benign' or
'remedial"' and those that "are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics," Justice O'Connor stressed the
power "of strict scrutiny . . . to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to
warrant use of a highly suspect tool."55 0
The city failed, almost
catastrophically, to satisfy the evidentiary burden imposed by strict scrutiny's
narrow tailoring requirement.5 ' Richmond could not rely on amorphous,
unsupported assertions of discrimination against groups that arguably had
never contributed to the city's economy or political scene. 52 Nor did the
J.) ("[O]ur treatment of an exercise of congressional power in Fullilove cannot be dispositive
here.").
545. Id. at 490 (O'Connor, J.).
546. Id. (O'Connor, J.) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,326 (1966)).
547. Id. (O'Connor, J.); see also id. (O'Connor, J.) ("To hold otherwise would be to cede
control over the content of the Equal Protection Clause to the 50 state legislatures and their
myriad political subdivisions."); id. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (observing that the question of a race-based classification under federal law was
not before the Court).
548. Id. at 493-97 (O'Connor, J.).
549. Id. at 494 (O'Connor, J.).
550. Id. at 493 (O'Connor, J.).
551.
See id. at 498-506 (criticizing the defects of Richmond's ordinance).
552. See id. at 506 (conjecturing that no "Spanish-speaking, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, or
Aleut" person had ever faced discrimination in Richmond's contracting industry and concluding
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Court detect "any consideration of... race-neutral means to increase minority
'
business participation in city contracting."553
55 4
During the following Term, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
leveraged Croson's description of Congress's section 5 power into a firm
holding on the standard of review for race-based classifications in federal law.
For the first time since Fullilove, the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of an affirmative action program arising under federal law. 5"
Justice Brennan accomplished a unique feat in the Supreme Court's
constitutional case law on affirmative action: He assembled a five-vote
majority for his entire opinion.56 "It is of overriding significance," he wrote,
"that the FCC's minority ownership programs have been specifically
approved - indeed, mandated - by Congress."5 7 Exploiting the failure of
Fullilove to "apply strict scrutiny to the race-based classification at issue"
there 5 ' -or, for that matter, to adopt any standard of review - Justice Brennan
held "that benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress - even if
those measures are not 'remedial' ... - are constitutionally permissible to the
extent that they serve important governmental objectives within the power of
Congress and are substantially related to achievement of those objectives."" 9
Even as he limited Croson to "minority set-aside program[s] adopted
by a municipality," Justice Brennan noted that "much of the language and
reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the lesson of Fullilove that race-conscious
classifications adopted by Congress to address racial and ethnic discrimination
are subject to a different standard than such classifications prescribed by state
and local governments. ""'6 After this argumentative stroke, the Court's actual
holding - that the FCC's minority ownership policies "serve[d] the important
governmental objective of broadcast diversity" and were "substantially related
to the achievement of that objective" - seemed an afterthought. 6 Metro
Broadcasting'sreal accomplishment was transforming the unbroken chain of
in any event that the city had offered no concrete evidence of such discrimination).
553. Id. at 507.
554. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
555. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (framing the issue as
whether federal "minority preference policies violate the equal protection component of the
Fifth Amendment"), overruled byAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
556. Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's opinion.
Id. at 550.
557. Id. at 563.
558. Id. at 564.
559. Id. at 564-65 (footnote omitted).
560. Id. at 565.
561.
Id. at 566.
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decisions on Congress's power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
into the basis for a holding that the Court had rejected in every other
affirmative action case: a softer standard of review for "benign" race-based
classifications. But Justice Brennan's sleight of hand did not come free of
cost. Reliance on section 5 confined his view of race-conscious measures to
judicial review of federal law. The resulting bifurcation between standards
of review plunged affirmative action doctrine into deep confusion.562
More important, at least for the integrity of the Nickel and Five, the
contrast between Croson and Metro Broadcastingexposed the fundamental
incompatibility of Boiling and Morgan. Legislation to "enforce" the
Fourteenth Amendment cannot be "appropriate" if it violates some
independent limit on Congress's power or the substantive principles
underlying the Fourteenth Amendment itself. The constitutional logic implicit
in Morgan's one-way ratchet supports Metro Broadcasting's deferential
stance toward a congressional embrace of race-conscious remedies. But
combining Croson's rule of strict scrutiny for even putatively benign and
remedial uses of race in state law with Bolling's rule equating Fifth
Amendment due process with Fourteenth Amendment equal protection yields
a radically different result. The treacherous prospect that "legislation enacted
by Congress to enforce the Equal Protection Clause [might] violate the
equality rights of others" is therefore "most likely to arise in the affirmative

action context in which special protection rights for one group arguably

collide with the equality rights of another group."563
Of the Justices in Croson and Metro Broadcasting, only Justices
Stevens and White voted with the prevailing side in each case.5" Justice
Stevens explained his preference for forward-looking schemes such as the
FCC's minority ownership programs, which "focus on the future benefit, rather
than the remedial justification" underlying compensatory, retrospective
schemes such as the MBE set-asides in Crosonand Fullilove.56 5 Justice White,
who wrote nothing in either Croson or Metro Broadcasting, presented a
562. E.g., Charles A. Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts ofEquality,
104 HARv. L. REv. 107, 113-17 (1990); Douglas 0. Linder, Review ofAffirmative Action After
Metro Broadcasting v. FCC: The Solution Almost Nobody Wanted, 59 UMKC L. REv. 293,
316-17 (1991).
563. Colker, supra note 291, at 680 (concluding nevertheless that "[i]t is possible for
special protection legislation not to infringe the equality interests of others").
564. Compare Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 550 (1990) (Justice Brennan's
majority opinion joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) with City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 473 (1989) (Justice O'Connor's majority opinion as to Parts I, r-B, and IV
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and Kennedy).
565. Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 601 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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tougher puzzle. The solution lies in the simple (albeit dangerously unreliable)
expedient of taking those cases at face value. Perhaps more so than any other
member of the Court, Justice White earnestly believed that section 5 and
Morgan dictated divergent standards of review for racial classifications under
state and federal law. In two of the Burger Court's signature clashes over
separation-of-powers doctrine, INS v. Chadha5 " and Bowsher v. Synar,"61
Justice White wrote dissents championing Congress's prerogative to structure
the federal legislative process without judicial interference.sa One Term after
Metro Broadcasting, he dissented again from the Court's decision to invalidate
a governing board empowered to review the decisions of the Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority. 69 Justice White evidently did not construe
his belief in congressional supremacy as a more generalized acceptance of
legislative license at lower levels of government.
Like Justice Brennan, Justice White was a Warren era holdout on the
Burger Court. These two Justices, however, drew their inspiration from
distinct elements of the Warren Court's civil rights legacy. Justice Brennan,
seemingly more inspired by the antidiscrimination component of the Warren
agenda, generalized Morgan's one-way ratchet into something resembling the
antisubordination principle. Nothing more succinctly summarizes his
attraction to gentler scrutiny of "benign" racial classifications, a yearning he
first expressed in Bakke and finally consummated in Metro Broadcasting. In
contrast, Justice White, an intellectual heir of the New Deal, favored a robust
federal government and judicial deference to the political process. He stayed
true to the structural underpinnings of the Warren Court's section 5 and
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In matters implicating the relationship
between the states and the national government, Morgan, HeartofAtlanta, and
McClung counsel federal supremacy. As to the distribution of powers within
the national government, these cases upheld the New Deal's preference for
judicial deference to Congress's superior fact-finding prowess and political
pedigree.
But the die had been cast. At a minimum, the affirmative action cases
foreshadowed the demolition of the Nickel and Five. Less charitably, one
could accuse those cases of foreordaining that catastrophic conclusion. As
566. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
567. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
568. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 759-76 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the majority's invalidation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, a balanced
budget measure); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967-1003 (1983) (White, J., dissenting)
(arguing against the majority's invalidation of the legislative veto).
569. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise,
501 U.S. 252, 277-93 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
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Bakke begat Wygant and Croson, so FullilovebegatMetroBroadcasting.And
Metro Broadcastingwas not only Justice Brennan's last opinion; it was also
the most doctrinally unstable and politically vulnerable ofthe Supreme Court's
affirmative action decisions.570 The affirmative action cases, though falling far
short of settling this politically charged dispute,57' had inflicted mortal
doctrinal damage to the Warren Court's vision of civil rights. By the end of
the Supreme Court Term following Metro Broadcasting,the first President
Bush had replaced two surviving Warren Court veterans, William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall, with David Souter and Clarence Thomas. The rapidly
maturing Rehnquist Court was now poised to deliver the coup de grace to the
Nickel and Five.
IV The GrandRehnquisition 72
It comes into existence in the way of denying established
institutions. Its office is ratherto destroy the old world,thanfully
to reveal the new.
573
Henry James, Democracy and Its Issues
Exactly four decades after the Supreme Court ruled against him, Fred
Korematsu successfully overturned his conviction for violating the wartime
exclusion order affecting persons of Japanese descent. 74 Four years later, in
1988, Congress repudiated America's wartime treatment of JapaneseAmericans. 575 The deepest regret of Earl Warren's political career was thereby
expiated. Meanwhile, the deepest disappointment of that career had all but
570. See Neil Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69
TEx. L. REv. 125, 128 (1990) ("Metro Broadcastingmay prove to be a sign post, the final
landmark of a period when individuals like William Brennan helped lead the Court.").
Contra Herman Swartz, The 1986 and 1987Affirmative Action Cases: It'sAll Over
571.
But the Shouting, 86 MICH. L. REV. 524, 576 (1987) (concluding that "the effort to kill
affirmative action programs has failed").
572. The term "Rehnquisition" appears to have originated in a Harvard Law Review
publication from the early 1970s. Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the Rehnquist
Court: Has the RehnquisitionBegun?, 62 IND. L.J. 273,273 n.a (1987). Cf Orrin G. Hatch,
Avoidance of ConstitutionalConflicts,48 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1025, 1034 (1987) (using the term
"Rehnquisition" to describe the attacks on William H. Rehnquist during his confirmation
hearings as Chief Justice).
HENRY JAMES, SR., Democracy andIts Issues (1853), quoted in R.W.B. LEWIS, THE
573.

AmEcAN

ADAM: INNOCENCE, TRAGEDY, AND TRADMON IN Tim NINTEENTH CENTURY 13

(1955).
574. Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
575. See Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (extending an apology
to the detainees on behalf of the nation and providing reparations for their suffering).
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run its course. Even as Congress and the federal courts brought closure to
America's wartime embarrassment, William H. Rehnquist succeeded Warren
E. Burger as Chief Justice of the United States.
The summer of 1994 marked the twentieth anniversary of Earl
Warren's death. In the seasons that immediately followed, a significant
portion of the old Chief Justice's jurisprudential legacy would also wither and
die. On July 25, 1994, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas
approved a desegregation plan submitted by Unified School District #501 of
Topeka. The court's admonition that the parties should "negotiate and
cooperate in bringing the case to an end" effectively closed one of the longest,
most bitterly contested, and most doctrinally significant cluster of legal
proceedings in American history."1 6 The resolution of Topeka's desegregation
controversy confirmed what the Supreme Court had only recently signaled in
Board of Education v. Dowell.. and Freeman v. Pitts:78 Brown v. Board of
Education was dead. Three summers later, in July 1997, Woolworth's, the
original five-and-dime chain, declared bankruptcy and announced that it would
mothball all of its remaining stores. 79 Between the end of the Supreme
Court's 1993 Term and the beginning of October Term 1997, therefore, death
came not only for Brown v. Boardof Educationbut also the great American
five-and-dime. Death came too for the Nickel and Five, the basis of the
Warren Court's civil rights consensus.
From the beginning of October Term 1994 through the end of October
Term 1996, the Rehnquist Court took three scarce Terms to dismantle the
Warren Court consensus on civil rights. In 1995, Chief Justice Rehnquist led
the Court where no majority of Justices had gone in six decades: invalidating
a federal statute for having exceeded the limits of Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce. That same Term, the Court used Boilingto undermine an
affirmative action standard of review derived from a generous view of

Congress as a coequal enforcer of Fourteenth Amendment values. At long last
the obligation of the federal government to respect equal protection consumed
576. Paul E. Wilson, Ad Astra per Aspera: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 68
UMKC L. REV. 623,635-36 (2000).
577. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-51 (1991) (remanding a segregation case
for a determination regarding the need for ongoing judicial supervision).
578. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471-99 (1992) (removing a formerly segregated
school district from the supervision of a federal court).
579.

KARENPLUNKETr-POWELL, REMEMBERING WOOLWORTH'S: ANOSTALGIC HISTORY

OF THE WORLD'S MOST FAMOUS FIvE-AND-DIME 11 (1999); see also Jennifer Steinhauer,
Woolworth Gives Up on the Five-and-Dime, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1997, at Al (summarizing
the history of "America's first great retail chain"); Natalie Merchant, Motherland, on
MOTHERLAND (Indian Love Bride Music 2001) ("Oh, my five and dime queen tell me what have
you seen? The lust and the avarice, the bottomless, the cavernous greed, is that what you see?").
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its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Two Terms later, Morgan
having been shown impotent to influence the course of affirmative action
jurisprudence, the Court squarely rejected any prospect that Congress could
use section 5 to effect its own substantive interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Nickel and Five lay in ruins. All of these landmark
decisions arguably came to the Court by way of "aggressive grant[s]" of
certiorari - petitions not granted out of a need to resolve a circuit split or out
of a sense of institutional responsibility, but rather out of the desire of certain
Justices to score ideological points or to cut new doctrinal ground. 8 0
The first of these decisions, United States v. Lopez,"" contested the
constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,582 which made it
a federal offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm... at a
place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone. " 3 The Supreme Court held "that the Act exceeds the authority of
Congress '[tio regulate Commerce... among the several States."' 5 4 Chief
Justice Rehnquist began by reviewing Commerce Clause precedents from
Gibbons v. Ogden.. to Jones &Laughlin,Darby,and Wickardv. Filburn- the
New Deal cases "that greatly expanded the previously defined authority of

Congress" under the Commerce Clause. 8 6 Without purporting to overrule any
precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist summarized the '"three broad categories of

activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power":
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities ofinterstate commerce, or persons or things in
interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes
the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce."" 8
580. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JuSTICEs MAKE 80 (1998). On the
certiorari process generally, see H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).
581.
582.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994) (amended 1996).

583.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(IXA)

before its amendment in 1996).
584. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
585. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 553 (summarizing the Gibbons
Court's interpretation of the "nature of Congress' commerce power").
586.

Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.

587.
588.

Id. at 558.
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).

COME BACK TO THE NICKEL AND FIVE

1283

Of particular interest to the Lopez Court was the gun possession
statute's apparent lack of connection "with 'commerce' or any sort of
economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."" 9 The
Court also faulted the absence of a "jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the" proscribed activity "in question
affects interstate commerce." 5" Although the Chief Justice putatively
affirmed older cases relieving Congress of the obligation "to make formal
findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on interstate
commerce, '5 91 he complained that their absence in this controversy left "no...
substantial effect" on commerce "visible to the naked eye.""9 Chief Justice
Rehnquist accordingly rejected a lenient standard of review that would
"authorize a general federal police power" with the potential to embrace
subjects at the heart of traditional state regulation, "such as family law and
direct regulation of education." 93 Declining what he considered an invitation
"to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States," the Chief Justice declared
himself "unwilling" to erase the "distinction between what is truly national
and truly local."594
In at least a formal sense, Lopez overruled none of the Court's
Commerce Clause precedent. Justice Thomas's concurrence hinted that the
Court "must [eventually] modify [its] Commerce Clause jurisprudence," 95
perhaps by restoring a narrow definition of "commerce" distinct from
agriculture, manufacturing, and other activities leading to "the production of
goods. "" But Justice Thomas's comments in a concurring opinion about the
proper conception of commerce were just that: comments in a concurring
opinion."9 The Lopez majority posed its deepest threat to Commerce Clause
precedent when it designated Wickard v. Filbum as "perhaps the most far
9
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity.0"
589. Id. at 561.
590. Id.
591. Id. at 562 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294,304 (1964)).
592. Id. at 563.
593. Id. at 564-65.
594. Id. at 567-68.
595. Id. at 602 (Thomas, J., concurring).
596. Id. at 587 (Thomas, J., concurring).
597. Cf United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980) ("The
comments in the dissenting opinion about . . . the correct statement of the equal protection
rational-basis standard... are just that: comments in a dissenting opinion.").
598. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995). For a discussion of the impact of
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Nevertheless, Lopez has stripped the New Deal and Civil Rights Act of much
of their authority. Lopez was a classic instance of "cite and switch," the
Court's emerging strategy of paying nominal homage to precedent before
proceeding to ignore or eviscerate it.599 Whatever its doctrinal consequences,
Lopez assuredly signaled the Rehnquist Court's intent to recalibrate the
frontiers of a "commerce power [that] ha[d] swelled to a proportion that
would leave the framers 'rubbing their eyes' with amazement."'
Six weeks after Lopez, the Court dropped another bombshell.
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena64" overruled Metro Broadcasting.'
Because Adarand involved a federal affirmative action plan, Justice
O'Connor's discussion of the appropriate standard of review began with a
reconsideration of the Korematsu conundrum. Adarand hinged on the
"varying degrees of significance [accorded] to the difference in the language
of' the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 3 Justice O'Connor described
Boiling as the "first time" that the Court had "explicitly questioned the
existence of any difference between the obligations of the Federal
She accepted
Government and the States to avoid racial classifications."'
Boiling's reverse incorporation principle as controlling, declining to accord
controlling weight to "a few contrary suggestions in cases" such as Mow Sun
Wong, "in which [the Court] found special deference to the political branches
of the Federal Government to be appropriate. '"" Having begun with this
premise, Justice O'Connor effectively committed the Court to unifying the
bifurcated standards of review established by Croson and by Metro
Broadcasting. But which level of scrutiny, strict or intermediate, would
prevail?
Strict scrutiny won out. Justice O'Connor adopted "three general
propositions" for understanding the constitutional status of "governmental
Wickard v. Filburn,317 U.S. 111 (1942), on Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see supra notes
312-17 and accompanying text.
599. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for NeutralPrinciples in Constitutional
Law: Bush v. Gore and the Emerging Jurisprudenceof Oprah!, 90 GEo. L.J. 2087, 2136
(2002).
600. Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searchingfora Way to Enforce Federalism,
31 RuTGERS L.J. 631, 658 (2000) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 807 (1999) (Souter,
J., dissenting)).
515 U.S. 200 (1995).
601.
602. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
603. Id. at 213.
604. Id. at 215.
605. Id. at217-18.
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racial classifications."' "First, skepticism," in the sense of strict scrutiny.?
"Second, consistency," in the sense that the standard of review ought not vary
according to the race of those benefited or of those burdened by a challenged
classification.'
The notion of "congruence," in the sense suggested by
Bolling's equivalence between federal and state governments' obligation to
accord equal treatment, completed the picture. "Taken together, these three
propositions lead to the conclusion that any person, of whatever race, has the
right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify
any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the
strictest judicial scrutiny." 6 MetroBroadcastingcould not surviveAdarand's
holding "that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or
local governmental
actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
610
scrutiny.t
In the final weeks of its 1994 Term, the Rehnquist Court thus gutted
Heart of Atlanta and McClung in Lopez and used Boiling as the principal
weapon in Adarand for projecting strict scrutiny across all affirmative action
cases. Among the legs in the Warren Court's civil rights triad, an appointment
with Morgan awaited. Morganproved too weak to stave off Adarand's use of
Boiling to bludgeon the use of intermediate scrutiny to review "benign" racial
classifications in federal law, a doctrine that Metro Broadcastinghad derived
from section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Morgan's suggestion of a
substantive section 5 power was ripe for repudiation.
The inevitable collision took place two Terms later in City of Boerne
v. Flores.61 ' Boerne's origins lay in the 1990 case of Employment Division v.
Smith, 2 which subjected religious practices to neutral, generally applicable
laws even in the absence of a compelling governmental interest. 61 Seeking to
restore the Free Exercise Clause balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner 4 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder,615 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993 (RFRA)61 6 RFRA prohibited any government - federal, state, or
606. Id. at 223.
607. Id.
608. Id. at 224.
609. Id.
610. Id. at227.
611.
521 U.S. 507 (1997).
612. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
613. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
614. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
615. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
616. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994)).
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local - from "substantially burden[ing]" the exercise of religion absent
demonstration of a "compelling governmental interest" and proof that the
burden is "the least restrictive means of furthering that... interest. '617 RFRA
effectively expanded civil liberties beyond the limits marked by the Supreme
Court in Smith. As applied against a state or local government, that expansion
operated against the backdrop of the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause
into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61 Because RFRA
had been deployed against the Texas city of Boerne and its historic
preservation ordinance, Boerne squarely presented the issue of Congress's
authority to pass that statute under its power to "enforce" the Fourteenth
Amendment "by appropriate legislation." 61 9 Morgan's interpretation of
section 5 lay before the Court.6 2°
Boerne represented the first time that the Supreme Court
unequivocally rejected a substantive interpretation of section 5. Equating the
constitutional word "enforce" with the judicial shorthand of "remedial," the
Court reasoned that the "design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States." 621' The
"power 'to enforce,"' wrote Justice Kennedy, is "not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation."622 "Legislation which alters the
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the
Clause."62 3 To mark the unclear "line between measures that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change
in the governing law," the Court adopted the following test: "There must be
a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end." 2 4 Legislation that fails this test
is "substantive in operation and effect" and therefore lies beyond Congress's
section 5 power.625 Even Justice O'Connor, despite dissenting from the
Court's decision to invalidate RFRA, acquiesced in the "congruence and
617.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994).

618. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303. (1940) (declaring that the
"fundamental concept of liberty embodied in" the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment").
619. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 5; City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,516-17 (1997).
620. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527-29 (construing Kalzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966)).
621.
Id. at519.
622. Id.
623. Id. ("Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the fight is.").
624. Id. at 519-20.
625. Id. at 520.
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proportionality" formulation of the standard of review for congressional
invocations of section 5.626
Boerne specifically addressed the prospect that certain "language" in
Katzenbach v. Morgan "could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in
Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. "'627 Justice Kennedy rejected this suggestion outright.
He recharacterized section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act and Morgan as
having rested on Congress's factual basis for remedying discrimination against
Puerto Ricans in procuring governmental services and establishing voting
qualifications. 6" A contrary reading of Morgan, one permitting Congress to
"define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning,"
would allegedly reduce the Constitution from its status as "'superior
paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means,"' and place it "on a level
with ordinary legislative acts."629 In a single stroke, Boerne not only eased
Morgan's implicit threat to Marbury v. Madison but also effectively
decommissioned the one-way ratchet without resort to that unruly word,
"overrule."
After Boerne, Morgan will never again enjoy iconic status. Morgan
once stood for the proposition that Congress holds equal footing vis-a-vis the
federal courts in interpreting the Constitution. Because institutional
differences between branches of government yield systematic differences
between legislative and judicial readings of the Constitution,6 3 Morgan
ensured that Congress and the courts would provide checks and balances
against each other in an interpretive pas de deux. No longer: Boerne holds, in
effect, that the Constitution's allocation of interpretive authority permits no
differences of this sort, and the Supreme Court will prevail over Congress in
any case of conflict.631 Whether an act of Congress "come[s] under [one of]

626. Id. at 545-46 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
627. Id. at 527-28.
628. Id. at 528.
629. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
630. See, e.g., David Cole, The Value ofSeeing Things Differently: Boeme v. Flores and
CongressionalEnforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 59 (arguing that
institutional differences between Congress and the federal courts justify distinct interpretations
of the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A
Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 185 (1997) (stating that
differences in constitutional interpretation by legislative and judicial bodies "are not solely a
product of intellectual disagreement" but also a result of institutional differences).
631. Cf Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, United States v. Morrison and the Emperor'sNew
Clothes, 27 J.C. & U.L. 735, 736-37 (2001) ("[Tlhe Rehnquist Court firmly believes that
categorical federalism lines not only can be drawn, but that they should be drawn by the

Court.").
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the constitutional power[s] of Congress... is ultimately a judicial rather than
a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by th[e] Court. ' 632 Soon
after William Rehnquist's accession as Chief Justice, the official voice of
conservatism distinguished sharply "between the Constitution and
6' between "judicial pronouncements" and extrajudicial
constitutional law, '"6
efforts to interpret the Constitution. 634 A decade later, Boerne took its place
in the ongoing conservative transformation of the Supreme Court with a
striking endorsement of judicial supremacy.
More practically speaking, Boerne destroys what had been symmetry
among the Enabling Clauses of the Reconstruction Amendments. Morgan
carefully unified judicial review under those Enabling Clauses according to the
deferential standard first outlined in McCulloch v. Maryland. Although
Boerne heralds a more rigorous approach to the Enabling Clauses of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, it leaves untouched the Court's
approach to section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. That the Thirteenth
Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, reaches purely
private conduct, wholly devoid of state-law complicity, may justify this
difference. Whether a phantom or an abiding spirit, the state action
requirement of the Civil Rights Cases has never haunted the Thirteenth
Amendment. Nevertheless, by driving a wedge between section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Boerne
does upset the historical understanding of those closely related constitutional
provisions.635
Of the components of the Warren Court's civil rights triad, Morgan
fared the worst under fire. All three of the cases in this "Grand
Relnquisition" - Lopez, Adarand, and Boerne - vividly demonstrate the
unsustainable nature ofMorgan'sone-way ratchet. Like any other affirmative
action case, Adarand gives constitutional voice to members of groups
disfavored by putatively benign forays into official race-consciousness. Lopez

632. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 273 (1965) (Black, J.,
concurring); accord United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995).
633. Edwin Meese IlI, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979,981 (1987).
634. Id. at 989.
635. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARv. L. REV. 747, 822-25 (1999)
(discussing how the Court's differing interpretations of similar language in section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment create an "obvious
inconsistency" that Boerne does not resolve); William G. Buss, An Essay on Federalism,
Separationof Powers, and the Demise of the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 83 IOWA L.
REV. 391,417-18 (1998) (contrasting the historic deference accorded to Congress under section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment with Boerne's
apparent realignment of legislative power under the Fourteenth Amendment).
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shows how congressional regulation of guns under the Commerce Clause can
be construed as an intrusion into the state regulatory sphere and into such
personal rights as may be bundled into the Second Amendment. Finally,
Boerne ran ashore on the intrinsic First Amendment tension between free
exercise and establishment; every decision crediting a claim under either of the
religion clauses raises an incipient violation of the other clause.636 These
countervailing claims are not necessarily meritorious; they need only to be
plausible to expose footnote ten's incredible fragility. Hellerv. Doe was right:
One person's antisubordination claim is another's equal protection violation.637
Morgan's vulnerability to this assault helped torch the Warren Court
consensus on civil rights.
What I have called the Grand Rehnquisition represents only the
leading edge of what appears to be a doctrinal offensive by the Rehnquist
Court. Soon after the conclusion of this three-Term tour de force, United
6 3 combined Lopez
States v. Morrison
and Boerne. That the Court would
condemn the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)639 for failing to satisfy
either Lopez's Commerce Clause test or Boerne's section 5 test was all but a
foregone conclusion. At issue was petitioner Christy Brzonkala's pursuit of
a federal remedy for her rape by two fellow students at the Virginia
Polytechnic Institute.'
Morrison narrowed VAWA's Commerce Clause
query strictly to one of congressional "regulation of activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce.""4
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the same five-Justice majority that
decided Lopez, distilled four "significant considerations" from that case." 2
First, the putatively "economic" nature of the regulated "endeavor" is crucial
to judicial approval of "federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the
activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce."' ,
Second, a
636. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 518 n.ll (1979) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (observing that a judicial exemption for church-operated schools from the National
Labor Relations Act, inspired by a desire to avoid the potential infringement of free exercise,
"generates a possible Establishment Clause question of its own") (emphasis omitted).
637.
The road to social dysfunction, after all, often begins with the "naive inability to
understand or appreciate that other individuals ... have rights" and ends in the intractable
propensity to be "intolerant of the demands and pleas of the community, scornful of communal
enterprise and spirit, [and] suspicious of the motives of community minded people." ROBERT
LINDNER, REBEL WnIHour ACAUSE 7 (1944).
638.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
639.
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
640.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,604-05 (2000).
641.
Id.at 609.
642.
Id. at 609-12.
643.
Id. at 611.
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"jurisdictional element" in the text of a statute "may establish that the
enactment is in pursuance of Congress' regulation of interstate commerce."" 4
Third, though congressional findings regarding the activity's impact on
interstate commerce are not indispensable, Morrison repeated the Court's
previously expressed preference for findings." 5 Finally, the Chief Justice
emphasized the "attenuated" nature of "the link between
gun possession" and
6
the "effect on interstate commerce" alleged in Lopez."
VAWA failed this analysis. "Gender-motivated crimes of violence,"
Chief Justice Rehnquist proclaimed, "are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity."" 7 Nor did VAWA contain a "jurisdictional element
establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress' power
to regulate interstate commerce.""
But VAWA differed from the gun
possession statute in Lopez insofar as Congress made "numerous findings
regarding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and
their families." 649 These findings nevertheless proved unavailing. Chief
Justice Rehnquist refused to treat "the existence of congressional findings...,
by itself," as "sufficient ...to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation.1 65 ° Morrison characterized these findings' connection of
sex-based violence with interstate commerce as so "substantially weakened"
that their use as a foundation for Commerce Clause legislation would
"completely obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and
local authority."65 The Court feared that the inexorable extension of"the butfor causal chain from the initial occurrence of violent crime" would permit
"Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact
of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or
consumption."6 2 This reasoning concluded in a stunning limitation on the
"aggregation" principle that had been a hallmark of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence since Darby and Wickard v. Filburn: "We .. .reject the
argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
'6 3
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. " 1
644.
645.
646.
647.
648.
649.
650.
651.
652.
653.

Id. at 612.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id. at 614.
Id.
Id.at 615.
Id.
Id. at 617.
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Morrison also dismissed the "alternative argument that [VAWA's]
civil remedy should be upheld as an exercise of Congress' remedial power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."654 Despite acknowledging the
"voluminous congressional record" supporting Brzonkala and the United

States' "assertion that there is pervasive bias in various state justice systems
against victims of gender-motivated violence,"65 Chief Justice Rehnquist
sought refuge in "the time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment,
by its very terms, prohibits only state action.""6 6 He rejected the suggestion
that the Civil Rights Cases and other sources for this proposition had been
658
overruled in United States v. Guest657 and District of Columbia v. Carter.

Reaffirming Boerne's requirement that "prophylactic legislation under § 5...
have a 'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevened or
remedied and the means adopted to that end,'659 Chief Justice Rehnquist

characterized VAWA as aimed solely "at individuals who have committed
criminal acts motivated by gender bias," to the exclusion of "any Virginia

public official involved in investigating or prosecuting Brzonkala's assault."' °
He thereupon distinguished VAWA from "any of the § 5 remedies that [the
Court] ha[d] previously upheld.""' 1
For his part, Justice Thomas wrote a separate concurrence to repeat his

view, first articulated in Lopez, "that the very notion of a 'substantial effects'
test under the Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding
of Congress' powers and with th[e] Court's early Commerce Clause cases. "I
He urged the Court to "replace[] its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence

654. Id. at 619.
655. Id. at619-20.
656. Id. at621.
657. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
658. 409 U.S. 418 (1973); see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 622-24 (2000)
(rejecting the suggestion that Guest or Carter casts doubt on the Civil Rights Cases). Guest
held that the Fourteenth Amendment could reach conduct that was neither exclusively nor
directly state action. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 755 (1965). A claim that police had
arrested blacks on false reports made by private parties provided sufficient state action. Id. at
756. Carter stated in dicta that the Fourteenth Amendment did not reach "purely private
conduct." District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418,424-25 (1973) (emphasis added).
659. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26 (quoting Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997)).
660. Id. at 626.
661. Id. (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879)).
662. Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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with a standard more consistent with the original understanding."' 3 Justice
Souter's principal dissent focused strictly on VAWA's validity under the
Commerce Clause and never "reach[ed] the question whether it might also be
sustained as an exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
''
Amendment.
Morrisonmerely punctuates - albeit loudly - the Court's restructuring
of Commerce Clause and section 5 jurisprudence in Lopez and Boerne. The
contemporary Court has severely devalued "the traditional interest in the
uniform enforcement of civil rights, '66' an interest informed by awareness of
the states' historical shortcomings in civil rights enforcement and, indeed, of
state actors' more-than-occasional forays into affirmative discrimination."
At an extreme, Lopez and Morrison have "single[d] out civil rights laws as
667
being uniquely beyond the scope of Congress's commerce power.
Lest this emphasis on Morrison's extension of principles previously
outlined in Lopez'and Boerne suggest that the Grand Rehnquisition is
approaching its logical limits, let us recall that the Rehnquist Court had laid
down an even more extensive agenda for doctrinal reconstruction during the
1995 Term. Between Adarand and Boerne, the Supreme Court handed down
Seminole Tribe v. Florida," which overruled yet another decision by Justice
Brennan 669 in holding that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity merely by exercising its Article I powers, including the commerce
power.670 The Court later held that legislation arising under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment may indeed abrogate state sovereign immunity, but
Congress in so doing must satisfy the "congruence and proportionality" test of

663. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
664. Id. at 628 n.I (Souter, J., dissenting).
665. Julie Goldschied, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the
Violence Against Women Act: A CivilRights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism,86
CORNELL L. REv. 109, 131-32 (2000).
666. For traditional expressions of federal distrust of the states in the realm of civil rights
enforcement, see, for example, Jett v. DallasIndep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 722 (1989); Patsy
v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 505-06 (1982); Monroe v. Pape,365 U.S. 167, 174 (1961).
667. Louis J. Virelli I& David S. Leibowitz, "FederalismWhether They Want It or Not":
The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future ofFederalCivil Rights LegislationAfter
United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926, 976 (2001).
668. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
669. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (opinion of Brennan, J.)
(permitting Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity by exercising its Commerce Clause
powers), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
670. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
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Boerne.67 As a result, Boerne has now displaced Morgan not only as the
source of the standard of review for legislation arising under section 5, but also
as controlling precedent in the Eleventh and Fifteenth Amendment contexts.
Together, "Lopez, Seminole Tribe, and Boerne put a triple whammy on
congressional authority. 61 2 To the extent that the Supreme Court has endorsed
certain civil rights statutes as exercises of Congress's commerce power, but
not necessarily as exercises of Congress's section 5 power, 6" a broad swath of
federal antidiscrimination legislation will remain vulnerable to the Court's
Eleventh Amendmentjurisprudence after Seminole and Boerne.674 For its part,

the sovereign immunity concept now extends to suits against states in their

own courts 6" and to federal administrative proceedings against states.676 The
Nickel and Five has imploded. What the Rehnquist Court is building in its
place remains, for the moment, invisible to the naked eye.677
671.
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,636-37 (1999).
672. Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the CongressionalProcess, and
the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1722 (2002)
(suggesting, however, "that due process of lawmaking [offers] a way out of the bind").
673. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 & n.18 (1983) (declaring that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp.
V 1999), is a valid exercise of the commerce power); cf Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,412
(1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that "it is questionable whether Congress was
invoking its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment (rather than merely the Commerce
Clause)" in subjecting the states to the ADEA, as described in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 467-68 (1991)). Compare Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
250, 261 (1964) (upholding the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 on a Commerce Clause theory without reaching the section 5 question) with Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-53 & n.9, 456 n.l 1 (1976) (describing the application of Title VII
to state and local governments as having proceeded under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
674. See Note, The IrrationalApplication of Rational Basis: Kimel, Garrett and
Congressional Power to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2146, 2147
.(2001) ("[T]he valid federal authorization.., of private suits against states for money damages
for violations of federal antidiscriminatory laws now rests solely on section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
675. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,713 (1999).
676. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, ___, 122 S.Ct. 1864,
1865 (2002).
677. Cf United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) ("But to the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in
question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here."). Compare John 0. McGinnis, Reviving

1294

59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1203 (2002)

The extension of Boerne's interpretation of section 5 into Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence turns the Fourteenth Amendment on its head. The
extent to which the Eleventh Amendment was intended to preserve the

6
sovereign immunity of the states is highly contestable and hotly contested."
Whatever intent may have underlain the Eleventh Amendment, the history of
the Fourteenth Amendment knows no such ambiguity. That Amendment was
intended, unequivocally, to enhance federal judicial and legislative power at
the expense of the states in the wake of the Civil War. Applying Boerne's
stringent congruence and proportionality test to congressional abrogations of
state sovereign immunity thus betrays the intended function of the
Reconstruction Amendments as "limitations of the powers of the States and
enlargements of the power of Congress."679

V The Fallof the House of Warren
No golden age enduresforever.... [Flor reasons which escape
our grasp, the best and most creative minds of a generation are
drawn to aparticularfield.... After ageneration or two ofintense
activity thejob is done; the best and most creative minds ofthe next
generation follow their genius into new fields. But it will be a long
time before anyone realizes that the last great playhas already been
written, the last great symphony composed.
Grant Gilmore, The Ages ofAmerican Law6sO
Tocqueville 'sAmerica: The Rehnquist Court'sJurisprudenceof SocialDiscovery, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 485, 491 (2002) (defending the Rehnquist Court's agenda as one that advances local
control and associational freedom) with Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda,
111 YALE L.J. 1141, 1142 (2002) (accusing the incumbent Court of being motivated by hostility
toward newer, more aggressive extensions of antidiscrimination law).

678.

See generally Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).

679. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,345 (1879); accord City of Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491 (1989) (plurality opinion); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454
(1976); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 252 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); see also City of
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (describing the Reconstruction Amendments
as "specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state
sovereignty"); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972) (acknowledging the Fourteenth
Amendment as the "centerpiece" of "the new structure of law that emerged in the post-Civil War
era" and that thereby "clearly established" "the role of the Federal Government as a guarantor
of basic federal rights against state power"); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36,
68 (1873) (noting that the Reconstruction Amendments granted "additional powers to the
Federal government" and laid "additional restraints upon those of the States").
680.
GRANT GOImORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 40 (1977); cf.JoNI MrrcHELL, Big
Yellow Taxi, on LADIEs OF THE CANYON (Warner Bros. Records Inc. 1970) ("Don't it always
seem to go / That you don't know what you've got / Till it's gone").
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The Warren Court's consensus on civil rights rested on three
premises. First, Fifth Amendment due process binds the federal government
no less than Fourteenth Amendment equal protection binds the states.
Second, Congress stands as the peer of the federal judiciary in enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment and consequently may grant civil rights regardless of
whether they are formally recognized by courts. Third, discrimination on the
basis of race was America's original sin,"' whose expiation began in earnest
during the Civil War and endures through continuing elaboration of the
Reconstruction Amendments.
By extending the New Deal Court's
understanding of the Commerce Clause, the Warren Court upheld the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and thereby overcame some of the disappointments of
Reconstruction. These three premises combined the basic ingredients of
American constitutionalism - federalism, separation of powers, and civil
liberty - in an almost Aristotelian set of unities.
In its time the Warren Court undertook "a program of constitutional
reform almost revolutionary in its aspiration and ... in its achievements." 2
It "spurred ... great [social] changes... and inspired and protected those who
sought to implement them." 68 3 Yet the two judicial generations that succeeded
Earl Warren have systematically dismantled his Court's civil rights legacy.
A jurisprudential house divided between Boiling and Morgan could never
stand, and the Burger Court's inept articulation of equal protection doctrine
in affirmative action controversies exposed a doctrinally unstable Nickel and
Five to radical restructuring in the Rehnquist Court. A cycle of cases
spanning October Terms 1994 and 1996 have resolved the internal tension
between Boiling and Morgansharply in favor of Bolling. That resolution has
dramatically heightened the Supreme Court's power vis-&-vis that of
Congress. Whatever truth lies in the frequent characterization of the Warren
Court as an institution dedicated to judicial activism, this much cannot be
denied: The Rehnquist Court has greatly expanded the federal judiciary's
power relative to that of Congress. Indeed, the Rehnquist Court deserves the

681.
Cf Chen, supra note 459, at 1843 ("'For the Framers so loved the land ... that they
gave us their only written Constitution, that whosoever believeth in it should not perish, but
have everlasting power.' The Constitution commanded equal protection, not in order to
condemn the land, but that the union through equal protection might be saved." (footnotes
omitted)). See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 80 (1986) (arguing "that the Court has
approved affirmative action only as precise penance for the specific sins of racism a
government, union, or employer has committed in the past").
682. Owen Fiss,A Life Twice Lived, 100 YAU L.J. 1117,1118(1991).
683. Id.
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label of "judicial activism" at least as much as the Warren Court did."e4 The
judicial supremacy of the Warren era has come home to roost: The premise
that "the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution" has become "a permanent and indispensable feature of our
constitutional system."' ' In particular, the Rehnquist Court's campaign to
expand the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments relies not on the text of the
Constitution, but rather on the "premises and postulates" that the creative
judicial mind can extract from these provisions.""
In treating the Supreme Court as a political instrument, the Rehnquist
Court does not so much rebuke as emulate the Warren Court. In one sense,
the Rehnquist Court has been quite true to the jurisprudential underpinnings
of the Warren era. Formal equality - nothing more and nothing less than "the
demand that government remain neutral" - "provides the framework
underlying the jurisprudence of both the Warren Court and the Rehnquist
Court."" 7 As usual, though, the devil lurks in the details. Although the
Rehnquist Court may have inherited much of the Warren Court's political
savvy and perhaps even some of its core legal instincts, the latent doctrinal
weaknesses of the Warren Court's civil rights framework have minimized
those decisions' precedential effect in an era of shifting judicial values. Thus,
the doctrinal shortcomings of Boiling and Morganhave enabled the Rehnquist
Court to undermine crucial elements of the Warren legacy. Adarandcrushed
Justice Brennan's farewell to the Supreme Court, Metro Broadcasting,and
684. See, e.g., Scott Fruewald, lfMen Were Angels: The New JudicialActivismin Theory
andPractice,83 MARQ. L. REv. 435,438-40 (1999) (summarizing four points that show a "new
judicial activism"); Larry D. Kramer, Puttingthe PoliticsBack into the PoliticalSafeguards of
Federalism,100 COLuM. L. REv. 215,290 (2000) (accusing the Rehnquist Court of abandoning
"institutional arrangements that have worked for two centuries" in favor of "a radical experiment
in judicial activism"); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term - Foreword: We the
Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14 (2001) (accusing the Rehnquist Court of practicing "judicial
sovereignty"); cf OILMORE, supra note 680, at 93 ("The rebirth of judicial activism has gone
hand in hand with a rebirth of the federalizing or nationalizing principle.").
685. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); accord United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
•598, 616 n.7 (2000); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922-23 (1995).
686. Laurence H. Tribe, Sacnz SansProphecy: Does the Privilegesor Immunities Revival
Portend the Future - Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 155

(1999); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (admitting that "the sovereign
immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment"); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
665 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the current Court's "dramatic expansion of the
judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity" as "unpredictable" and "defined only by the
present majority's perception of constitutional penumbras rather than constitutional text"). See
generally Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution,51 DUKE L.J. 289 (2001).

687.

Sherry, supra note 283, at 478.
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with it Justice Brennan's group-based vision of equal protection. Boerne
nominally upheld Morgan but effectively overruled it. The contemporary

Court's federalism cases project Boerne's theory of section 5 across a wide
jurisprudential swath, ranging from the Commerce Clause to the Eleventh
Amendment. Indeed, Lopez, Boerne, and Morrison now form a doctrinally
sealed front in the Relmquist Court's campaign to ensure that the sovereign
prerogatives of the states routinely "command the support of a majority of

[the] Court."' 8
Ever since Earl Warren took command of Brown v. Board of
Education, the Supreme Court has exerted "pervasive influence on a wide
range of issues that can only in a partial and peripheral way be considered
legal rather than political."' sss In an inversion of Alexis de Tocqueville's
description of the young Republic, there is hardly a judicial question in the
United States which does not sooner or later turn into a political one .0s As
if to spite the frustration of his presidential ambitions, the transformation of

the Supreme Court into a sophisticated and influential political institution
represents Earl Warren's enduring legacy. As another Chief Justice who

aspired to the White House once observed, "the Constitution is what judges
say it is." 91 Warren and his cohorts neither created nor denied this state of
affairs. They simply made their voices - and the constitutional messages they
carried - heard in the halls of elected power.

688.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580 (1985) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); see also William Blodgett, Just You Wait, HarryBlackmun, 3 CONST. COMMENT.
3 (1986) (setting to music then-Justice Rehnquist's retort to Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion in Garcia);cf, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (admonishing
the federal government that it "may neither issue directives requiring the States to address
particular problems, nor command the States' offiers ... to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program"); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (preventing Congress
from using the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate state sovereign immunity); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the "Federal Government may not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program"); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 473 (1991) (upholding Missouri's mandatory retirement age for state judges as not
prohibited by the ADEA or the Equal Protection Clause).
689. Robert F. Nagel,Advice, Consen4 andInfluence, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 858, 860 (1990);
cf.CRAY, supra note 8, at 496 (reporting the observation of Earl Warren, Jr., that the Chief
Justice was "contentfl" with his Court's work in "all major areas of social concern").
690. Cf ALEXIS DE TOCQuEVmIE ,DEMOCRACYNAmERICA 270 (J.P. Meyer ed. &George
Lawrence trans., 1969) ("There is hardly a political question in the United States which does
not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.").
691. CHARTES EVANS HUGHES,ADDRESSES AND PAPERS 139 (1908); see James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 550 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that
"when the Court changes its mind, the law changes with it"); see also Harper v. Va. Dep't of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,115 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting this passage from Beam).
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Critics have frequently belittled the Warren Court's record as one of

"deeds without doctrines." 6" But Chief Justice Warren himself would have
turned this epithet into a battle cry. Justice Potter Stewart noted that

"Warren's great strength was his simple belief in the things [others] ... laugh

at - motherhood, marriage, family, flag, and the like."693 Warren remained
true to the "basic beliefs" drawn from "his hard-working, injustice-hating,
proletarian childhood."694 He "never forgot that people, individuals, stood
behind each case," behind each petition for certiorari.695 What he lacked in
"genuine intellectual distinction," he offset with "decency, stability,
sincerity."6' Those characteristics manifested themselves in the Chief
Justice's opinions. His typically "short, nontechnical" opinions, written in
"direct and straightforward" language devoid of "legalisms," fell "well within
the grasp of the average reader."'
This rhetorical simplicity gave the
"important Warren opinions ... a simple power of their own: if they do not

resound with the cathedral tones of Marshall, they speak with the moral
decency of a modem Micah."6' What does the law demand, but to do justice,
love mercy, and walk humbly with the law?6' After all, the predominant
rhetoric of the civil rights era combined the vengeful thunder of the Hebrew
Bible with the merciful rhythms of the New Testament. "Fiatjustita,ruat
coelum, ''7r° said the preacher. Whether the road to Washington runs through
Sacramento or Selma,
let justice be done. "Let justice be done, though the
70 1
heavens may fall.'

692. ROBERT 0. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREM COURT 221 (1972); Robert 0.
McCloskey, Deeds Without Doctrines,56 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 71 (1962).
693. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT - A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 139 (1983).
694. WARREN, supra note 4, at 376 (editors' epilogue).
695. CRAY, supra note 8, at 440.
696. JOHN GUNTHER, INSIDE U.SA. 20-21 (1947); see also id. at 18 (noting that Warren
would "never set the world on fire or even make it smoke").
697. Bernard Schwartz, ChiefJusticeEarl Warren: Super Chief in Action, 33 TULSA L.J.
477, 485 (1997).

698. Id. at 502.
699. Micah 6:8, as translated in the King James Version, states: "what doth the LORD
require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" The
Revised Standard Version renders the verse in this fashion: "what does the LORD require of you
but to do justice, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your God?"
700. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
701. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Latin maxim quoted by Justice Scalia has several
historical precedents. Fiatjustiiaet pereat mundus - "Let justice be done, though the world
perish" - was apparently the motto of Ferdinand I, King of Bohemia and Hungary and (from
1558-64) Holy Roman Emperor. Fiatjustitia,ruat coelum has been attributed to a poet of the
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But law does not live by rhetoric alone." ° American legal culture
prefers a clear separation of judicial craftsmanship from politics,7 °3 the better
to sustain "the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian ofthe
rule of law."'" Our tradition demands that judicial opinions, once issued, "will
provide professional readers with explanations for the results reached."7'0 In
response to the jurisprudential challenge posed by Brown v. Board of
Education, Herbert Wechsler advocated a "genuinely principled" judicial
process grounded in "analysis and reasons quite transcending the immediate
result that is achieved."'7"e More than four decades later, Wechsler's "concept
707
of neutral principles remains an article of faith" among American jurists.
late Roman republic, Lucius Calpumius Piso Caesoninus. BARTLETT's FAMMLAR QUOTAiONS:
ACOuI/CTIONOFPAsSAoES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES INANCIENT
AND MODERN LrrATuRE 119 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). The maxim's popularity in

English, especially in judicial opinions, is traceable to Lord Mansfield: "The constitution does
not allow reasons of State to influence our judgments: God forbid it should! We must not
regard political consequences; how formidable soever they might be: if rebellion was the
certain consequence, we are bound to say 'fiatjustiia,ruat coelum.'" Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng.
Rep. 327,347 (K.B. 1770); accord,e.g., Raoul Berger,JudicialManipulationof the Commerce
Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695, 716 & n.174 (1996) (attributing the maxim to Lord Mansfield in
Wilkes); Leon R. Yankwich, The Art of Being a Judge, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 374, 379 (1957)
(same). See generallyBURTONSTEVENSON, THE HOME BOOKOFQUOTAIONS: CLASSICALAND
MODERN 1030-31 (1967) (tracing the maxim as used in numerous English literary and legal
sources). Thanks to architect Lewis Broome, it appears today on the rotunda of the New Jersey
State House in Trenton.
See The History of the New Jersey State House, at
http://www.state.nj.usfhangout nj/govemmentstatehouse.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
702. See Jim Chen, Law as a Species of LanguageAcquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263,
1297 (1995) ("Law does not live by words alone, but on every value given voice through
participatory politics."); cf. Deuteronomy 8:3 (Revised Standard) ("man does not live by bread
only"); Matthew 4:4 (Revised Standard) ("Man shall not live by bread alone"); Luke 4:4
(Revised Standard) ("Man shall not live by bread alone").
703. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our
membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is little different from the two
political branches of Government. No misconception could do more lasting injury to this
Court. . . ."); Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, CreatingLegal Doctrine,69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1989, 2026 (1996) (arguing that "judges are likely to take ... institutionally induced beliefs
about the way they should carry out their official functions ... quite seriously"); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices ofRules andStandards,
106 HARV. L. REV. 24, 120 (1992) ("Most judges hold deeply internalized role constraints and
believe that judgment is not politics.").
704. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
705. Frederick Schauer, Opinions asRules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1465-66 (1995).
706. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
707. Susan Bandes, Erie and the History ofthe One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829,
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Surprising though it may seem, "some judges feel an obligation to do the job
right."7 "5 The underlying faith in principled adjudication, however, is quite
fragile. If even the Justices no longer believe in "precedents which are binding
on the court without regard to the personality of its members," surely the
public at large will expect "that on great constitutional questions [the] court
[will]... depart from the settled conclusions of its predecessors." 7" Doctrinal
coherence "is the only thing that prevents [the] Court from being some sort of
nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs up or thumbs down to whatever
outcome . . . suits or offends its collective fancy."'7 ° Should the typical
Supreme Court decision begin to resemble "a restricted railroad ticket, good
for this day and train only," '' the Constitution, far from "embodying only
relatively fundamental rules of right," would be perceived
as "the partisan of
12
a particular set of ethical or economical opinions.0
Perhaps Robert Cover was correct in suggesting that prominent legal

decisions or even trials convey constitutional meaning simply as historical
events or cultural episodes, independent of any questions of law that are
formally resolved.7" 3 But doctrine still matters. Doctrinal precision matters
because, as the example of technological evolution shows, the yearning for
and development of automated, user-friendly tools enables a doctrine - no
832 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A- PURCEu.L, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITImON: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLIICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000)). See generally Deborah Helman, The Importance of
Appearing Principled,37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1107 (1995).
708.
Thomas 0. McGarity, On Making Judges Do the Right Thing, 44 DUKE L.J. 1104,
1105 (1995).
709. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652 (1895) (White, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Constitution under such circumstances as "a most dangerous
instrument to the rights and liberties of the people"), overruled by South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505 (1988).
710. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,455 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia has often accused his colleagues of reducing constitutional law to "the perceptions of
decency, or of penology, or of mercy, entertained . . . by a majority of the small and
unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on this Court." Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 873 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); accordAtkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, _, 122
S. Ct. 2242, 2265 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of "cavalier[ly]" treating
constitutional adjudication as "just a game" of discerning "the feelings and intuition of a
majority of the Justices") (emphasis in original).
711.
Smith v. Aliwright, 321 U.S. 649,669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
712. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (Holmes, J.); accord Wechsler, supra note
706, at 19.
713. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) ("No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists
apart from the narratives that locate [law] and give [law] meaning. For every constitution there
is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture.").
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matter how complex in origins - to be used (though not necessarily
understood) by a less skilled but vastly deeper audience.7" 4 The traditional
practice of delegating doctrinal details to law clerks partially explains the
phenomenon," 5 but it does not come close to providing a plausible

justification.
The trouble is that constitutions and constitutional doctrines, like
statutes and other forms of nonfimdamental law, 1 6 take on a social meaning
and political life of their own."' The not-so-secret political life of legal
decisions corrodes their doctrinal integrity. A decade ago in Planned
Parenthoodv. Casey,7"' the Supreme Court decided to preserve key elements
of Roe v. Wade" 9 on almost no basis except assuaging the "entire generation"
that had "come of age" since the Court began manipulating the Constitution's
"concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society, and to
714. See generally, e.g., DONALD A. NORMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY TINGS
29-33 (1990) (discussing the "paradox of technology": because new devices embody more
advances and features but must remain simple enough to be used by the general public, "clever
design seeks to minimize apparent complexity"); DONALD A. NORMAN, THINGS THAT MAKE US
SMART: DEFENDING HuMANATrRBLrES iN THE AGE OF THE MAcINE 3-8 (1993) (illustrating
how many technologies represent society's embodiment of complex concepts in easily used
devices); Leon E. Wein, MaladjustedContrivancesandClumsy Automation: A Jurisprudential
Investigation, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 375 (1996) (arguing that the law should encourage
technology to be better adapted for human use). For further examination of the connections
between cognitive science and legal reasoning, see Dan Hunter, Reason Is Too Large: Analogy
and Precedent in Law, 50 EMORY L.J. 1197 (2001).
715. See Mark Tushnct, Themes in Warren CourtBiographies, 70N.Y.U.L.REV. 748,771
(1995) (describing how Justices routinely leave doctrinal details to law clerks who eventually
become "legal academics and political theorists" and in that capacity will supply "sophisticated
elaborations" on the shortcomings of Supreme Court opinions); cf. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM
CENTER: THE SLTRaEM COURT INA M CAN PoLTICS 128 (1986) (arguing that the extensive
role of law clerks undermines the historical value of the Supreme Court's finished opinions);
Mark Tushnet, ConstitutionalInterpretation,Character,andExperience, 72 B.U. L. REV. 747,
752-53 (1992) (arguing that the Justices' use of clerks means that opinions do not necessarily
"represent the work of the Justice" and that "examination of the internal working papers of the
chambers" may be needed to understand the Justices' "use [of] constitutional theory"). See
generally Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the JudicialPower, 59 Mo. L. REV. 281
(1994) (arguing that law clerks' influence on Supreme Court opinions may be greater than the
Justices themselves realize); David McGowan, Judicial Writing and the Ethics of the Judicial
Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmcS 509 (2001) (proposing an ethical requirement that judges not
delegate writing to their clerks).
716. See generallyWilliam N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J.
1215 (2001).
717. See generallyLawrence Lessig, The RegulationofSocialMeaning, 62 U. CM. L. REV.
943 (1995).
718. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
719. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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make reproductive decisions." ' ° I do not mean to suggest that Roe is
indefensible, doctrinally or theoretically, but rather that Casey rested almost
entirely on the idea that Roe belonged to that class of legal propositions for
which it is more important that the "law be settled than that it be settled
right." '' As with abortion, so too with affirmative action.722 Sheer age has
entrenched the Bakke decision, if only "as a matter of stare decisis."" Just
as men and women across "two decades of economic and social
developments... have organized intimate relationships and made choices...
in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception

should fail," 72 4 "[a]n entire generation of Americans has been schooled under
Bakke-style affirmative action, with... explicit blessing[s]" and meticulous,

725
step-by-step guidance by the Supreme Court.
Argumentive adverse possession, however, is a singularly repulsive
way to resolve constitutional questions. "It is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.""' 6 No more dramatic demonstration of the need for periodic
constitutional renewal exists than Brown's triumph over the "separate but
equal" creed of Plessy v. Ferguson.727 Therefore, if "[o]ur Constitution is a
covenant running from" generation to generation, "[e]ach generation must

[reject] anew ... ideas and aspirations" not fit to "survive more ages than
one. 7 28 "Twenty-five years," roughly the span of a single human generation,

"is a relatively long time for the Supreme Court to complete a constitutional
hiccough." 2 9 Brown and the rest of the Warren Court's civil rights agenda
720.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
721.
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
722. See Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racialldentityas New Property,68 U. COLO.
L. REv. 1123, 1126-27 (1997) ("Bakke... is to affirmative action as Roe is to abortion.");
Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-BasedAffirmativeAction,84 CAL L. REv. 1037, 1044-46 (1996)
(questioning whether Bakke has "the 'super-precedential' value of Roe" and concluding that
"there are strong reasons to doubt that Bakke carries the same precedential value of Roe").
723. Farber, supranote 288, at 916.
724.
Casey,505 U.S. at 856.
725. Amar & Katyal, supra note 495, at 1769.
726.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,469 (1897),
reprintedin 110 HARv.L. REv. 991, 1001 (1997); accordBowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
727.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
728. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
729. Chen, supra note 480, at 98.
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have reached that "most difficult period in the life of' any entity, human or
legal: "middle age."73 These doctrines may be "no longer what [they] once
[were] but there is... life in the old dog yet. 7 31 When constitutional doctrines
become obsolete, shortcuts taken during the early stages of doctrinal
development not only make it difficult (if not impossible) for the Justices
closest to the original formulation to make improvements, but also expose a
once vibrant legal innovation to capture and even perversion by hostile forces.
At some point the Justices must articulate and defend some body of
coherent legal principles, for perpetual ad hockery (whatever its short-term
33
virtues) 732 over the long run promotes no meaningful jurisprudential values.
The prospects for such a careful and comprehensive approach, however, are
grim. When legal academia by and large disdains scholars who concentrate
on providing "sustained, disinterested, and competent criticism" of judicial
doctrine, when most critics "of the [Supreme] Court's work seem to have little
more to say... than that they do not like some of the results and yearn for
ipse dixits their way instead of the Court's way," we drift further from the
ideal state in which "reason is the life of the law and not just votes for your
side. 7' 34 Judges are not likely to pay closer attention. Even Justice Brennan,
the ingenious lieutenant who converted 'Warren['s] . . . orders" into "the
7 3 exhibited extreme impatience with what he considered
General's victories,""
"chicken-shit" 736 and "cow shit" cases.7 37 In an age when "[ildeology rather
than merit" dictates judicial appointments, the Supreme Court is unlikely to
welcome new Justices who have the 'temperament, maturity, and demeanor"
730.

GILMORE, supra note 680, at 96.
Id.
See generallyCASsR.SUNSTEIN, ONECASEATATIME: JUDICIALMINDMAISMONTHE
SUPREME COURT (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Cour4 1995 Term - Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
733. See Neil Devins, TheDemocracy-ForcingConstitution,
97 MICH. L. REv. 1971,1986
(1999) (arguing that "principal consequence" of avoidance "may be" shifting of authority from
Supreme Court to lower courts); David Shapiro, In Defense ofJudicialCandor, 100 HARV.L.
REv. 731, 737 (1987) (arguing that the requirement "that judges give reasons for their
decisions" serves a "vital function" in constraining the judiciary because grounds for decision
"can be debated, attacked, and defended").
734. Henry M. Hart, The Supreme Cour4 1958 Term - Foreword: The Time Chartof the
Justices, 73 HARv. L. REV. 84, 125 (1959).
735. Hutchinson, supra note 277, at 929.
736. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 481, at 359 (reporting Justice Brennan's
characterization of Antoine v. Washington,420 U.S. 194 (1975)).
731.
732.

737.

Id. at 419 (describing how Chief Justice Burger insulted Justice Brennan by assigning

him Sakraidav.Ag Pro,Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976), a dreary "patent dispute over a water flush
system designed to remove cow manure from the floor of dairy barns").
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not only to "craft a brilliant opinion in a major constitutional ruling" but also
to "stay awake and... pay[] equal attention" to dull cases whose doctrinal
complexity exceeds their political visibility." " It is a Court, after all, whose

docket teems with "peewee" cases. 9 Boling and Morgan were far from
"peewee" cases, but they played secondary roles in the Warren Court's grand
dramas on school desegregation and voting rights. Doctrinal imperfections
exposed these cases to capture, even perversion, by a later Court that learned
its political savvy, but not its judicial values, from Earl Warren.
"The Warren Court is dead. 7 40 Welfare rights and elaborate
procedural safeguards for criminal defendants no longer dominate
constitutional law.7 4' Like so much of the rest of the Warren Court agenda, the
Nickel and Five has collapsed. In the Rehnquist Court, the only "five" that
survives is the eternal Supreme Court maxim that "five votes can do anything
around here. 7 42 On a Court that is infallible because it is final, 43 five is the
loveliest number you will ever know.7 " To this day it remains unclear whether
Justice Brennan's five-finger salute in chambers signified a "rule of five" or
"rule by five," whether he was reminding his clerks that it takes five votes to

achieve anything at the Court or whether he was signaling that five votes
enabled a Justice to achieve anything.7 4 Regardless, a constitutional edifice
738. Neil M. Richards, The Supreme CourtJustices' "Boring"Cases,4 GREEN BAG 2D
401,407 (2001).
739. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 481, at 128 (quoting Justice John Marshall
Harlan); accordRonald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cohen v. California: "Inconsequential"Cases and
Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1996) (noting how Justice Harlan initially
characterized Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15 (1971), as an insignificant case but observing
how Harlan eventually "look[ed] beyond.., to the broader implications of [the] ruling").
740. Cass R. Sunstein, What Judge Bork Should Have Said, 23 CONN. L. REv. 205, 205
(1991); accord Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term - Foreword: The New
ConstitutionalOrderand the Chasteningof ConstitutionalAspiration,113 HARV. L. REV. 29,
30 (1999) (adding that "the New Deal/Great Society political system" that produced the Warren
Court "is no longer in place"); see also REBEL WITHOUT A CAUSE (Warner Bros. 1955) ("It's
all over, the world ended.").
741.
See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, The ClintonificationofAmerican Law: Abortion, Welfare,
and Liberal ConstitutionalTheory, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 731, 736-38 (1997) (documenting the
displacement of Warren-era constitutional concerns by an agenda grounded in preserving
contraception and abortion as constitutionally protected rights).
742. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES 6
(1996) (attributing this aphorism to Justice Brennan); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS:
THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 54 (1995) (same).
743. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).
744.
Cf Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, "Duel"Diligence: Second Thoughts About the
Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 219, 233 (1996) ("On the Court, four is
the loneliest number.").
745. Tushnet, supra note 715, at 763.
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built from randomly assembled five-vote coalitions and laid upon a foundation
of shifting doctrinal sands will not long endure in a contemporary Court less
disposed than ever to respect precedent.7" "Power, not reason," has become
the currency of this Court. 4" "Precisely to the extent that a Justice needs five
votes to do anything, articulating a coherent vision becomes more difficult."'"
Chief Justice Warren himself initiated the jurisprudential cycle that
would eventually undermine his Court's civil rights consensus. In lieu of a
more careful elaboration of the difference between Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection and Fifth Amendment due process, Boiling adopted a single
approach to equal protection for federal as well as state law. For its part,
Morganendorsed a primitive variant ofthe antisubordination principle without
resolving issues of formal inequality raised by the one-way ratchet. In its own
way, each of these cases established an approach to equality no more
sophisticated than the slogan carved into the west pediment of the Supreme
Court building, "Equal Justice Under Law." It is harder to imagine a legal
soundbite more profound - or more ostentatious." 9 Since 1948 the Court has
become fond of reciting that slogan,75 ° and the Justices often acknowledge the
architectural prominence of the phrase.' When confronted with the gravest
746. See generally Krotoszynski, supra note 599, at 2131-33 (arguing that "the entire
system of constitutional adjudication will break down" if judges disregard stare decisis in favor
of results-oriented adjudication).
747. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
748. Tushnet, supra note 715, at 767.
749. For exemplary uses of the phrase in legal scholarship, see DEAN ACHESON, MORNING
AND NOON 69 (1965) (distinguishing "the justice of Louis IX or Harun al-Rashid" from "that
described on the lintel of the Supreme Court Building, 'Equal Justice Under Law"'), quoted in,
e.g., United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 613 n.14 (2d Cir. 1966); Arthur R. Miller, The
Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 29 (1984) ("If conditions
continue to deteriorate, we might as well chisel off the legend above the Supreme Court's door,
'Equal Justice Under Law,' and replace it with a sign that says, 'Closed - No Just, Speedy, or
Inexpensive Adjudication for Anyone."'). Many other commentators, but few worth citing,
suggest that disagreement with some contestable legal proposition or another would be
tantamount to chiseling or sandblasting "Equal Justice Under Law" from the Supreme Court's
portico. Perhaps it is time to retire the metaphor.
750. Justice Jackson appears to have been the first to use the phrase in United States
Reports. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876, 877 (1948) (separate statement of Jackson,
J.) (using the phrase "equal justice under law" to compare the Court's treatment of Germans
convicted of war crimes with its treatment of Japanese convicted of war crimes); Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162, 175 (1950) (Jackson, J., concurring) (speaking of "equal justice
under law" in a discussion of civil liberties and communism).
751. See, e.g., Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 983-84 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Barclay v. State, 343 So. 2d 1266, 1271 (Fla. 1977), and noting a state court's
reference to the Court's inscription); 01ff v. E. Side Union High Sch. Dist., 404 U.S. 1042,
1044 n.2 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting the presence of the
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challenge to the authority of its desegregation decisions and to the Court's very
legitimacy, Chief Justice Warren declared that the "Fourteenth Amendment
embodied and emphasized th[e] ideal" of "equal justice under law." 15 2 The old
Chief Justice even opened his memoirs by invoking the "awesome sight" and

"Grecian serenity" of the "most beautiful building in Washington, D.C.," and

75 3
the "inspiring" words "chiseled in white marble above the main entrance.1
Equal justice under law, indeed.
Although the inscription in the west pediment of the Supreme Court

building may confirm the Hebrew prophet Amos's contention that "justice has
priority over law and that equal law under justice is the more fit order, '75 4 the
Court itself has never acknowledged the vacuity of its architectural

shibboleth.755 Would the Supreme Court building signify less if it simply read,

"Justice Under Law"? 756 After all, the slogan appears in none of the

foundational texts of American constitutionalism - not the Constitution itself,
nor in The Federalist Papers, nor in any Supreme Court opinion before
1948 .75 The building's architect, Cass Gilbert, appears to have formulated the

phrase on the Court's portico); Francis J. Larkin, The Legal Services CorporationMust be
Saved, 34 JUDGES' J. 1, 1 (1995) (quoting Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., as president of the
American Bar Association: "Equal justice under law is not merely a caption on the facade of
the Supreme Court building. It is perhaps the most inspiring ideal of our society. It is one of
the ends for which our entire legal system exists .... It is fundamental that justice should be
the same, in substance and availability, without regard to economic status.").
752. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
753.
WARREN, supra note 4, at 1.
754. MuJLERBALLLYINGDOWNTOGETHER: LAW,%ETAPHOR,ANDTHEOLOGY23 (1985);
cf CRAY, supra note 8, at 9 (comparing Chief Justice Warren to "an Old Testament prophet, a
conscience to remind us that this nation could be a more perfect union, that we individually
could be better, even more noble"); id. at 7 (choosing Psalms 72:2, as an epigraph: "He will
judge your people with righteousness /And your poor with justice").
755.
See Arthur Miller, Myth andReality in American Constitutionalism, 63 TEX.L. REV.
181, 194 n.62 (1984) (book review suggesting that the slogan is "used as if[it] mean[s]
something, which gives the appearance but not necessarily the reality of justice") (emphasis in
original).
756. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 558 (1982)
(rhetorically asking whether the insertion of "Justice" yields "anything. . . besides redundancy
and obfuscation"). No manner or frequency of transcription will infuse meaning into a vacuous
phrase. Even if "emblazoned on the very heavens in skywriting," a "stale and contrived" battle
cry will remain just that. EDNA FERBER, GIANT 2 (Buccaneer Books 1996) (1952).
757.
To be sure, Justice Black in 1956 acknowledged that the challenge of "[p]roviding
equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem." Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956). He cited one source known to, but not explicitly embraced by,
the framers of the Constitution: "'Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgment: thou shalt not
respect the person of the poor, nor honour the person of the mighty: but in righteousness shalt
thou judge thy neighbor."' Id. at 16 n.10 (quoting Leviticus 19:15 (King James)).
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slogan on his own.75

In a very real sense, therefore, the rhetorical basis of American
constitutional law finds its origins in an architect's hand. 59 Chief Justice
Warren failed to articulate a more persuasive case for equating the federal
government's obligation to respect due process with the states' duty to accord

equal protection to all persons within their jurisdiction. Neither he nor his
greatest lieutenant, Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., ever reconciled

-thisvision of Fifth Amendment due process with the invocation of section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of congressionally initiated
"interpretation" of the Constitution. The resulting contradiction rendered the
Warren Court's civil rights legacy equal parts edifice and artifice. Within half
a century, the Warren Court's successors have smashed the Nickel and Five of
a bygone jurisprudential generation:
For behold, the LoRD commands, and the great house shall be
smitten into fragments, and the little house into bits. Do horses run
upon rocks? Does one plow the sea with oxen? But you have turned
justice into poison and the fruit of righteousness into
wormwood....76o

758. See Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, The East Pediment.
Information Sheet 2 (Aug. 18, 2000), at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/aboutleast
pediment.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). Perhaps because the Supreme Court building's east
pediment is less visible, its inscription, "Justice the Guardian of Liberty," has never been quoted
in a Supreme Court decision, even though it has a firmer judicial pedigree than "Equal Justice
Under Law." See id. (describing how Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes suggested "Justice
the Guardian of Liberty" in place of Gilbert's proposal, "Equal Justice Is the Foundation of
Liberty," and how Justice Willis Van DeVanter added a simple concurrence, "Good"). Indeed,
"[t]he inscription on the East Pediment - Justice the Guardian of Liberty - is one of the few
decisions regarding the architecture of the building that was made directly by one of the
Justices." Id.; see also Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as InstitutionalPractice:
Dissent Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267,

1268 (2001) (noting how Gilbert, for his part, hoped that the new Supreme Court building
would combine "all the beauty, charm and dignity of the Lincoln Memorial" with "the practical
qualities of a first-rate office building" (quoting a Jan. 16, 1929, letter from Cass Gilbert to
William Howard Taft)). The closest reference in United States Reports comes from an 1895
decision describing "trial by jury... as the guardian of liberty and life, against the power of the
court, the vindictive persecution of the prosecutor, and the oppression of the government."
Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 149 (1895).
759. Cf Daniel A- Farber, The Dead Handof the Architect, 19 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y

245, 246 (1996) (observing how architectural design all but dictates law school culture). For
other expressions of this edifice complex, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF
CYBERSPACE (1999); Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039
(2002).
760. Amos 6:11-12 (Revised Standard).

